CHAPTER V

"GRAND SLAM" AND XV CORPS RESPONSE

Operation Gibraltar, having failed, Pakistan put in her regular forces to the battle. Pakistan had already prepared itself for such an eventuality, after very careful planning.

OPERATION ABLAZE

But before we discuss the Indian reaction, military planning and deployment of forces in August 1965, something should be said about Operation Ablaze of May–June 1965. This code-name was given to the retaliatory measures taken by the Indian Army along the Indo-West Pakistan border after the Pak attacks against Indian posts in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965(1). Under Operation Ablaze, all formations earmarked for Punjab were put on 'red alert'.

Under XI Corps, 15 Inf Div was concentrated at Amritsar, and its units were moved to their battle locations, while 4 and 7 Inf Divs were given other sectors, with HQs at Fazilka and Bhikhiwind respectively. On 6 May, these divisions were ordered to complete all defence preparations including laying of defensive and tactical mine-fields. This was an extreme step as laying of such extensive mine-fields in Indian territory especially in the intensely cultivated Punjab, was something that had not been thought of before. The Divisional Commanders were not informed officially, but from civilian sources it was learnt that on 29 April, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri had given his approval for military action against Pakistan at a time and place to be chosen by the Army, and that General Chaudhuri had indicated that offensive operations could start by 10 May(2).

A conference of the Divisional Commanders was held at the Corps HQ without notice. There, no information about the intentions and strength of the enemy was given, except that one of the Pak Armoured Divisions was located in the Raiwind area. The Corps Commander, Lt Gen J.S. Dhillon, did not indicate his or any higher plan in detail. However, the Ichhogil Canal from Malakapur to Ganda Singhwala was divided into three parts, and each of the three Divisions was given a stretch of it to be secured. 15 Inf Div was given the tasks to secure the east bank of Ichhogil Canal from Malakapur to Dahuri and to open the Grand Trunk road axis from Wagah to Dograi. Additional tasks given were to secure intact, if possible, the road bridge over the Ichhogil Canal on the GT road, the railway bridge across the canal and the Jallo link.
bridge. Major General Niranjan Prasad, GOC 15 Inf Div, carried out several ground and one air reconnaissance of the area to have a clear idea of the terrain.

During OP Ablaze, XI Corps had an excellent opportunity to play war games to evolve the plan of advancing to the Ichhogil Canal. The working drawings of the Canal were made available to the Corps Commander. Being trained in irrigation engineering in Roorkee, the Corps Commander could visualise the various works on the Canal and assess their military implications. However, Lt Gen J.S. Dhillon did not disclose the details of the Canal to his formation commanders. He instructed all Commanders down to the level of Lt Cols about the essentials of their roles, so that they could have the opportunity to rehearse them(3). But by the middle of May, it became clear that the Indian Army would not be required to take any offensive action against Pakistan, as talks had started for a cease-fire in the Rann of Kutch. The Army Chief visited Amritsar in mid-June 1965, and held a conference at the 15 Div HQs where the Chief of Staff, Western Command, and the Corps Cdr were present. After the conference, General Chaudhuri remarked: "All my experience teaches me never to start an operation with the crossing of an opposed water obstacle; as far as I am concerned, I have ruled out Lahore or a crossing at Dera Baba Nanak". On 30 June 1965, there was an agreement that the Kutch dispute was to be referred for arbitration. Under this, both sides agreed to carry out certain troop withdrawals. Thus, "OP Ablaze", which had "taken off to an excellent start, ended up as a damp squib"(4). The Indian troops dismantled their defences and lifted the mines - a most unpleasant task - in which a number of casualties were suffered by Indian troops and civilians due to mine explosions. In July 1965, the armies of both sides stood down, and formations returned to their peace stations, except 1 Armd Div, which withdrew to an interim location in the Jalandhar area. Pakistan also kept her two Armd Divs within striking distance inside Pak Punjab.

Pak Plans

Gradually, appreciations and operational plans and orbats were evolved on both sides, leading to September 1965 operations (OP Riddle). According to information then available with Pakistan, the strength of the Indian Army was estimated as equivalent of four infantry divisions and strong civil armed forces in Kashmir, reinforced by additional brigades and battalions; one armoured division, one independent armoured brigade, nine infantry divisions, and three
independent infantry brigades against West Pakistan; about one infantry division and one independent infantry brigade poised against East Pakistan; and about two infantry divisions from the two Corps facing the Chinese in NEFA and Siliguri areas.(5).

The overall Pak plan of action envisaged infiltration of irregulars into Jammu and Kashmir on a wide front, use of the Special Service Group personnel against pre-determined objectives in that state, and also employment of her regular forces to support the irregulars, when necessary, to fight a conventional military action. Pakistan specifically planned the disruption of the Indian lines of communication from Srinagar to Leh and the isolation of Kargil for its subsequent elimination by Northern Scouts and Karakoram Scouts in conjunction with trained SSC commandos; diversionary thrusts via the Nastachun Pass and Tutmari Gali towards the Valley combined with infiltration raids through the Northern Gallies to sever communication to Tithwal; an offensive against Akhnur-Naushahra sector for snapping Indian lines of communication towards Rajauri and Punch; and disruption of the primary Indian lines of communication from Pathankot, to isolate Jammu and Kashmir theatre.

In Punjab and Rajasthan, Pakistan had adopted an aggressive defensive posture by moving the major elements of 1 Armd Div (approximately two Patton regiments and one Chaffee regiment) into Lahore area, and most of 7 Inf Div from Peshawar to the Lyallpur-Sheikhupura area, with one of its Brigades stationed near the Marala Headworks. Two armoured regiments (11 Cavalry and 13 Lancers) from 6 Armd Div were at Shakargarh Salient and the remainder of the Division was concentrated in general area Sialkot-Gujranwala(6). Lt General Harbakhsh Singh had appreciated that these Pakistani tactical moves were undertaken to deny access via Dera Baba Nanak Bridge by effectively sealing this approach; to ensure security of the Lahore sector by holding in strength the Ichhogil Canal and the Upper Bari Doab Canal; and to mount an offensive in Khem Karan sector where the alignment of the various canals and distributaries permitted a thrust in Punjab from the direction of Kasur(7).

Gen Musa, the Pak Army Chief, made his own appreciation. He thought that in the event of war, India would try swift move to destroy the fighting power of Pakistan and capture territory in West Pakistan as well. For this, he thought, India would seek a break-through in the Chenab-Ravi corridor by attacking Sialkot with an Infantry Division plus
supporting arms from the direction of Jammu; cut the
Grand Trunk Road between Wazirabad and Gujranwala and
attack Lahore along the two main approaches -
Amritsar-Wagah and Harke-Lahore, with the intention
of capturing Lahore and the Ravi bridge, or failing
that, at least to contain Lahore. Simultaneously,
India was expected to break-through between Bedian and
Kasur to outflank Lahore from the south, attack Kasur
from Ferozepur across the headworks to divert Pak
attention, threaten Sulaimanke and the headworks, and
launch diversionary moves in Sind to extend the
frontage, disperse Pak troops and prevent Pakistan
from diverting resources to other areas(8).

As far as Pak-Occupied Kashmir was concerned,
Pakistan concluded that India would plan to launch the
main attack against Muzaffarabad through Uri and
Tithwal; advance from Punch towards Hajira and then
fan out in the direction of Rawalakot or Palamari;
and protect the Chenab bridge by strongly holding the
Chamb-Jaurian-Akhnur approach(9).

After carefully considering the likely Indian
moves, Pakistan decided to deploy the bulk of the army
(two Armoured Divisions, three Infantry Divisions,
including 11 ad hoc Division, and three Independent
Infantry Brigades) in Punjab, where the main battle
was expected to be fought. It would hold the Indian
Army opposite Lahore and Kasur along the BRB Canal,
south of Ravi river, and mount a counter-offensive
from an area further south, for which the force had
been concentrated at a suitable place. Sialkot and
Lahore were to be held at all costs; and Pak army
would hold POK and to operate from there in the
Valley, mainly with the AKRF Division located there,
and plan the defence of East Pakistan. Based on this
strategy, the operational plan of Pakistan was to hold
Sialkot-Pasrur sector and Jassar with one Infantry
Division and one Infantry Brigade respectively; move
6 Armd Div to Pasrur from its forward concentration
area near Gujranwala; defend Lahore with one Infantry
Division, basing its defences on the BRB Canal; deploy
the ad hoc 11 Div in the Bedian-Kasur sector to repel
the Indian attack and prevent it from securing canal
crossings; engage the Indian army operating in the
Fazilka area and protect Sulaimanke headworks with one
Infantry Brigade; launch the main counter-offensive
force, consisting of 1 Armd Div and 7 Inf Div, from
its concentration area; and check Indian advance in
Sind(10).

This plan was expected to enable Pakistan to
keep the Indian Army heavily engaged in West Pakistan
so that adequate force could not be spared by India
against East Pakistan. By defending at least four
Armoured Regiments in the front line with, and under the immediate control, of the Infantry Divisions, without committing to battle any of the Armoured Divisions; it could keep both the Armoured Divisions in their strategic concentration areas (one north of the Ravi and the other south of it), poised for counter-offensive against a lightly held area. Sialkot and Jassar would threaten the flanks of the Indian Army attempting to advance southwards through the gap between these two places, and prevent it from resorting to wide encircling moves against Pak troops in that area(11).

