CHAPTER - III

PAK PLANS AND MOVES AGAINST KASHMIR

General

Pakistan evidently concluded from the brief successful military encounter with India in April 1965 over the Rann of Kutch that a similar solution of the Kashmir problem, favourable to Pakistan, was possible through a limited military adventure. The annexation of Kashmir was Pakistan's single, definite political aim and she would do everything possible to attain that objective. The methods by which she could hope to do so were either negotiations, or resort to sabotage and subversion, or the application of force. While outwardly professing the desire for peaceful negotiations, the Pakistani were secretly preparing to strike in Kashmir in August 1965. Therefore, hardly had the ink dried on the document of the Kutch agreement, when Pakistan embarked upon a new military venture on the Jammu and Kashmir front.

Pakistan lulled India into a false sense of security by outwardly lying low after the truce in Kutch. However, there was no material change in the extent of the military threat from Pakistan. Although since the cease-fire agreement on Kutch, the regular formations and units of the Pakistan Army had been withdrawn from their battle positions along the Indo-Pak border, they had not all returned to their permanent peace-time locations(1). This was obviously due to Pakistan's pre-planned decision to increase guerrilla and sabotage activities in Jammu and Kashmir and to retain a position of strength so as to be able to cope with any reaction from India.

The evident Pakistani plan was to set off a 'People's War' in the Valley and to create a situation permitting active Pakistani intervention to aid the rebels. In the past also, Pakistan had indulged in campaigns which inflamed tension, and conspired to create disturbances in the Valley. She had fully exploited the turmoil, precipitated by the Hazaratbal (hair of the Prophet) incident in Kashmir in December 1964, and later the situation arising out of the internment of Sheikh Abdullah in May 1965.

Holy Relic Incident

The alleged theft or mysterious disappearance of the Holy Relic (a strand of hair believed to be of the Prophet, called Moe-e-Muqaddas), on 27 December 1964, from the Hazaratbal shrine in Srinagar had deeply hurt the sentiments of the devout Muslims of the Valley.
Large crowds thronged the streets protesting against the theft, and a hartal was observed in Srinagar and many other parts of the Valley. The incident gave Pakistan a God-sent opportunity to indulge in anti-India propaganda. It accused the Government of India of having engineered the theft of the Holy Relic in order to humiliate and suppress the Muslims of the Kashmir Valley. Muslim feeling was sought to be roused against the "Hindu" rulers of India who had supposedly outraged Islam, and a Jehad was called. The Kashmiris were exhorted to rise and "throw away the chains of slavery for ever". They were assured of full support of Pakistan and the entire Muslim World. The entire Valley was in a state of turmoil, and people's anger had been fully roused. But to the regret of Pakistan, peace returned to the Valley when the Holy Relic was recovered on 4 January 1965, and restored honourably to the Hazaratbal shrine.

Though the quick recovery of the Holy Relic had foiled the Pakistani plan of bringing about a mass upheaval in Kashmir, Pakistan was not going to be outplayed so easily, as she was determined to take over Kashmir. Pak official media started propagating that the Holy Relic, which had been recovered, was not the real one and accused India of perpetrating a fraud on the people of Kashmir. It incited the Kashmiris to renew their agitation. The pro-Pakistan elements, who were crest-fallen on the recovery of the Holy Relic, saw an opportunity to stage a comeback. The Pak agents in the Valley came out openly and again began to build up public opinion against the authorities. By mid January 1965, the adverse propaganda started taking a violent form in Srinagar and other parts of the Valley. A demand for a special 'Deedar' (exposition) by the Action Committee was made to establish the true identity of the relic. The demand was clearly inspired by Pakistan. But fortunately, the religious leaders, who conducted the identification at the 'Deedar' on 3 February, certified the Holy Relic as the genuine one and the Pak designs came to naught(2).

Internment of Sheikh Abdullah

The internment of Sheikh Abdullah in May 1965 provided a fresh opportunity to Pakistan to malign India and mislead world opinion to the effect that a state of revolt existed in Kashmir. Under the inspiration of the Pakistan Government, the Pakistan Radio, Press and political leaders raised a big hue and cry. Protest meetings and demonstrations were organised in Pakistan condemning the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah. The Pakistanis immediately built up Abdullah into a martyr and thereafter repeatedly
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Invoked his image to serve their cause. Pak agents instigated acts of hooliganism and provocations in Srinagar. Pro-Pak and pro-China slogans were shouted at some of the demonstrations in the Valley(3). Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, described the internment as a ruthless and unlawful step towards 'the point of no return' in Kashmir(4). The Pak Press widely published exaggerated reports about the internal situation in Jammu and Kashmir getting out of hand and a wave of suppression sweeping over the entire land. A memorandum was also presented to the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-Lai, in Rawalpindi, on 2 June 1965, by the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, requesting him to raise the issue at the Afro-Asian Conference.

Stepping up of Cease-Fire Violations

Thus having failed to instigate the people of the Valley to rise in rebellion, Pakistan now started building up pressure by intensifying its aggressive activities along the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir under the illusion that it was militarily superior to India and that Indian Armed Forces were demoralised. Pakistan concluded that the time was now ripe to take military action. The inactivity and years of defensive posture by the Indian army encouraged the Pak troops to step up offensive operations, which mainly comprised raids on bridges, firing on convoys and systematic encroachment on Indian territory. Pakistani troops and "Razakars" (irregulars) were active in Keran, Tithwal, Kargil, Punch and Chamb areas. They were constructing new bunkers, bringing reinforcements and improving their positions in Tithwal and Keran sectors(5). There had been a steep rise in the number of firing incidents, intrusions, border raids and other provocative activities by Pakistani forces. The documents seized from the captured Pak infiltrators revealed that plans for the attack on Kashmir had been finalised as early as May 1965. The C-in-C of the Pakistan army, General Mohammad Musa, visited his troops along the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir in May 1965 and told them: "All steps have been completed to deal with any eventuality"(6).

A large number of men of Pakistan's Frontier Corps (comprising Khyber Rifles, Kurrum Militia, Zhob Militia, Tochi Scouts, South Waziristan Scouts and Bajaur Scouts), which guarded the North-West frontier along Afghanistan, were moved to the Pak-occupied Kashmir. During the same period, the "Azad Kashmir" administration ordered universal military training for its citizens between the age of 16 and 45. A resolution, adopted by the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim
Conference on 27 May 1965, called upon Kashmiris to join the "Razakar" movement in large numbers, and reiterated that the time had come to undo the cease-fire line in Kashmir, which divided their homeland into two artificial and unnatural parts.

In fact, the firing and shelling across the cease-fire line were stepped up as early as January 1965. As the year progressed, the spiral of cease-fire violations shot up alarmingly. There had been as many as 1,347 cease-fire violations from the Pakistan side between January and May 1965(7), compared to 522 in the previous year(8). The intensification of the hostile activities along the cease-fire line was intermixed with a series of subversive activities inland. It soon became clear that this sudden spurt in hostile activities was part of a calculated plan to increase tension along the border and create a law and order problem in the State. The ground was being prepared with elaborate care for Pak military aggression which was to follow soon.

Kargil Operations

As a result of the intensification of cease-fire violations by Pakistan, the Indian military authorities in Jammu and Kashmir decided in May 1965 not to remain passive any longer, but to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy as and when the attack came(9).

There were Pakistani posts on the heights in Kargil area, commanding the vital Srinagar-Leh road, which constituted the main supply route, for the Indian troops guarding the Sino-Indian border in Ladakh. The Kargil region is strategically located between the Ladakh Range in the north-east and the great Himalayan Range in the south-west. The Pak defences on Pt 13620 dominated the Indian positions at Kargil, including the Brigade HQ. The Pakistanis harassed the movement of supplies with gun-fire, and attempted to cut the road by armed assault across the CFL. On 16 May, the Pakistanis attacked one of the Indian posts in strength. The attack was repulsed but the danger persisted.