The deployment of Pak forces in West Pakistan, according to the information available with India, was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Name of Formation</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) In POK:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>i. Along the Cease Fire Line</td>
<td>HQ 12 Inf Div</td>
<td>Murree</td>
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<tr>
<td>ii. Skardu Sector</td>
<td>HQ Baltistan Force</td>
<td>Skardu</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Karakoram Scouts</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Strength 1200)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Waziristan Scouts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(strength 850)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Mahsud Bn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Strength 350)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Det 19 Baluch (SSG)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Strength 100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. Kel-Minimarg Sector</td>
<td>No.2 and No.3 Wings</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northern Scouts</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zhob Militia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Strength 553)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. HQ No.1 Sector</td>
<td>Four AK Bns</td>
<td>Muzaffarabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9,13,16,23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v. HQ No.2 Sector</td>
<td>Five AK Bns</td>
<td>Rawalkot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4,6,7,10,12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
vi. HQ NO.3 Sector
Six AK Bns (1,8,11,18,19,21)
Kotli

vii. HQ No.4 Sector
102 Inf Bde (Three Inf Bns)
Bhimber

Three AK Bns (2,5,14)

b) Chhamb-Sialkot-Shakargarh Sector
HQ IV Corps
Sialkot
6 Armd Div
Sialkot
7 Inf Div
Sialkot
15 Inf Div
Sialkot
IV Corps Arty
Road
Wazirabad - Sialkot

C) Lahore-Kasur-Sulaimanke Sector
HQ 1 Corps
Sheikhupura
1 Armd Div
Lahore - Sheikhupura-Raiwind
HQ 10 Inf Div
Lahore
114 Inf Bde
Wagah
103 Inf Bde
Lahore - Khaira axis
22 Inf Bde
Kasur
105 Inf Bde Gp
Sulaimanke
106 (Indep) Inf Bde
Harbanspura (Lahore)
1 Corps Arty
Lahore
11 Inf Div
Bedian area
d) Sind:

i. Opposite Rajasthan
52 Inf Bde
Naya Chor

ii. Opposite Kutch
HQ 8 Inf Div
Badin
6 Inf Bde
Vingoor
51 Inf Bde
Rahim Ki Bazar(12)
Indian Preparations

So far, the Indian plans, in case of hostilities with Pakistan, were mainly defensive. But in view of Pak intentions the urgent need was felt for undertaking some offensive action aimed at both the destruction of Pakistani forces and the acquisition of territory, so that India would be in a better bargaining position. Any attack by Pakistan in collusion with China was unlikely. But China could help Pakistan during the war against India in some way. The Indian forces were built up with this view. Accordingly, Western Command was allotted the general tasks of -

(a) defending Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Rajasthan against Pakistan's regular or irregular forces;

(b) defending Ladakh and Sugar Sector (Himachal Pradesh area bordering China) against aggression from China; and

(c) launching an offensive into Pakistan.

The tasks in particular allotted to it in Jammu and Kashmir were to ensure the security of Srinagar and the Valley, inflict the maximum attrition on infiltrators between Akhnur and Punch, and to protect the line of communication Pathankot-Udhampur-Srinagar-Leh. In Punjab, Western Command was to hold ground suitable for a defensive position as close to the International Border as possible, while in Rajasthan the task was to deny the enemy the Hyderabaad(Sind) - Jodhpur Railway east of Jasai and to undertake limited raids across the border.

The limited offensive action, to be taken on instructions from the Army Headquarters, included a raid from Sulaimanke towards Montgomery, an advance from Ferozepur-Khem Karan to the line of Upper Bari Doab Canal, and an advance to the Ichhogil Canal along the Grand Trunk road from Amritsar and along Khaira-Lahore road. In addition, it could establish a bridgehead across the Ravi in area Dera Baba Nanak-Pathankot and secure the line Dhallewali-Wuhilam-Daska-Mandhali. There was no possibility of getting a long notice of any major aggression by Pakistan, but as the enemy's logistical preparations for a major offensive were difficult to conceal, a ten days' notice was expected. Taking note of Pakistan's aggression in the Kutch and large scale infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir in August 1965, the Indian Army reviewed its plan against Pakistan and issued Operation Instruction No.36 on 9 August 1965, which laid down that on orders
from the Army Headquarters, the Western Command was to take simultaneous action to -

i. secure the line of Ichhogil Canal from north of Grand Trunk Road to Bedian;

ii. establish a bridgehead across river Ravi in area between Mumka to Gil;

iii. carry out a limited advance towards Sialkot, and establish a brigade less a battalion across the border in area north of Zafarwal and Shakargarh, and

iv. capture Tanda.

On completion of the above tasks, preparations were to be made for one of the following:

(a) securing the line Dhallewali-Wuhilam-Daska-Mandhali;

(b) continuing the advance on Lahore(13).

There was no change in the tasks allotted in Jammu and Kashmir or Rajasthan Sector. But it was clarified that the Western Command could count on a notice of only five days (instead of 10 days envisaged earlier) as far as Pakistan was concerned, that it be prepared to take offensive action within 48 hrs, and that there was to be no concentration of formations nor any defensive phase to cover such concentration. The forces allotted to Western Command for these tasks were(14):-

1. HQ I Corps
   14 Inf Div
   Lt Gen P.O. Dunn
   Maj Gen R.K. Ranjit Singh

2. HQ XI Corps
   4 Mtn Div
   Lt Gen J.S. Dhillon
   Maj Gen Gurbaksh Singh, MVC
   7 Inf Div
   Maj Gen H.K. Sibal, MVC
   15 Inf Div
   Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad
   2 Indep Armd Bde
   Brig T.K. Theogaraj

3. HQ XV Corps
   3 Inf Div
   Lt Gen Kashmir Singh Katoch, MC
   19 Inf Div
   Maj Gen S.S. Kalaan, MVC, MC
   Maj Gen G.B.S. Singh, MC
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 Inf Div</td>
<td>Maj Gen Amreek Singh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Inf Div</td>
<td>Maj Gen M.L. Thapan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4 bdes)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68 Inf Bde Gp</td>
<td>Brig S.C. Bakshi, MVC, Vr C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121 Inf Bde Gp</td>
<td>Brig V.K. Ghai</td>
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<tr>
<td>191 Inf Bde Gp</td>
<td>Brig Manmohan Singh</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4. **1 Armd Div**
   Maj Gen Rajinder Singh Sparrow, MVC

5. **28 Inf Bde**
   Brig Pritpal Singh

6. **41 Mtn Bde**
   Brig M.R. Rajwade

7. **67 Inf Bde**
   Brig Bant Singh

**XV Corps Tasks and Orbat**

When in the last week of August, reports were coming on Pakistani build-up opposite Chamb, Lt Gen K.S. Katokh, MC, GOC XV Corps, allotted the following tasks to the various formations under its command:-

**Tasks in general**

(a) To hold defensive positions on the Indian side of CFL and International Border for the defence of Jammu and Kashmir State.

(b) To destroy all Pak/POK infiltrators and inflict maximum attrition on any further Pak infiltration.

**Tasks in particular**

**121 Inf Bde Gp**

To defend Dras and Kargil.

**19 Inf Div**

(a) To defend the following:-

i. Gulmarg.

ii. Uri Heights.

iii. Tutwari Gali.

v. Northern Gallies.
vi. Razdhainangan Pass.

(b) To deny Northern and Western approaches into the Valley.

SRI Force

(a) To ensure the safety of Srinagar town and its suburbs by both close defence and vigorous aggressive action against parties operating in its area of responsibility.

(b) To be responsible for the ground defence of Srinagar air-field.

(c) To be prepared to deny -oji La.

25 Inf Div

(a) To defend the following:

i. Punch.

ii. Mendhar.

iii. Bhimber Gali.

iv. Jhangar.

v. Naushera.

(b) To prevent the enemy from enlarging the corridor Sialkot-Mandi.

191 Inf Bde Gp

(a) To hold the following:

i. Kalidhar Ridge.

ii. Area Laleali.

(b) To defend Akhnur. Akhnur Bridge was vital.

26 Inf Div

(a) To defend Jammu and Samba.

(b) Provide ground defence to 43 SU and 628 SU at Jammu.
Offensive tasks

Following offensive tasks would be carried out:-

(a) 19 Inf Div

To capture Badori and Haji Pir Pass.

(b) 25 Inf Div

To advance towards Haji Pir Pass along Ridge and link up with 19 Inf Div.

(a) 26 Inf Div would be prepared to carry out tasks allotted by HQ 1 Corps.

(b) 121 Inf Bde Gp would be prepared to carry out raid in area Marol along axis Gurgurdu-Marol.

(c) 191 Inf Bde Gp would be prepared to capture area Batala Ridge(15).

Detailed instructions for offensive tasks were to be issued personally to GOCs/Comdrs depending on how the situation developed. However, plans to capture suitable ground opposite CFL to improve defences was to be borne in mind.

To accomplish these tasks, XV Corps was allotted the following teeth arm units:-

19 Inf Div

(a) HQ 19 Inf Div

Maj Gen S.S. Kalaan

(b) HQ 68 Inf Bde

Brig S.C. Bakshi

1 Para

19 Punjab

4 Rajput

6 JAK Rif

(c) HQ 104 Inf Bde

Brig B.C. Chauhan

1 Sikh

2 Rajput

4 Kumaon

8 Kumaon

3/8 GR
(d) **HQ 161 Inf Bde**  
7 Maratha  
20 Maratha  
6 Dogra  
4 Sikh LI  
6 Bihar  
7 Bihar  

(e) **HQ 268 Inf Bde**  
6 Guards  
3 Sikh  
3 JAK Rif  
2 J&K Militia  
13 J&K Militia  
ITB Force (on arr)  

**Armr**  
One tp CIH  

**Arty**  
7 Fd Regt  
164 Fd Regt  
37 Lt Regt  
Two Comp Mtn Btys  
one Med Bty  

**25 Inf Div**  

(a) **HQ 25 Inf Div**  
Maj Gen Amreek Singh  
(b) **HQ 62 Mtn Bde**  
Brig H.C. Gahlaut  
2 Dogra  
14 Kumaon  
4/5 GR  
3/11 GR  
11 J&K Militia
(c) HQ 80 Inf Bde  
Brig U.B.S. Verma  
1 Madras  
5 Sikh LI  
2 Bihar  
4/3 GR  
4/8 GR  
9 J&K Militia less one coy

(d) HQ 93 Inf Bde  
Brig Zora Singh  
i. 7 Madras  
8 Grenadiers  
3 Raj Rif  
3 Rajput  
7 Sikh  
3 Dogra

ii. 2 Sikh - Temp allotted for special task.