The two recce patrols sent by 4 Rajput to area Pt 13620 and Black Rocks discovered for the first time that the enemy in strength supported by MMGs and 3-inch mortars) occupying Pt 13620, Saddle, Black Rocks, Peak 1 and Peak 2, had committed encroachment into Indian territory. 121 Brigade with three battalions 4 Rajput, 1 Jammu and Kashmir Militia and 17 Punjab, plus 1 Guards (ex 3 Inf Div) held this
area. Two Coys of 12 Jammu and Kashmir Militia and 85 Lt Regt were in support.

Brig V.K. Ghal, Commander 121 (I) Inf Bde Group, thereupon decided to launch a two-pronged attack with 4 Rajput, commanded by Lt Col Sudarshan Singh and supported by 85 Lt Regt less bty. The Pak posts were on dizzy heights, with steep gullies and razor-thin ridges radiating from them. It was decided to use the southern approach for attack on Pt 13620, as it was an extremely difficult and hazardous route and the enemy defences were not very strong on this unlikely route of approach. In fact, the enemy expected an attack through the central approach where he had his defences strengthened with mine strips.

Two coys of 4 Rajput were to capture Pt 13620 and Saddle from the south and the third coy was to capture Black Rocks, Peak 1 and Peak 2 from the north-east. Strict security measures were adopted during the preparatory stage. Villages in the area were sealed and ammunition was dumped and forward moves undertaken only in the hours of darkness. No civilian labour or ponies were employed. The approach march had to be in single file. The FUP was barely 90 metres from enemy bunkers, and there was just about sufficient room to deploy one platoon. Hence, the attacking company had to be deployed one platoon behind the other.

The silent attack went in at 0200 hours on 17 May. The Indian troops were able to get within 90 metres at pt 13620, without losing surprise. Thereafter the coy came under heavy mortar, LMG and small arms fire, and hand-to-hand fighting broke out. Major B.S. Randhawa, the Coy Commander, was killed in the fighting. Lt Col Sudarshan Singh, who was following, immediately rallied the men and the momentum of the attack was maintained. On the north-east side, progress was a bit slow as surprise had been lost. The FOO, Capt N. Darkunde, accompanying Major Nayyar's company, brought down arty fire on Saddle, Black Rocks, Peak 1 and Peak 2. Indian MMGs and 3-inch mortars also opened up in full fury on the enemy positions. Pt 13620 was captured by 0330 hours. Major Nayyar's coy was in possession of Peak 1 and Peak 2 by 0430 hours. The Black Rocks and Saddle fell by 1030 hours.

The enemy opposition was stiff, but the fierce onslaught of Indian troops forced the enemy to withdraw leaving behind their dead, large quantities of arms, ammunition and rations. Pakistan suffered casualties of two officers and fourteen ORs killed, as against 1 Officer, 2 JCOs and 9 ORs killed, and 1 JCO
and 50 ORs wounded on the Indian side(10). It was a difficult military operation, for the troops had to scramble through a huge rocky wasteland, commanded by Pakistani guns, but it succeeded brilliantly.

After the loss of the area around Pt 13620, the Pak troops intensified their hostile activities. They also made several attempts to reoccupy their lost picquets. Pak troops attacked an Indian position in the vicinity of Kargil twice, first on the night of 18 May and again in the early hours of 19 May. Both attacks were repulsed as a result of heavy and accurate firing from Indian positions(11). Smarting under their defeat, the Pakistani aggressive activities continued. Incidents were reported from various sectors of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir. On the night on 18-19 May, there were 20 violations of the CFL by Pak troops from Chhamb to Punch. They fired about 2,700 rounds from Browning medium and light machine guns, besides 300 mortar shells. A full battalion of Pakistani troops, which attacked an Indian picquet, south-west of Mendhar, in the early hours of 19 May, was repulsed by Indian troops. Forty Pakistanis were killed and many injured. Another concentrated attack by Pakistani troops on an Indian forward post, Dalla, south-west of Chhamb, on the night of 18 May was repulsed by Indian patrols. The Pak troops which crossed the cease-fire line south of the Tithwal sector, also suffered heavy casualties at the hands of the Indians.