(e) HQ 120 Inf Bde  
Brig Bharat Singh  
22 Maratha  
14 Jat  
2 Garh Rif  
10 Mahar

Arty

(a) 23 Comp Mtn Regt  
52 Comp Mtn Regt less two btys  
42 Fd Regt  
169 Fd Regt  
31 Lt Regt  
one sec 39 Med Regt
(b) 163 Fd Regt. Temp allotted, at 6 hrs notice to move back to 26 Inf Div.

26 Inf Div

(a) HQ 26 Inf Div  Maj Gen M.L. Thapan
(b) HQ 19 Inf Bde  Brig Aban Naidu
   14 Dogra
   8 JAK Rif
   2/1 GR
(c) HQ 162 Inf Bde  Brig R.S. Sheoran
   6 Jat
   7 Jat
   1 Sikh LI
(d) HQ 168 Inf Bde  Brig A.K. Luthra, MC
   9 Mahar
   5/4 GR

Armr

18 CAV
62 CAV

Arty

13 Fd Regt
168 Fd Regt
38 Med Regt
126 Div Loc Bty

SRI Force

(a) HQ SRI Force  Maj Gen Umrao Singh
(b) HQ 163 Inf Bde  Brig G.S. Kale
   1 Maratha
   2/9 GR
(c) HQ 31 Comn
Z Sub Area
Brig A.J.R. Dyer
8 J&K Militia less one coy
(d) HQ J&K Militia
Brig Hardit Singh
12 J&K Militia less two coys

Armr
One Sqn CIH less tp

Arty
25 LAA Regt less one bty.

HQ 121 Inf Bde Gp
Brig V.K. Ghai
1 Guards
17 Punjab
1 J&K Militia
Two coys 12 J&K Militia

Arty
85 Lt Regt less bty.

HQ 191 Inf Bde Gp
Brig Manmohan Singh
(a) 9 Punjab
6 Rajput
6 Sikh LI
3 Mahar
3 J&K Militia
(b) 15 Kumaon - Available for 26 Inf Div at 6 Hrs notice.

Armr
B Sqn 20 L

Arty
14 Fd Regt
39 Med Regt less bty and one sec
85 Lt Bty
With the failure of the Operation Gibraltar, the first phase of Pak aggression in Jammu and Kashmir had ended. But the guerilla threat continued. Large number of infiltrators were still present in the Valley and their comrades were operating on the northern front and in Jammu. In an effort to seal the bases from where the infiltrators sneaked into Jammu and Kashmir territory, Indian forces were advancing on Haji Pir Pass to effect a link up between those advancing from Uri and those advancing from Punch. Pakistan feared that after this link-up the Indian army would push westward, threatening the whole of Pak-Occupied Kashmir. This limited military operation also threatened the road communications channelling infiltration into northern Kashmir.

Pakistan then decided to undertake the second phase of the operation to sever Kashmir from India. This was given the name - 'Operation Grand Slam'. According to Brig Gulzar Ahmed (Retd), "As a result of Indian offensive in Kashmir, the President of Pakistan in consultation with the C-in-C, Pakistan Army, decided to undertake offensive operations and to attack the enemy in Chamb and Jaurian"(17). This major attack was intended to capture or destroy the Akhnur bridge, lying 40 km from the CFL. This would have cut off Naushahra, Rajauri and Punch from Jammu and Pathankot, as the Jammu-Rajauri road passed over
this bridge. Consequently, the Indian forces, stationed in the north-western sectors of the front, would have been isolated. After this a second tank thrust would have been made towards Jammu which was only about 30 km from Akhnur. Had Jammu also fallen to the invading forces, the land communication with the Indian forces stationed in Jammu and Kashmir would have been snapped, and these forces isolated. With Jammu in his hands Ayub could have dictated terms.

This was a grand plan. It was meticulously planned and well executed to some extent. The Chamb-Jaurian sector, chosen by Pakistan for launching the massive offensive with a powerful armour-cum-infantry force, was bounded in the West by the CPL and in the south by mostly flat fields upto the international border. The Kalidhar range formed its northern bound, and the river Manawar Tawi was the only water-obstacle in this sector. However, this river was only a partial tank obstacle and was fordable during dry weather. India had no anti-tank defences there, and the lay of the land also restricted her use of tanks, whereas Pak armour had freedom of Manoeuvre in its approach to Indian defences. It was the most suitable sector in Jammu and Kashmir for the application of Pakistan's heavy striking power. The terrain favoured the thrust and it had short lines of communication with Pakistan's bases - Sialkot and Kharian. "From the Indian side, the terrain was unfavourable. The 180-kilometre line of communication consisted of a single road from Pathankot. Running close to the Indo-Pak border at some places, it was vulnerable. The bridge over the Chenab at Akhnur could not take heavy tanks"(18).

Further, river Chenab provided an effective right flank security to the Pak offensive, but imposed a serious logistic handicap on Indian Operations. "While Pakistan could assemble a striking force without legal complications in its own nearby territory, the battle area was in Kashmir, where the disposition of Indian troops was curtailed by the Cease Fire Agreement"(19).

The preparations made by Pakistan for this thrust could not be concealed, and the United Nations observers had warned the Indian authorities of the impending Pak attack in this sector. The warning was probably not taken seriously, and no efforts were made to take adequate counter-measures. The Indian armed strength in the sector remained at about 1,000 men, mainly lightly armed police. Some concrete bunkers, inter-linked by covered communication trenches, were built as a defensive measure. "They had a top storey for observation, the ground storey, with MMG, LMG and RR emplacements for fighting and the basement for
living"(20). The area was under the operational command of 191 Infantry Brigade Group which was responsible for its security. The Brigade had made the following disposition of forces under its command:

(a) HQ 191 Inf Bde Group - At Mandiala crossing
(b) 6 Sikh Light Infantry - Along CFL from Burejal to Pir Jamal
(c) 15 Kumaon - Area Mandiala
(d) 3 Mahar with elements of 3 J&K Militia - Area north of Pir Jamal
(e) 6/5 Gorkha Rifles - General area Kalidhar
(f) 'C' Sqn 20 Lancers - West of Mandiala
(g) 14 Fd Regt - Regiment less one battery in area Chhamb and one battery at Dhak Baniyar
(h) Troop Medium Battery - Area east of Chhamb(21)
(i) 6 Rajput(22) - Concentrated at Akhnur at 0700 hrs on 30 August 1965.

According to the information then available to India, the CFL was held by Pakistan with only two Azad Kashmir battalions and about 600 para-military personnel. A squadron of armour and a Baluch battalion were kept in depth. Across the international border in the south, one infantry battalion, a regiment of armour (less two squadrons) and a mechanized battalion were stationed. Pakistan had kept its reserve around Bhimber and the Marala headworks. It consisted of two infantry battalions, a regiment of armour and 14 Para Brigade (less a battalion). The artillery force included two field regiments, one medium battery (155 mm howitzer) and two heavy mortar batteries(23).

With this force, India thought, Pakistan posed no major threat in the immediate future. The maximum it would do was to indulge in shelling, raids and infiltration by guerillas. During a meeting on 31 August 1965 at Srinagar, between the Chief of the Army Staff, General Officer Commanding XV Corps and the Director, Military Operations, the Army Chief opined that "Pak had not so far officially associated herself with infiltrators, but if she decided to do so
she was likely to attack in Chhamb or in Jhangar-Nowshera, simultaneously stepping up infiltrators"(24). He further remarked: "It was difficult to say whether Pak dispositions were purely defensive or were for offensive purposes but in any case an offensive by Pak was unlikely to get very far"(25). Lt Gen Katoch, however, thought that "Pak was bound to react to our taking of Hajl Pir and would either go for Jhangar, Nowshera or attack in Chhamb Area"(26). But he was of the opinion that Pakistan would not be able to take the Akhnur bridge. These observations reveal some misreading of Pakistan's intentions and capabilities by Indian army Generals.

Contrary to Indian assessment, Pakistan had already decided to launch a big attack in Chhamb-Jaurian sector with more than two regiments of armour (Sherman and Patton tanks mixed - 80% Pattons) two Field Regiments, two Medium Regiments, one Heavy Mortar Battery, and 7th Infantry Division, consisting of eight infantry battalions(27). The tasks allotted to this force were:

(a) To secure the west bank of Manawar Wali Tawi and effect crossings in Chhamb-Mandiala areas on D Day.

(b) To capture Akhnur Bridge at the earliest.

(c) To use the Hill Section between Kalidhar Ridge and Kalit for sending infiltrators and columns of regular infantry to establish road blocks between Sunderbani and Akhnur in the general area Tanda(28).

On the Indian side the tasks allotted to XV Corps on 31 August 1965 were:

(a) to hunt out infiltrators;

(b) to complete Uri-Punch link-up; and

(c) to be prepared for an offensive by Pakistan.

The Corps Commander accepted these tasks and hoped to complete the Uri-Punch link-up by 3 September. He felt confident to repulse the Pak attack on Jhangar, expected to be a minor one. He, however, realised that his major weakness was in artillery, and sought permission to call on a medium regiment and field regiment from 26 Inf Div, if required. Subsequently, during the course of discussions he amplified that Pakistan's likely area of offensive would include a thrust towards Naushahra
or into the Chhamb sector. But he assured that Pakistan would not be able to capture Akhnur bridge, although he expressed concern about the linear defences in the Jhangar sector. These discussions continued even on 1 September 1965, which show that India was guessing regarding the timing and area of Pak offensive even up to the eleventh hour.

Brig Mammonoh Singh, had taken over the command of 191 Inf Bde Gp on 15 August 1965, following the death of Brig Masters killed by Pak shelling, and was new to the job. Prior to this, he was commanding 162 Inf Bde under 26 Inf Div with HQ in Jammu. 191 Inf Bde Gp was an independent formation, directly under XV Corps, and its area of responsibility was very large, covering approximately 83 km of the international border and 32 km of the CFL, containing 66 border posts. While the Indian border posts on the international border were manned by the Punjab Armed Police (PAP), the Indian posts on the CFL were held by the Indian Army. Chicken's Neck also fell in this Bde Sector. By 16 August 1965, 3 J&K Militia had lost 8 pickets. The Bde Commander had only two battalions-9 Punjab and 3 Mahar - at that time. Now, 2 Sikh joined him, and by 24 August all the eight lost pickets were recovered by him. Brig Mammoohan Singh had a plan to deploy the infantry battalions on Troti heights, but he did not have sufficient troops to do that. To make things worse, the Corps Commander took away 2 Sikh, two regiments of medium artillery and some more infantry from 191 Inf Bde in order to reinforce Punch.

Brig Mammoohan Singh asked for anti-tank mines but they never reached him. He sent his tank commanders along with infantry patrols to detect Pak tanks through tank noise or by observing armour tracks on the ground. The latter confirmed reports about Pak armour concentrations in the area, but the Corps HQ would not believe(29). The Brigadier concentrated all his RCL guns on road Dewa, and his armour (out of one Squadron, three tanks were already disabled) in the south.

Exploiting to the maximum India's ignorance of the impending danger, Pakistan launched a three-pronged attack with a force, estimated to be a division of Infantry and two regiments of armour. The attack began at about 0400 hrs on 1 September with an intense artillery and mortar bombardment on all the Indian posts along the Cease-Fire Line in the Chhamb sector. Pakistan had deployed IV Corps Artillery to support the attack on Chhamb. Pak IV Corps, commanded by Lt Gen Bakhtiar Md. Rana, had the following

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artillery units under its command:

2  Field Regiment
39 Field Regiment
81 Azad Kashmir Field Battery
8  Medium Regiment
28 Medium Regiment
32 Battery, 10 Medium Regiment
124 Battery, 33 Heavy Regiment (155 mm guns)
127 Battery, 34 Heavy Regiment (8 inch howitzer)
111 Battery, 29 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment
17 Corps Locating Regiment(30).

Chhamb-Mandiala Battle

The Pak artillery units selected for the assault assembled near Padhar, where IV Corps Artillery Command post and 17 Corps Locating Regiment Command post were established. The guns shelled all the forward posts occupied by the Indian soldiers from Red Hill to Burejal. Heavy artillery fire was also directed towards Mandiala and Chhamb villages and on Mandiala crossing and gun areas(31). The shelling was so heavy that even the buildings in Jammu felt its tremors(32). Under the cover of this massive fire-support, Pakistani forces surged forward. Simultaneously, Pakistan launched an attack on Jhangar, about 56 km north-west of Chhamb, also at 0400 hrs. The place was heavily bombarded for about two hours to keep the Indian army guessing about Pakistan's intentions.

Around 0600 hrs, Pakistan attacked the post of Burejal, south of Chhamb, where the CFL and the international boundary met. The assault was repulsed, but the post was again attacked by a column that came across the international border. Both the assault columns had armour support of about a squadron each. Meanwhile, a third column, with a squadron of Pattons, had advanced through the gap between Moel and Paur at about 0030 hrs. Indian squadron of 20 Lancers boldly faced the enemy and knocked out about ten enemy tanks. These attacks were, however, only probes, and while the above battle was raging furiously, the main assault came from the direction of Pir Maungawali along general line Green Ridge - Bramia - Dewa on the road to Mandiala. It was a Brigade attack with a regiment of Pattons and one motorised battalion.

With the meagre armour at its disposal, 191 Brigade was in no position to stem the three-pronged assault for long. By about 1000 hrs, Pakistan was able to cut off 3 Mahar from other Indian troops, south of Dewa. One AMX troop, rushed from area Chhamb, was also caught on the run and destroyed by
pak armour. Other Indian posts - Moel, Paur and Burejal were also overrun by Pak armour. Advancing further, it attacked 15 Kumaon's forward defence line and almost overran its two forward companies. This brought Pak tanks within 450 metres of the Brigade Headquarters. At this moment, in a remarkable performance, a 15 Kumaoni RCL destroyed the leading Pak tank and knocked out the barrel of the following tank. Apprehending more RCLs and tanks in Mandiala area, the Pak tanks turned towards the south. But, by now most of the Indian posts had either been overrun or surrounded by Pak tanks and the defenders were either killed or taken prisoner.

In this grim situation, at noon the Brigade Commander made an urgent request for immediate air strikes by the IAF. But the IAF sorties came at 1700 hrs when the situation had vastly changed. The IAF ground attack might have acted as deterrent to Pakistan's tank advance, but unfortunately it also hit Indian gun positions and armour, causing considerable damage(33). All artillery ammunition lorries, three AMX tanks, one Armoured Recovery Vehicle and one ammunition lorry with tank ammunition, were destroyed in the IAF strikes.

Pak advance continued, and by 1800 hrs it succeeded in driving a wedge between Mandiala and Chhab. By 2200 hrs, about 10 Pakistani tanks crossed over to the eastern bank of river Manawar Tawi. Simultaneously with this attack, Pakistan also made a thrust in the hilly section of Chhab sector, and captured Red Hill and Green Hill pickets, held by 3 Jammu and Kashmir Militia. 191 Inf Bde Headquarters was thus put in great danger. Orders for its withdrawal were, therefore, issued at 2100 hrs on 1 September, and 191 Inf Bde Gp HQ, 6 Sikh LI, 15 Kumaon, 14 Field Regiment, including medium troop, and the surviving elements of C squadron withdrew to Jaurian, leaving behind heavy equipment(34). However, 3 Mahar, 6/5 Gorkha Rifles and remnants of 3 Jammu and Kashmir Militia were to continue holding their defence in area Kalidhar.

Now, 191 Inf Bde was made responsible for the defence of Akhnur, including the Akhnur Bridge, and 6 Rajput, already deployed for the defence of the bridge, was placed under command 191 Inf Bde. At about 0630 hrs on 2 September, Pakistani Sabre jets strafed, rocketed and bombed the Jaurian area, inflicting considerable damage to Indian forces, especially 3 Punjab Armed Police. 191 Inf Bde Gp less 9 Punjab and 3 Mahar concentrated at Akhnur and redeployed for its defence. Elements of C Squadron 20 Lancers were deployed as covering troops under 41 Mtn
Bde for the defence of the Jaurian heights.

Meanwhile, Headquarters XV Corps had been watching with growing concern the rapidly deteriorating situation. Earlier in the afternoon of 1 September, it had ordered 10 Inf Div to take charge of the situation. The task allotted to it was to stem the Pak offensive and defend Akhnur Bridge and Kalidhar complex. Frantic efforts were also made to rush troops to reinforce the sector. Orders were issued on 1 September 1965, for the move of the following:-

(a) 6 Rajput from 163 Mtn Bde for defence of Akhnur Bridge. (The battalion arrived at its destination after first light on 2 September 1965).

(b) 20 Lancers less two squadrons from Pathankot. (On arrival this armour element was placed under command 41 Mtn Bde which was already in the process of occupying an intermediate position in Jaurian).

(c) 28 Inf Bde (consisting of 2 Grenadiers, 5/8 Gorkha Rifles and 1/1 Gorkha Rifles) from Pathankot to Damana. The formation reached Damana at 0800 hrs on 2 September 1965 and was designed as Corps reserve. 161 Fd Regt and its affiliated artillery complement were sent forward to Jaurian to support 41 Mtn Bde. 1/1 GR were ordered to move to area Chauki Chaura for the protection of line of communication Akhnur-Sunderbani.

Pakistan had based the success of its offensive on surprise, speed and slow reaction on India's part on account of time-consuming process of decision-making in a democracy. 'Grand Slam' did achieve surprise, and Chhamb fell on the first day. But, thereafter Pakistani offensive lost its momentum. Instead of pushing on to Jaurian, the Pakistanis were inactive till 3 September, which gave 41 Brigade time to prepare its defences. According to Gen Musa, the first stage of the offensive operations ended with the capture of Chhamb and the advance of the Pak army to their side of Manawar Tawi river. In the second phase, Maj Gen Akhtar Husain Malik was replaced by Maj Gen Yahya Khan as commander of the Pak forces. The change of commanders took place on 2 September at 1100 hrs. This, Gen Musa claims, was pre-planned and not an after-thought. Whether this change was pre-planned or not, the stubborn resistance put up by the defenders certainly forced Pakistan to delay its advance and move cautiously.
But the sudden collapse of 191 Inf Bde had created a critical situation. The feasibility of making a firm stand on Jaurian-Kalit line with both 41 Mtn Bde and 28 Inf Bde was considered, but it was decided to contest the Jaurian position with 41 Mtn Bde only, keeping 28 Inf Bde in hand as Corps reserve for the final defence of Akhnur. Orders were accordingly issued to 41 Mtn Bde (which had only two battalions under it at the time), to occupy the Jaurian-Troti position as quickly as possible (35).

41 Mtn Bde acted quickly, and reported in the morning of 3 September 1965 that the intermediate position at Jaurian was reasonably well prepared to oppose the enemy. The armour support to this position comprised 20 Lancers less two squadrons, plus the remnants of 'C' squadron which had so far been battling with the enemy single-handed. 161 Fd Regt, commanded by Lt Col V.N. Swami, and a battery of 38 Medium Regt, provided the artillery support.