Capture of Kala Pahar

Meanwhile, the enemy had grabbed an unoccupied 2700 metre long feature Kala Pahar, about 10 km west of Kargil, dominating the road. This was discovered by a patrol of 1 Jammu and Kashmir Militia on 29 May. A complaint was lodged, and Pak troops were asked to vacate the area by the UN. When all efforts by the UN to get the aggression vacated failed India decided to evict the enemy from her territory and make the road Srinagar-Leh safe for traffic by 9 June 1965. 1 Guards was entrusted with the task of capturing Kala Pahar. Recce patrols carried out by 1 Jammu and Kashmir Militia found that the enemy strength on Kala Pahar was about 200 men, and that the terrain was steep and not easily negotiable by men, even by day, and that Pak troops had obtained reinforcements.

It was decided to capture Kala Pahar from the north and attack it from the Right Ridge. Accordingly, Major M.C.S. Menon, Offg OC 1 Guards, was ordered to establish a firm base with one coy in area Right Ridge on 1 June and move the entire battalion on the feature by 3 June and secure a suitable FUP.
Gunners were to carry out registration/harassing fire (HF) tasks over 2/3 days. 'H' hour was fixed at 0230 hours on 5 June 1965.

Right Ridge, located at a height of over 3,600 metres, involved a steep and hazardous climb for approximately 1,200 metres from Harka Bahadur Bridge. A coy 1 Guards succeeded in establishing the firm base at Right Ridge by 0800 hours on 2 June after a brief encounter with an enemy protective patrol. The enemy started shelling the area and made a move to occupy an area known as Three Bumps which dominated the proposed FUP. Capt R.S. Saharawat led a section through the shelling and secured the area Three Bumps before the enemy could do so.

For two days and nights prior to D day, the enemy was subjected to HF by 85 Lt Regt. 1 Guards' 57 mm RCL guns, which had been manhandled to the firm base, were successfully employed in destroying enemy 'sangars' before last light on 4 June. The battalion moved to the FUP at 0130 hours on 5 June. The troops encountered heavy SA fire, and the enemy put up stiff resistance and fought from bunker to bunker. But Kala Pahar peak was captured by 0500 hours on 5 June. Indian troops continued the momentum of attack and succeeded in the capture of the OP Ridge also by 1030 hours, inflicting heavy casualties. 1 Guards suffered 7 Killed and 44 wounded as against the Pak casualties of about 64 killed and 3 PsOW(12). Casualty evacuation and movement of replenishment posed a major problem, as local porters and ponies were reluctant to come for fear of getting hurt. Therefore, troop labour had to be used extensively.

It was appreciated that the enemy after having been evicted from Kala Pahar would try and occupy another peak, called Snow Peak, to dominate the Srinagar-Leh road. So, 1 Jammu and Kashmir Militia sent a strong probing patrol with a FOO towards the Snow Peak. There was six feet of snow on the objective. As expected, on 7 June 1965, this patrol contacted the enemy, and heavy fire was exchanged. The FOO, 114 Lt Bty, brought down concentrated and accurate fire and in broad day light, the patrol supported by one bty 85 Lt Regt launched a quick attack forcing the enemy to withdraw from the area.

Outstanding Features of the Operation:

This was the first counter-offensive undertaken by Indian troops in many years. Its success had a good effect on the morale of the troops in Jammu and Kashmir and the Army as a whole. Politically it bolstered the image of the country.
This operation was unique in many respects. The attack was launched over extremely rugged terrain on heights above 4,000 metres. It was launched at night in sub-zero temperature. Men had to go through snow over 45 cm deep near Black Rocks, Peak 1 and Peak 2. 4 Rajput showed remarkable courage and determination. Major B.S. Randhawa of 4 Rajput was awarded Maha Vir Chakra, posthumously. Capt Ranbir Singh and Sepoy Budh Singh, both of 4 Rajput, won Vir Chakra. Brig V.K. Ghai who commanded Indian troops in the Kargil Sector was awarded the Vishisht Seva Medal (VSM) Class I for outstanding service during the operations.