Meanwhile Pak Infantry had also consolidated their positions along river Manawar Tawi. By 1930 hrs on 2 September, they had crossed the river unopposed and established a bridgehead. They renewed the offensive at about 1200 hrs on 3 September, and at about 1800 hrs the same day, the enemy mounted a major attack on Jaurian with approximately thirty tanks, supported by infantry and heavy concentration of artillery from the north. The attacks was repulsed with losses on both sides, but it was clear that 41 Mtn Bde would not be able to hold this attack for long. Indian forces fought stubbornly, but had to withdraw (36). 191 Infantry Brigade was still in the process of preparing its defences in Akhnur area and was not in a position to withstand the Pak onslaught. 28 Inf Bde, consisting of 2 Grenadiers and 5/8 Gorkha Rifles, was, therefore, rushed in at this critical juncture. It was placed under command 10 Inf Div at last light 3 September 1965, and was allotted the task of holding a delaying position on the general line of Fatwal Ridge, approximately 10 km West of Akhnur by first light 4 September 1965.

During 2-5 September 1965, the order of battle of 10 Inf Div was (37):

1. 191 Inf Bde Group

(a) At Akhnur:

6 Rajput (new arrival)

6 Sikh LI

15 Kumaon } After fighting the

} initial thrust on

} 1 September
6/5 GR
3 PAP (remnants)
14 Field Regiment (elements)

(b) Area Kalidhar/Sunderbani:
3 Mahar
9 Punjab
3 J and K Militia
One tp 123 Med Regt

2. **41 Mtn Bde (Jaurian)**
9 Mahar
1/8 GR
161 Fd Regt
123 Med Bty less one bty and one tp (tp det to Sunderbani)

3. **28 Inf Bde** (Damana/Fatwal)
2 Grenadiers
1/1 GR (det to Chauki Chaura 2 September)
5/8 GR

The disposition of the Indian forces in the Divisional sector on 4 September was:-

(a) **Jaurian-Troti**
41 Mtn Bde was under heavy enemy pressure but was expected to hold out until night 4/5 September 1965.

(b) **Fatwal Ridge**
28 Inf Bde (two battalions) was in the process of preparing a hasty delaying position.

(c) **Akhnur**
191 Inf Bde was strengthening its sector around Akhnur with mines.
Post No. 707 had fallen during the night 3/4 September 1965. 3 Mahar, 9 Punjab and elements of 3 Jammu and Kashmir Militia were, however, in occupation of the Main Hill feature (9 Punjab had relieved 6/5 Gorkha Rifles on night 1/2 September 1965).

The Pak forces renewed the attack on Jaurian position at about 1100 hrs on 4 September and also attempted to outflank the position with armour from the south. The assault was a determined attempt on Jaurian from the north with a force of one armoured regiment and two infantry battalions, supported by one regiment each of field and medium guns and a heavy mortar battery. The battle raged till 1400 hrs, when, in spite of repeated armour and infantry attacks and three forward company positions having been overrun, the situation was stabilised through counter-attacks. Later in the evening, considerable enemy movement forward was reported across Manawar Tawi towards Jaurian and Kalit, as also armour and infantry concentration north and south of the Indian positions. The situation of 41 Mtn Bde had become desperate and the formation itself was in danger of being overrun. Accordingly, 41 Mtn Bde was withdrawn during night 4/5 September 1965 to area Akhnur, passing through Fatwal Ridge position which had been occupied by 28 Inf Bde on the previous night. During this critical battle 161 Field Regiment had abandoned their guns the previous day. Strict orders were issued making it obligatory on the formation to retrieve the guns at all costs. But, it appears, that its attempts could not succeed due to intensive Pak shelling.

Pakistani troops followed the withdrawing Indians, and leaned on Indian defences on both Jaurian and Kalit axes in the afternoon of 5 September. They maintained pressure by armour and artillery all along the front, and patrols and probing elements made contact with the delaying position of 28 Inf Bde (2 Grenadiers and 5/8 GR) by 1530 hrs on 5 September(38). Then it made a determined attack on 2 Grenadiers by the southern flank of the brigade on 6 September, making extensive use of artillery and tank fire and MMGs mounted on Jeeps. The attack was, however, effectively repulsed. An attack was also made from the north but it was also repulsed.

Meanwhile, frantic efforts were being made by the UNO since 2 September to arrange a cease-fire between India and Pakistan. Pakistan was, however, not in a mood to listen and paid no heed to UNO.
pleadings. The Security Council called for an immediate cease-fire on 4 September. Pakistan, as if to show her disdain for such calls, carried out an air-raid on Amritsar the next day (39). By now the crisis in the Chamb sector was rapidly slipping into disaster. To relieve Pakistan's pressure in this sector it became inevitable to mount a full-fledged offensive in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors by XI and I Corps respectively on 6 September. Within a few hours of opening of the Indian offensive, the major portion of Pak medium armour, artillery and a brigade of infantry were ordered to pull out of the Chamb sector. Pakistan's ambitious thrust towards the Akhnur Bridge was thus stumped just in the nick of time.

However, Patton regiments were quickly replaced by a tank destroyer unit; also there was no appreciable let up in artillery fire. Pakistan was thus able to maintain pressure all through, only changing her tactics to increased employment of infantry. But Pak advance was effectively halted, and India decided to launch counter-offensive in this sector against the remaining Pak forces. Plans were, therefore, made for an offensive in this sector on night 6/7 September 1965:

(a) 28 Inf Bde, with 20 Lancers less one Squadron and one troop, 6/5 Gorkha Rifles and 5/8 Gorkha Rifles were to advance on the main axis, secure Jaurian heights and be prepared to seize the Chamb crossing.

(b) 191 Inf Bde Gp, with two troops 20 Lancers, 6 Rajput and 15 Kumaon, were to advance along axis Akhnur-Kalit, secure Kalit and then seize Mandiala crossing.

(c) After the capture of Jaurian by 28 Inf Bde, 41 Mtn Bde, with 1/1 Gorkha Rifles and 1/8 Gorkha Rifles, was to pass through and seize Chamb, if not already secured by the former.

However, the offensive did not make much headway, because the Indians did not have adequate superiority in armour and artillery. The advancing columns were halted by intense artillery and tank fire on 7 September. 28 Inf Bde just struggled up to short of Chak Karpal. On 7 September, 191 Infantry Brigade Group with 15 Kumaon and two troops of 20 Lancers moved to area Kaikn. Then 15 Kumaon advanced along axis Akhnur-Kalit with under command two troops of armour at 0730 hrs. Pakistanis were found in good strength here and their tanks, RCL and MMG fire
engaged Indian forces at Thunder Wali Khad and knocked out one AMX tank, dispersed the infantry and separated it from the armour. In addition, one Company 15 Kumaon was ambushed in area Jad. Although, the Indian armour and infantry were pulled back, they suffered heavy casualties - over 120, including approximately 30 killed, and 2 AMX tanks lost. On 8 September 1965, the above plan was revised, and regrouping and allotment of tasks were ordered as under:

(a) 28 Infantry Brigade, with 6/5 Gorkha Rifles, 2 Grenadiers and one squadron 20 Lancers, were to be in defence astride road Akhnur-Jaurian.

(b) 191 Inf Bde, with 5/8 Gorkha Rifles, 6 Rajput, 15 Kumaon and two troops 20 Lancers were to deploy along road Akhnur-Kaink-Kalit.

(c) 41 Mtn Bde, with 6 Sikh Light Infantry, 1/1 Gorkha Rifles and 1/8 Gorkha Rifles, was to be responsible for the close defence of Akhnur. It was also to be prepared to advance to Jaurian.

On night 8/9 September, the two forward brigades improved their positions. Intensive patrolling was carried out on their respective fronts, despite intermittent shelling by Pak artillery, leading to a number of patrol clashes. The situation stabilised on 9 September 1965, and a fresh offensive was planned to advance along the main axis. General Officer Commanding 10 Inf Div issued his verbal orders at 1600 hrs on 9 September 1965. The three-phased plan in outline was:-

(a) Phase I

Attack on Chak Karpal by 2 Grenadiers, under 28 Inf Bde, during night 9/10 September 1965.

(b) Phase II

One company 15 Kumaon, with two troops tanks, to advance at first light 10 September 1965 to threaten Chak Karpal from the north and rear. Responsibility for this was of 191 Infantry Brigade Group.

(c) Phase III

Thereafter 41 Mtn Brigade was to advance to Jaurian.
On 10 September, 2 Grenadiers made another attempt to capture Chak Karpal, supported by a squadron of tanks astride the Jaurian axis. But under the intense artillery and medium machine gun fire, the battalion disintegrated before it had even left the forming up place, and had to be extricated with difficulty. The unit suffered heavy casualties during this disastrous action - fourteen killed, forty-six wounded and twelve missing. The company of the Kumaoonis, with two troops of tanks coming in from the North, ran into stiff opposition, consisting of two troops Shermans, and a company plus of infantry, with four recoilless guns, supported by heavy artillery. This group, too, failed in its mission, and after a fight, lasting six hours, returned to the base. Pak casualties were three Shermans and one RCL gun destroyed or damaged. India lost three AMX tanks(40).

The same day, 41 Mtn Bde was moved to the XI Corps Zone of operations. This took away the striking potential of 10 Inf Div, and the Indian position at Fatwal took a permanent shape. But the enemy continued to exert pressure against Indian defences along the Fatwal Ridge and infiltrated in force in the hilly area to the North, i.e. between Fatwal Ridge and Kalidhar. Accordingly, fresh grouping became essential, and was effected as under:-

(a) 28 Inf Bde, with 6 Rajput, 6/5 Gorkha Rifles, 5/8 Gorkha Rifles, one company 1/1 Gorkha Rifles, and one squadron 20 Lancers, was to be responsible for operations in area Fatwal Ridge, with the task of sealing both the axes.

(b) 191 Inf Bde Gp, with under command 1/1 Gorkha Rifles less one company, 3 Kumaon and 2 Grenadiers, was to operate in the hilly area to the North. The troops already deployed in Kalidhar area, (9 Punjab, 3 Mahar and elements of 3 Jammu and Kashmir Militia) were to come under command 191 Inf Bde Gp. Headquarters 191 Inf Bde Gp was to be located at Tanda(41).

After the initial reverses on 1-2 and 3-4 September, 3 Mahar and 9 Punjab had taken up resolute defences on Kalidhar Ridge. While the operations in Chhamb-Jaurian were going on, Pakistan had made repeated attempts to dislodge the Indian troops from the Kalidhar Ridge. Pakistan now pushed through approximately two infantry battalions with a force of irregulars into the hills, north of Garh. On 14 September 1965, Indian patrols reported that the enemy
had infiltrated a sizeable force of regular troops and Mujahids in general area Manani-Gulaba Chappar. For clearing this intrusion, two battalions, 1/1 Gorkha Rifles and 3 Kumaon, were employed. 1/1 Gorkha Rifles attacked and captured Point 2357 on 14 September 1965, after inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. On 18 September, they captured Manani after a well-fought action, again inflicting heavy casualties on Pak forces. Similarly, 3 Kumaon attacked the Pak position at Gulaba Chappar on 17 September and captured it at 1530, after inflicting approximately sixty-three casualties, including thirty-three killed. Large quantities of arms, ammunitions and stores were also captured. The Pak column in area Dager was also effectively stopped, and the enemy fell back towards Gopiwala in area Keri. Next, 3 Kumaon attacked Keri at 0300 hrs on 18 September, but the enemy artillery and counter-attack by approximately three companies foiled this attempt(42). In spite of the initial success, Gulaba Chappar could not be retained for long, and 3 Kumaon had to firm in at Jalara.

On 19 September 1965, 10 Inf Div received fresh instructions from Headquarters XV Corps based on the information that one Pak medium armoured regiment was likely to be employed in the Akhnur sector. The tasks allotted to 10 Inf Div at this stage were:

i. Hold present positions forward of Akhnur.

ii. Defend Akhnur at all costs.

iii. Hold Kalidhar Ridge.

iv. Be prepared to resume offensive to regain Troti-Kalit position and exploit forward to Manawar Wali Tawi.

v. Protect line of communication Akhnur-Sunderbani.

vi. At suitable opportunity, capture area Dager.

For offensive tasks, one infantry battalion and one squadron of AMX tanks were to be made available. 2 Grenadiers was earmarked as Corps reserve at six hours notice.

Increased activity of enemy was reported in area Gulaba Chappar on 20 September 1965. Encounter with Pak patrols also took place, in which both sides suffered casualties. Consequently, 28 Inf Bde was warned for a likely offensive task in Dager area. 6 Sikh Light Infantry less one company, and 2 Grenadiers less one company were placed under
command for this operation. This task was changed the next day when 28 Inf Bde was alerted for an offensive along road Akhnur-Jaurian on night 22/23 September 1965. The following additional troops were made available to the formation for the operation:-

(a) 11 Kumaon
(b) 1/1 Gorkha Rifles
(c) 2 Grenadiers
(d) One squadron 20 Lancers

However, the offensive was called off due to the coming of the Cease-fire on night 23 September 1965.

Meghdoot Force

It is appropriate to describe here the exploits of the Meghdoot Force, which operated unconventionally like Wingate's Chindits, although on a smaller scale, behind the enemy lines in the Uri-Punch and Chhamb sectors. Major Megh Singh, who had experience of clandestine operations in Burma during the Second World War and was on the verge of retirement from the Army, offered his services to Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh, GOC-in-C, Western Command, to head a special group to operate behind the enemy lines in Jammu and Kashmir. The Army Commander readily agreed to this. Major Megh Singh raised a batch of young and hardy men from 3 Rajput(43). After a short but intensive training, he prepared his Force by 1 September 1965, for operations "in the guts of the enemy".

During the night of 1/2 September 1965, this Force blew up an important culvert on road Dwarandi-Bandigopalpur 10 km deep in enemy territory. During 6/7 September, Maj Megh Singh's men captured 2 formidable enemy pickets - Neza Pir and Ari Dhok - in actions complementary to the main attack on Raja and Chand Tekri pickets. When 3 Dogra, after the capture of Chand Tekri, faced difficulties near the Kahuta Bridge, the Meghdoot Force came to the rescue. By a well-planned and bold manoeuvre, this Force drove away the enemy from this vital bridge area. Credit goes to Maj Megh Singh for the establishment of the link-up with 68 Inf Bde, south of Haji Pir, on 10 September 1965.

The Meghdoot Force demonstrated that great success could be achieved by small groups of specially trained and resolute troops, operating in the rear of the enemy. Maj Megh Singh made a creditable contribution of his Force, besides leading it to successful exploits. For this, he was awarded Vir Chakra and promoted as a Lt Col on 16 September 1965.
As the Haji Pir area grew quiet, the Meghdoot Force was shifted to the Chhamb area, where a full-fledged War started in early September 1965. In the Chhamb area, the Force carried out harrassing raids, spreading chaos and confusion behind the enemy lines. On 18 September, the Force captured an enemy stronghold at Thil, in the Kalidhar sector, about 4000 metres deep in the enemy held territory after killing 50 persons and wounding 70. Only two men of the Meghdoot Force were wounded in this attack. Next, the Force raided an enemy administrative base in area Nathal, about 12 km behind the enemy lines, at 0200 hrs. Approximately one company of enemy troops, guarding the base, was completely surprised, and fled after suffering casualties. After destroying the supply dump, the Force moved back and encountered another enemy post in Thuggi area at 0600 hrs. There ensued a fierce hand-to-hand fight in which 22 Pak troops were killed and another 40 wounded as against one OR killed and 3 ORs wounded on the Indian side. Lt Col Megh Singh was also wounded in this action. Operations of the Meghdoot Force ended on Cease-Fire on 23 September 1965.

Operations after Cease-Fire

Even after the declaration of the Cease-Fire, Pakistan with the characteristic frustration of a bad loser, continued to bolster the remnants of the infiltration groups. In the hills, Pakistanis infiltrated in large numbers, occupying Malla and Point 3776. These encroachments posed a serious threat to Sunderbani Road, and so, major attacks were launched to wrest the places back from Pakistan. It was on the night of 30 September/1 October that 1 Madras advanced over a difficult route in the face of the heavy artillery and MG fire. With the help of its artillery support and simultaneous attack by 6 Sikh Light Infantry on the target, 1 Madras captured Malla after a bitter struggle, by 0645 hrs on 1 October. Pakistan heavily shelled Malla area after its occupation by 1 Madras, and most of the casualties suffered by 1 Madras were due to enemy artillery air bursts.

The eviction of Pak forces who had occupied Point 3776 proved more difficult. The task was entrusted to 6 Sikh LI. As a prelude to assault on the main height, it was found essential to occupy two near-by ring contours. These were captured on 28 September through the enthusiasm and grit of the battalion, though it was a very difficult and steep climb. But soon, the Pak artillery heavily shelled the place and more than 50 Pak companies, supported by MMGs and mortars, inflicted heavy casualties and
forced the Sikhs to withdraw. Plans were then taken in hand to re-occupy the area. On 3 October, 163 Field Regiment (less battery) arrived from 25 Inf Div. A troop of medium guns also moved from Akhnur, and in addition, 100 Field Bty ex 14 Field Regiment was made available as artillery support for the assault.

On 4 October, 52 Mtn Bde, commanded by Brig R.D. Hira, came under command 10 Inf Div, and was located at Chauki Chaura. The new order of Battle of 191 Inf Bde on this day was:-

(a) 9 Punjab
(b) 1 Madras
(c) 6 Sikh LI
(d) 3 Mahar
(e) 11 Mahar
(f) Company ex 2 Grenadiers
(g) Company ex 3 J and K Militia

With this battle order, 191 Bde was allotted the following tasks:-

(a) Hold feature north of Jhang
(b) Secure and hold Point 3776
(c) Hold Kalidhar ridge
(d) Defend Sunderbani

The immediate task was to secure and hold Point 3776, for which a three-pronged attack was planned. Accordingly, the Indian artillery commenced heavy firing on Pak forces around Point 3776 at 0450 hrs on 4 October. The Pak strength in the area was about a company plus, supported by Mortars, MMGs and Machine Guns. 6 Sikh LI attacked and captured area Twin Pimples at about 0600 hrs after a stiff fight. But, 11 Mahar, which was to launch the main thrust from the south, disintegrated due to heavy enemy shelling, and the company 3 Mahar, which was to attack from the west, could also not make any progress. The whole burden thus fell upon 6 Sikh LI, which was still able to reach the objective. Pak forces counter-attacked immediately after, but were thrown back. Once again the enemy made a determined attack, but it was again repulsed. 6 Sikh LI continued its advance and, despite the heavy shelling by Pak forces and the
casualties already suffered, it was able to secure Ring Contour by 1430 hrs on 4 October after a hand-to-hand fight(44).

6 Sikh LI was then re-inforced by releasing one 6 Sikh LI platoon from the gun area, and then ordered to advance further. Simultaneously, one company 2 Grenadiers moved to Point 2317 from Jhang to occupy it as firm base for 6 Sikh LI. It was on 5 October morning that 6 Sikh LI attacked Point 3776 with tremendous dash and determination, and after one of the heaviest fightings encountered in the entire sector, occupied it by 0700 hrs. In the process, it killed 44 Pakistanis (counted on the ground) and wounded about 50 others. Besides congratulating Lt Col Nand Gopal CO 6 Sikh LI, for this excellent achievement, the Brigade Commander recommended immediate award of four Maha Vir Chakras (two of them posthumous) and three Vir Chakras to 6 Sikh LI.

In 25 Inf Div sector also, Pakistanis infiltrated into many areas, and consequently large-scale combing operations had to be mounted to flush out the infiltrators from their hideouts. By 16 October 1965, the last of the invaders was swept out of Jammu and Kashmir.