The Guards did equally well in their attack on Kala Pahar. The enemy was well-organised, alert and prepared for an attack. Men of the South Waziristan, Northern and Karakoram Scouts of Pakistan were doughty fighters, and fully at home in those high mountains. But they could not stand the determined assault. Good tactical planning and bold execution brought success to Indians.

During the Kargil operations, 85 Lt Regt gave effective fire support to attacks by 4 Rajput, 1 Guards and 1 Jammu and Kashmir Militia. During the attack on Pt 13620 and Black Rocks, 600 rounds and equipment of 853 Lt Bty were lifted by manpack, about 1000 metres up on a hill side to the gun area. All ranks including officers carried loads. For the first time in the history of the Regt, 853 Lt Bty took part in action and executed fire plan in support of 4 Rajput's attack on Pt 13620 and Black Rocks. No registration or proper survey of targets was possible. Targets were fixed by graph paper survey, and fire plan was on call. Fire was adjusted with the help of fixed points on the sky line, but it was so accurate that the enemy packed up quickly. Later, when the enemy reacted and attacked other picquets, they were beaten back by effective artillery fire.

During the attack on Kala Pahar by 1 Guards, the regiment again came in with its telling fire power. For this attack 114 Lt Bty from 32 Lt Regt (3 Div), placed under command 121 Inf Bde Group, was grouped with 85 Lt Regt. Between 2 June and 4 June 1965, when 1 Guards was preparing to attack Kala Pahar, the Regt fired HF tasks on the enemy location intermittently. On 5 June 1965, the Regt fired its first fire plan as a regiment in support of 1 Guards in the capture of Kala Pahar and adjoining features. The fire plan was well coordinated to suit the progress of advance, and the objective was swept with accurate fire, causing heavy casualties on the enemy.
It was estimated, and later confirmed from the prisoners captured, that the enemy suffered over 100 casualties. Immediately after the capture of Kala Pahar, the OP sighted the enemy gun position, and it was silenced for good.

On 7 June, 853 Lt Bty provided accurate and timely artillery support to the patrol of 1 Jammu and Kashmir Militia. This heavy volume of fire with troops advancing towards Snow Ridge gave the impression of an attack in great strength, and the objective was quickly captured.

The credit for the success in the Kargil operations goes not only to the infantry and artillery but also to the Pioneers and the Border Road personnel. No.9 Border Road Task Force was of great help in providing manpower for carrying ammunition, rations and stores to forward picquets. No.9 Task Force also launched a 100-Ft span Bailey Bridge near Harka Bahadur Bridge on 21 May 1965, when the later was in danger of being knocked out by enemy artillery.

This Task Force was mainly responsible for the maintenance of the L of C. The bridges damaged by the enemy were repaired with speed, and the men exhibited a high sense of discipline.

Hard Won Gains Given up

The steps taken in the Kargil sector by the Indian troops were purely in self-defence, and intended to protect the line of communication of Leh. However, on 30 June 1965, the Indian troops, vacated these posts falling in the Pak-occuled Kashmir along the cease-fire line in the Kargil sector. The Indian troops withdrew in deference to an appeal made by the UN Secretary General with a solemn assurance to India about the safety of the Srinagar-Leh road which passed through Kargil. The UN also agreed to post military observers to prevent violation of the cease-fire line in this area by Pakistani forces(14).

However, the scale and frequency of firing incidents during June and July touched a new high. In June, the Pakistan Government reportedly made it compulsory for employers to release all military reservists, and thus a Mujahid force was set up under the Pakistani Army(15). Indian posts in Tithwal, Uri, Mendhar, Naushahra, Punch and Chhamb were fired at frequently. India still hoped that Pakistan would not resort to a direct attack in Kashmir. These hopes were belied when large numbers of Pakistani infiltrators invaded Jammu and Kashmir in August 1965.
Who Planned Operation Gibraltar?