In addition, to the above counter-infiltration actions, two major operations were undertaken in the Mendhar and the Kishanganga sectors. These actions are described in the succeeding paragraphs.

Mendhar Sector - The Battle of OP Hill

Apart from the infiltration activities already described, the only action of any significance in the Mendhar sector was the battle of OP Hill, which took place after the Cease-fire had come into effect on 23 September 1965. Located on the south-west of the road Mendhar-Balnoi, Chuni-Nar feature with a height of 1524 metres provided a dominating view over Indian defences and road Mendhar - Balnoi. The feature comprised a complex of hills, and was mentioned in official correspondence as 'OP HILL'. It was sometime in early August 1965 that Pakistan had occupied this feature and gradually developed it into a battalion-defended position, when the Indian troops were busy dealing with the infiltrators and defending the CFL. The first time Pakistan is fired from 'OP HILL' on 2 Dogra Picket 636 was at 2300 hrs on 13 August. Pak troops used MGs and also sent a jitter party which used 2 inch mortars. The jitter party was effectively engaged by 2 Dogra and chased away. Again on 22 August, Pakistan shelled Picket 636 intermittently throughout the night and attacked in
strength at 0445 hrs the next morning. The attack was repulsed after a hard fighting. No action was, however, taken to evict the enemy forthwith which gave them an opportunity to develop and strengthen the defences on OP Hill. But OP Hill was not a lodgement area tactically large enough to act as a base for future operations, although it was an ideal location for artillery observers.

Having failed in their efforts to capture Pt 636 by a direct attack, the Pak troops infiltrated in the area on 18 September in a bid to isolate and "strangle" the picket. This intrusion was flushed out by a coy attack on night 20/21 September. Pakistan then concentrated on the development of OP Hill into a stronghold. The position was developed along three spurs emanating from a central position, called OP Hill. From 27 September the Pakistanis started using explosives to improve defence works. They also resorted to shelling of 2 Dogra base at Baloi and Picket 636. The movement of vehicle convoys and large bodies of troops by day on road Mendhar-Baloi was made impossible.

To dislodge the enemy from OP Hill, an attack by 2 Garhwal Rifles was mounted on night 6/7 October 1965. But by now the enemy had prepared shell-proof bunkers and wired the strongly built defences. It also counter-attacked repeatedly with overwhelming strength. The attack was repulsed with heavy losses(45). Subsequently, it was found that India had under-estimated the defence potentialities of the position and at least a Brigade attack was needed to evict the enemy from OP Hill. Before undertaking further operations for the recovery of OP Hill, it was considered expedient to appeal to the UN Observers. But on the failure of the UN Observers to get the area vacated by Pak forces, a decision was taken on 15 October to mount a Brigade attack on the feature.

The operation was planned and executed by Brig B.S. Ahluwalia, Commander 120 Inf Bde, who assumed the command of the Brigade only on 16 October 1965. According to the plan of operation, a three-phased Brigade attack was to be mounted. In phase one, 2 Dogra was given the task of capturing Twin Pimples and Black Rocks, and 5 Sikh LI was to capture White Rocks on D Day. In phase two, 7 Sikh was to capture Jungle and OP Hill by 0500 hrs on D+1. The battalion plan of 2 Dogra was to launch the attack with two companies. D Company was to capture Black Rocks, whereas C company with a platoon of A company was to capture Twin Pimples. B Company was to remain as reserve for D Company, and A company less platoon was to be the reserve for C Company.
Assaulting companies crossed the Cease-Fire Line at 2200 hrs on 2 November and formed up for the final assault below their respective objectives at 2245 hrs, under heavy enemy artillery and automatic fire. C company and a platoon of A company suffered about 50 per cent casualties due to enemy shelling and automatic fire. Yet the determined soldiers pushed on through the minefield and wire obstacles and finally captured Twin Pimples and the feature south-west of it by 2345 hrs after a hand-to-hand fight. There remained only 20 gallant survivors from C company to hold Twin Pimples. The rest were either killed or wounded. The platoon of A company also suffered heavy casualties. However, the Pak soldiers fled, leaving behind 11 dead and a large quantity of arms, ammunition and equipment.

D company also suffered heavy casualties due to enemy shelling and automatic fire, but continued to advance and reached within 45 metres of its objective. Here, it met with extensive minefield, wire obstacles and devastating enemy automatic fire, as a result of which the four assaulting sections of the two leading platoons were practically written off. But the remnants pushed through the minefield on a narrow frontage and created a breach through the obstacles and established a foothold. During the two-hour long severe battle, the company was badly mauled. B company was rushed to reinforce D company, but by then the enemy opposition had also stiffened, and he was bringing down effective fire on B and D companies. The progress upto 0030 hrs was very little, and B company had suffered about one-third of its strength as casualties. The battle continued for two hours more, and Black Rock was finally captured by 0430 hrs on 3 November.

Now, 5 Sikh LI was given the limited task of capturing White Rocks. All ranks were imbued with the spirit of capturing OP Hill, and, if possible, Jungle, Hill and Twin Trees. Accordingly, the operation plan of the battalion was:-

Phase I - B company was to capture White Rocks, C company was to capture area between White Rocks and OP Hill.

Phase II - Capture of OP Hill by D company.

Phase III - Capture of Jungle Hill by A company.

Phase IV - Capture of Twin Trees by D company.
It was decided that the attack would be mounted during moonlight through the southern approach, which was least expected, because it was steep, providing no room for deployment. Move to forming up place began at 1830 hrs on 2 November. The move was along the tracing tape which amounted to tight rope-walking. After reaching the forming up place, B and C coy's reached dangerously close to artillery concentration undetected. B company had reached as close as 23 metres, closely followed by D company in platoon waves, when it charged the enemy with speed and determination. "Officers JCOs, NCOs and Jawans were suffering heavy casualties due to extensive minefields, heavy concentration of enemy air burst shells, well co-ordinated fire of a large number of automatic weapons and showers of grenades, but all eyes were glued on the objective; no body hesitated, no body uttered a word of pain, Jawans with severed limbs, those who had only a few minutes to live and those seriously wounded refused to be attended to but instead exhorted their comrades to move on, to annihilate the enemy, to complete the tasks"(46). Severe hand-to-hand fighting ensued and the crucial objective was captured. The weight and speed of the attack overwhelmed the enemy. C and D coy's rushed forward, charged and captured OP Hill well ahead of time. After quick reorganisation, D company attacked Twin Trees and occupied this also. With this the entire Chun-i-Nar was captured and secured. During the operation the battalion lost 40 ORs killed, and 142 all ranks wounded.

The task originally allotted to 7 Sikh was to capture Jungle, OP Hill, Twin Trees and Lone Tree by 0600 hrs on D+1. The battalion reached forming up place at 2130 hrs on 2 November and the operation began at 2200 hrs. A company which was moving towards Jungle Hill had to encounter very heavy enemy fire. B company which was following A company also came under heavy artillery fire, but the advance continued and a fierce hand-to-hand fight took place after which these companies evicted the enemy from Jungle Hill and occupied it on 3 November(47). The rest of the task allotted to 7 Sikh had already been accomplished by 5 Sikh LI by this time. The following Indian heroes were decorated with gallantry awards:-

Maha Vir Chakra

1. Lt Col Sant Singh - CO, 5 Sikh LI
2. Capt Gautam Mubai - 2 Dogra
3. Naik Darshan Singh - 5 Sikh LI
Vir Chakra

1. Capt Sansar Singh - 7 Sikh
2. Sub Piara Singh - 5 Sikh LI (Posthumous)

Thus it could be seen that the Brigade plan of action involved an enveloping attack from three sides, combined with company strength of troops in the rear to prevent enemy reinforcement or ambush. The plan was brilliantly conceived and executed with courage and determination.

Kishanganga Sector - The Straightening of the Bulge

When Cease-fire was declared, Indians were in control of the area, east of River Kishanganga. But the task still remained to clear the enemy from the area between Point 9013 and Bugiana and to straighten the Kishanganga Bulge. This task was given to 4 Kumaon and 3 Sikh. The battalions had to operate in very rough terrain, made more difficult by the presence of snow. The Kumaonis and the Sikhs, however, set about their mission with dogged determination. 3 Sikh was tasked to destroy the Shahkot bridge. By 0330 hrs on 26 September, D company less platoon 3 Sikh had occupied the area which dominated the road across the Kishanganga river and the Shahkot bridge over it. The bridge was made of concrete and steel rope suspension and was heavily guarded by Pakistani troops, entrenched in concrete bunkers. From here fire was directed against the Indian troops. Initially, attempt was made by 3 Sikh to destroy this bridge by Medium artillery fire. But this could not be accomplished even after firing the whole day on 26 September. Then a party was despatched at about 1830 hrs to raid the bridge. This party was subjected to heavy enemy fire from along and across the Kishanganga. The Pakistanis probably had 81 mm mortars which outranged the Indian mortars. But even then the party succeeded in partially damaging the bridge on 27 September. The Pak troops continued to shell effectively with their mortars from the dominating position for the rest of the month, inflicting some casualties. Another attempt made by 3 Sikh to raid the bridge on 5 October was also foiled by the enemy, who subjected the raiding party to heavy mortar and automatic fire. Efforts to achieve the objective continued in October also, and finally at about 1800 hrs on 12 October, D company was able to blow off the bridge on river Kishanganga. The task allotted to 4 Kumaon on 2 October was to destroy the Jura Bridge. This involved a move over an approximate distance of 40 km at a height upto

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4,000 metres above sea level. The battalion concentrated on 3rd at Bhatija at a height of 3080 metres. The assault force was divided into groups and it reached Bimla Pass (height 4780 metres) on 5 October. Further advance to the objective commenced on 6 October. D Company stormed the objective and captured a Ring Contour by 1730 hrs. Advancing further, it attacked and captured the central position of the Ridge of Point 9020 at 2330 hrs. Twin Pimples were also occupied by the advancing troops at 1700 hrs on 7 October. On 8 October, Point 8667 was occupied after a severe hand-to-hand fight, lasting for over an hour. On 9 October another hill top was assaulted and captured.

For assault on Jura bridge, C and D companies concentrated by the night of 10 October. The enemy was probably aware of these movements and it counter-attacked on 11 October. During the night 10/11 October, it succeeded in infiltrating three companies across the river Kishanganga over the Jura bridge and assaulted the Indian positions repeatedly during the morning. But the Kumaonies beat back all the attacks. Fierce fighting, attacks and counter-attacks continued upto 1230 hrs.

Till now 4 Kumaon had lost 2 Officers, 2 JCOs, 24 ORs and 7 porters killed and 2 Officers, 3 JCOs, 72 ORs and 14 porters wounded. The enemy left behind 111 dead. It was now realised that a direct assault on the Jura bridge was not possible, and that the bridge should be destroyed by RCL guns. These reached Chejua at 1800 hrs on 14 October. Preparation for the destruction of the bridge commenced on 15 October. A fire plan was prepared to engage the enemy 3.7 howitzer and the two known mortar locations. The RCLs were directed against the target, and in the 7th round the bridge was destroyed at about 1215 hrs on 15 October.

Now, the Mirpur-Bugiana Bulge was cleared of the enemy, and the Cease-Fire Line was realigned to follow the course of the Kishanganga. With that, the Indian troops were in complete domination of the Muzaffarabad-Kel Road, and the infiltration routes into Kargil and Gurais had been effectively sealed.

Conclusion

XV Corps operations were neither too successful, nor too disappointing. The Corps' success lay in the counter-infiltration operations, especially in cutting off the sources and routes of Pak intrusion by capturing Kargil heights, Haji Pir Pass, OP Hill and the Kishanganga Bridge. But it met a debacle in the
Chhamb-Jaurian area due to lack of proper military appreciation, purposeful planning, and energetic preparation. No defence works were constructed to stop the Pak advance, nor sufficient armour and artillery were assembled for defending this sector. Even, the need for more ammunition was felt during the operations. Mines did not reach 191 Inf Bde, and although a large number of tanks (20 Lancers Regiment less two Squadrons) were there at Pathankot, unfortunately they were not sent to Chhamb in time(48).

The Pakistanis had expected the crossing of the Manawar Tawi to be strongly opposed by the Indians, but the latter did not dig in on its east bank, nor did they bring armour and artillery in sufficient strength to stop the Pak advance towards Akhnur. It was the last minute, ad hoc regrouping and reinforcement of the Indian forces in the area, and the Indian attack on the Punjab front, that really stemmed the tide of Pak thrust.

The late arrival of the IAF aircraft for ground support resulted in utter confusion. By mistake the IAF Vampires and Mysteres knocked out some of the Indian tanks, and also attacked own ammunition depots and troops. Perhaps it was all due to the lack of proper wireless network for calling up close air support at short notice, and indicating the shifting bomb line on the ground. Not only did 163 Fd Regt fall back leaving their guns undestroyed, at some places even the Indian infantry showed lack of determined will to fight. It is a fact that a large number of Indian troops were newly recruited, as a result of the rapid expansion of the Army. Inter-communication by wireless was not satisfactory, and 3 Mahar remained out of touch with 191 Inf Bde almost throughout the war(49). Only C Sqn 20 Lancers (AMX tanks), under the command of Maj Bhaskar Roy, although out-numbered 1:6 by Pak armour, stood its ground well, thus delaying the Pak advance for enough time to enable the Indian Army to launch its major counter-offensive in the Punjab Sector.

However, the safety of the Akhnur bridge was not the result of Indian generalship, but due to Pak hamhandedness in crossing the Manawar Tawi and changing horses in mid stream, i.e. replacing 12 Inf Div Commander Maj Gen Akhtar Malik with 7 Inf Div Commander Maj Gen Yahya Khan in this area. However, Gen Musa claimed that the change of command in the Chhamb valley was part of his plan, as it was not possible for Maj Gen Akhtar H. Malik to conduct the operations efficiently in Chhamb and also in other parts of far flung Kashmir which was his main
responsibility. Gen Musa thought it unsound to allow Akhtar Malik to be embroiled in the fighting opposite Akhnur on the extreme right flank of his extensive command, stretching over hundreds of miles of hilly areas. According to him, the inability of Malik to exercise effective personal control over his forward troops caused the initial delay in crossing the Manawar Tawi. In fact, his troops were awaiting on the west bank of the Tawi for the code-word for crossing that river, whereas Gen Malik did not seem to be aware of this development. Gen Musa has also blamed Maj Gen Yahya Khan for slow advance after the fall of Jaurian (50).

Unlike in the other Sectors, in the XV Corps Sector, stray operations continued even after the cease-fire till mid November 1965, in which the Corps attained undoubted successes.

In the Indo-Pak War of 1965, from 1 September to 10 October 1965, 10 Inf Div of the Indian Army suffered sizeable casualties (about 2,006) as under (51):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Missing</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCOs</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORs</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>713</td>
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<td></td>
<td>384</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>739</td>
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"The Canal could be divided into three distinct parts from its starting point. The first part did not command the land — which is an irrigation term for stating that the water level in the Canal was lower than the surrounding country and no irrigation was possible without pumping. This part was about eighty feet wide, was the deepest of the three parts, with steep banks and its channel was bricklined. The GT axis ran approximately through the middle of this part. It was clear that this part was designed as a military obstacle to make an assault crossing difficult and was bound to be covered by Arty fire. Indeed we pin-pointed the location of the main Pakistan Arty concentration by drawing gun range arcs from the two ends of the brick-lined portion of the Canal and where these crossed was the general area of the enemy Arty concentration.

The second part commanded the land. Here the channel widened and the depth decreased. The Khalra axis ran approx through the middle of this part. The enemy could resort to flooding by cutting the banks. The third part was after Badian to the end. Here the Canal crossed the natural drainage of the country-side in aquaducts.

Visualising the Canal with all its works and design, it was clear that it was a good defensive obstacle. Any advance on the GT axis would be resisted by concentrated Arty fire on an assault crossing of the Canal and an advance on the Khalra axis by flooding on one or both sides of the Canal. A counter attack by Pakistan could be launched without resorting to bridging through the third part. Our plans took all these factors into consideration".

It has, however been alleged by various Commanders under 11 Corps that detailed information about the Ichhogil Canal was not passed on to them by the Corps Commander.

5. Musa, Gen Mohammad (Retd), pp.15-16.
7. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid, pp.21-22.
12. There were also about 10,000 Mujahids/Razakars in support of the above formations. From Official Records.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid. According to Brig Gulzar Ahmed (p.88), the expeditionary force under 12 Inf Div comprised of 10 Inf Bde (2 Battalions), 102 Inf Bde (2 Battalions), 4 AK Brigade, two companies of 12 FF (R and S), 11 Cavalry 13 Lancers and Divisional Artillery and other services.
28. From Official Records. This information is based on Indian assessment and captured documents. According to Brig Gulzar Ahmed (p.88), the task allotted was to destroy Indian forces in area Lalial, Dewa, Sakrana and Chhamb and then to threaten Akhnur.
29. Interview with Brig Manmohan Singh dated 26 October 1988.
31. Ibid, p.176. In this massive bombardment for field guns, forty medium guns and eighty heavy guns took part.
32. Manmohan Singh, Brig (Retd)'s interview dated 28 October 1988.
33. Ibid.
34. According to Brig Manmohan Singh, Pakistan had lost 11 out of her 40 tanks, and consequently was too scared to attack Indian tanks crossing Manawar Tawi within sight.
35. The distance between Jammu and Akhnur was 32 km, and that between Akhnur and Chhamb was about the same. It was only about 1500 metres from Jaurian to Troti.
36. According to Maj Gen Rajwade, Commander 41 Inf Bde, the reasons for India's failure in Jaurian were: (a) Frequent shifting of commanders from one place to another every few days, (b) shifting of units frequently, (c) no time was given to settle down and prepare defences, (d) 161 Fd Regt ran away, leaving their guns undestroyed.

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37. From Official Records.
38. According to Brig A.A. Khan Chaudhry, the Pak C-in-C had told Div Commander on 5 September to abandon the plan to capture Akhnur. p.734.
40. From Official Records.
41. Ibid.
42. From Official Records. The attack took place on 19/20 September.
43. Official Records says, 20 civilians were also organised under Maj Megh Singh to go behind the enemy and raid his rear areas.
44. In this action, 6 Sikh LI lost 1 Officer, 2 JCOs and 31 ORs killed, and 4 Officers, 1 JCO and 24 ORs wounded, in addition to 7 ORs missing. The losses suffered by 11 Mahar included 30 ORs killed, 33 wounded and 55 missing. Besides, 5 Officers and one JCO were wounded, and 1 Officer was missing.
45. 2 Garhwal Rif casualties were 2 Officers, one JCO and 18 ORs killed and 4 Officers 3 JCOs and 68 ORs wounded.
46. From Official Records.
47. During this encounter the battalion lost 21 killed and 60 wounded.
49. Ibid, p.64.
50. Musa, Gen Mohammad (Retd), pp.40-42. According to Lt Col Irshad Rashid, MC, after the War when he asked Gen Yahya Khan the reason for not taking Akhnur in September 1965, the latter replied: "You know I was told not to do so". Brig Anjad Alik Khan Chaudhry reportedly wrote in his book, September 65-Before and After (p.56), that Gen Musa did not find it necessary to take Akhnur, and thus Akhnur was saved by India through diplomacy. Strategic Digest, IDSA, New Delhi, July 1984, p.734.
51. From Official Records.

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