Though Pakistan loudly and vigorously denied its complicity in the attack on Jammu and Kashmir by Pak infiltrators and made all efforts to propagate it as a local uprising, some recent Pakistani publications, including books authored by senior retired army officers, have provided fresh evidence to prove beyond doubt that the armed raiders, who crossed the cease-fire line and committed acts of sabotage, arson and loot in Jammu and Kashmir in August 1965, were Pakistani nationals, and they were raised, trained and equipped by the Pakistan Government. These publication have not only exposed the fact of Pakistani aggression, but also nailed the Pakistani lies about the "spontaneous upsurge" of the people of Kashmir, and the "great revolution launched by the freedom fighters" in the state.

According to Gen Mohammad Musa (Retd)(16), Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff in 1965, the plan for Operation Gibraltar was prepared by Maj Gen Akhtar Husain Malik, General Officer Commanding No.12 Infantry Division, in consultation with the GHQ. The operation was authorised by the Supreme Commander of Pakistan, President Ayub Khan, at a briefing in Murree, where Gen Malik discussed the final plan with the help of a sand model, before it was put into effect in August 1965 under the overall control of the GHQ. Gen Musa further stated that the Gibraltar force consisted of approximately 7,000 Mujahids from Azad Kashmir.

The General has also explained the circumstances under which the entire Operation Gibraltar was initially conceived and planned. "The then Foreign Minister Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed, spurred on by Major-General Akhtar Husain Malik, who was commander of our troops in Azad Kashmir, pressed the Government to take advantage of the disturbed situation in the valley and direct the Army to send raiders into the Indian-held Kashmir for conducting guerrilla activities there a movement with a view to eventually starting an uprising against the occupying power...."(17). Gen Musa was given a concrete proposal for enlarged operation in Kashmir with which, he says, he did not agree, and after its examination recommended that the raids be postponed so that the time thus gained could be utilised for making proper arrangements for not only guerrilla activities in Kashmir but also for building up the army's capacity for an open war(18).

But, surprisingly, one of his own divisional commanders and the foreign office experts proceeded
with the planning and actual launching of Gibraltar, contrary to the Army Chief's professional judgement. In a remarkably candid and forthright statement Gen Musa says: "The policy-makers thwarted the professional assessment and advice on a matter having grave military implications because of their miscalculation of the politico-strategic situation and the over-ambitiousness of a few individuals involved in the decision-making who were prompted by their desire to achieve some quick and spectacular results in Kashmir by clandestine operations"(19).

It is stated that the GHQ briefing, based on Special Service Group (SSG) Commander Col Mehdi's assessment, was against sending commandos into Kashmir due to time, space, logistic and follow-up support factors, and it clearly impressed upon the C-in-C that this operation was a non-starter. However, the army Commander-in-Chief failed to advise the President that on military grounds the General Staff, were opposed to Operation Gibraltar, under the impression that the President was in favour of sending the raiders. It is believed by some independent observers in Pakistan that it was this absence of a clear-cut opposition from his C-in-C to the operational soundness of Gibraltar that led President Ayub Khan to give the go-ahead signal(20).

Air Marshal Asghar Khan (Retd), former C-in-C Pakistan Air Force, says that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, had convinced the Government "that Pakistani's incursion into Kashmir would not provoke the Indians to extend the area of hostilities along the Indo-Pakistan border"(21). He says that the decision to launch the operation was made on three assumptions: (1) Widespread support would be available within Indian-held Kashmir; (2) India would restrict its offensive to the Azad Kashmir territory; and (3) there was no possibility of India crossing the international border. All the three assumptions proved wrong. Asghar Khan observes:"I found it difficult to believe that the President, who had always been cautious in his approach to international relations, particularly as they affected out contacts with India, should have agreed to a policy that had the germs of a conflict on a major scale....As these incursions began to increase in intensity it became obvious that a major shift had occured in our policy towards Kashmir"(22).

An eminent Indian journalist met Gen Ayub in Islamabad in 1972, and asked him why he provoked India by sending infiltrators into Kashmir. Ayub's reply was cryptic: "Don't ask me, ask Bhutto". Bhutto was
Foreign Minister in 1965 and President of Pakistan in 1972. When the journalist met Bhutto and told him that Gen Ayub seemed to blame him for the 1965 War, Bhutto did not deny the responsibility and argued that Pakistan had to act then because the ordnance factories which India had established had not yet gone into full production and once they did, India would have been too strong to be beaten. "There was a time when militarily, in terms of the big push, in terms of armour, we were getting and that was the position up to 1965. Now, the Kashmir dispute was not being resolved peacefully and we had this military advantage, we were getting blamed for it. So it would, as a patriotic prudence, be better to say, all right, let us finish this problem and come to terms, and come to a settlement. It has been an unfortunate thing", Bhutto added. Bhutto said he had no regrets about having persuaded Ayub to send in the infiltrators(23).

This leaves hardly any doubt about the direct involvement of the Government of Pakistan in planning, organising and executing the Operation Gibraltar, which led inexorably to the full scale war of 1965.
NOTE S AND REFERENCES

1. From Official Records.
2. Mullik, B.N., (pp. 140-41 and p. 151) has accused Pakistan of conspiring to remove the Holy Relic through its agents in the Valley with a view to bringing about an upheaval in Kashmir.
3. From Official Records.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. The UN Secretary-General's Report says:

"Among the most serious of the violations was one that occurred in May of this year when Indian troops in battalion strength attacked and captured Pakistan positions in the Kargil area of Kashmir and remained in occupation of them. In the interest of preserving the CFL, I appealed to the Government of India to withdraw its troops from the Pakistan side of the line. On assurance from me that UN Observers would henceforth be stationed on both sides of the Line in that area, which India considered strategically vital to the security of the Srinagar-Leh Road, the Government of India agreed to do so and in due course the Indian troops were withdrawn, thus closing the matter and making unnecessary any further consideration of a report on it to the Security Council. Subsequently, there were some military attacks on the road by armed elements from the Pakistan side."

Report of the Secretary-General, dated 3 September 1965, on the current situation in Kashmir, with particular reference to the cease-fire agreement, the cease-fire line and the functioning of UNMOGIP.

17. Ibid., p. 2.
18. Ibid., p. 4.
19. Ibid., p. 4.
21. Khan, Air Marshal Asghar, pp. 75-76.
22. Ibid., p.73. An interesting story about the operation and the setting up of the so-called Sada-i-Kashmir radio is narrated by the then Information Secretary of Pakistan, Altaf Gauhar, in the Foreword written by him for Air Marshal Asghar Khan's book "The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965". He says: "The first time I heard about the operation was on the 25th of July 1965, when Brigadier Irshad (then Director, Military Intelligence) requested me to depute a Kashmiri-speaking officer for a broadcasting station which was to operate from Muzaffarabad. He told me that the Army had the necessary equipment, and they could go on the air at a moment's notice. I placed the services of the late Mr. Yusuf Zafar, a dedicated and experienced Radio Pakistan official, at the disposal of the Army. A few days later Brigadier Irshad gave me some more information about "Operation Gibraltar", and told me that I would be given at least 24 hours notice before the D-Day. After that I heard nothing more until the morning of 8th August when Brigadier Irshad came to see me at a rest house in Murree. He looked a little excited. He informed me that the operation had already begun, and he was sorry that he had not been able to give me the promised 24 hour notice. What, however, brought him to the rest house was the discovery that the radio equipment, which the Army had installed in Muzaffarabad, had failed to work: I drove down to Rawalpindi and made alternative arrangements to get the Sada-i-Kashmir radio off the ground. A few days later there was a meeting in the Defence Secretary's office where Agha Shahi and Nur Khan were also present. Shahi was worried that the Foreign Office had not been able to establish a revolutionary council in Occupied Kashmir, and Nur Khan was urging me to publicise the fact that he proposed personally to drop food supplies for the volunteers trapped in Rajauri". pp.xiv-xv.


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