CHAPTER - XII

REVIEW AND REFLECTIONS

While the Kutch conflict of April 1965 was caused by an accidental border clash between the para military forces of India and Pakistan, the Indo-Pak War of September 1965 resulted from the miscalculated and miscontrolled Pakistani armed infiltration across the Cease Fire Line in Jammu and Kashmir. The Pak rulers thought that their armed infiltrators, with the support of the local population and some small help from the Pak Army, if necessary, would be able to capture the Kashmir Valley quickly, before the Indians could react effectively, and the UN also could not intervene in time to reverse a 'fait accompli'. Although they planned well, they could not execute the plan adroitly; and before the Pak army could capture the strategic Akhnur bridge to cut the supply line between Jammu and the western part of Kashmir, the Indians launched a direct attack against Pakistan in three sectors in Punjab-Khem Karan, Lahore, and Sialkot. But before we proceed further, the politico-military background needs to be made clear.

Just after the partition of the country, the popular slogan in Pakistan was: "We have got Pakistan with a laugh, we will take Hindustan with arms". Thus, Pak entry into SEATO and CENTO, and her acquisition of large quantities of arms and equipment through the US military aid programme were aimed at the conquest of Kashmir. Once the Indian army was humiliated by China on the Himalayan border in 1962, Pakistan jumped up to take advantage of the situation before India could strengthen and modernise her armed forces.

Again, the assumed Pak victory in the limited war in Kutch in April 1965 encouraged the Pak military leaders to turn their attention to Jammu and Kashmir. However, neither India nor Pakistan was keen to fight a real war in the inhospitable Rann of Kutch. Pak Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, told the Pak National Assembly that if Pakistan were to fight, "then it is not in Dharmasala or Chad Bet or Biar Bet that we have to fight, we have to fight where the problem lies, i.e., in Jammu and Kashmir", and that Pakistan "can never be complete without the people of Jammu and Kashmir". On the other hand, the loss of a few forward posts by India in the Rann led to the exertion of a lot of public pressure on the Indian Government and the Army to seek redress elsewhere(1).

Although there had been a long debate in Pakistan to pinpoint the responsibility for planning
"Operation Gibraltar" in Jammu and Kashmir in August 1965, neither Field Marshal Ayub Khan, nor General Md. Musa, nor Z.A. Bhutto could be absolved of it. "Ayub Khan, overconfident due to Pakistani successes in Rann of Kutch, tried to repeat the action in Kashmir"(2).

Unfortunately for Pakistan, the assumptions of the Pak rulers for the success of the ambitious Operation Gibraltar came to naught because:

(a) Wide-spread local support was not available to the Pak infiltrators,

(b) India did neither respect the Cease Fire Line to pursue the infiltrators, nor restrict the anti-infiltration offensive within Kashmir, and

(c) the Indian soldier destroyed the Pakistani myth that one Pakistani was equal to three Indians.

When the first few captured Pak infiltrators disclosed the entire plan of their operation to the Indian captors, and this was openly broadcast on the All India Radio on 8 August 1965, Pakistan's Director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier Irshad, remarked ruefully - "the blighters have spilled the beans".

The Pakistanis tried to follow the Chinese example of people's war to stage an insurrection in Jammu and Kashmir through massive infiltration, sabotage and subversion, but they could not adequately organise, plan, and train for that purpose, nor could they in 1965 prepare the common people of Jammu and Kashmir psychologically to support such a "liberation" movement.

Ultimately, when Operation Gibraltar failed in capturing the Kashmir Valley and the Pak infiltrators started retreating towards the end of August 1965, Pak Army's "Operation Grand Slam" was launched by mounting an infantry-cum-tank thrust through Chhamb to capture the strategically located Akhnur bridge and bottle up the Indian forces in Rajauri-Punch area. However, for unknown reasons the early thrust into Chhamb was not vigorously followed up, and before Akhnur could be taken, India launched a massive attack on Pakistan in Punjab to divert the Pak forces from Chhamb-Jaurian. Later, Gen Yahya Khan, who had commanded 12 Inf Division of the Pak Army in Chhamb area on 4 September 1965, reportedly told Lt Col I. Rashid that he "was not allowed to" take Akhnur(3). A Pakistan writer has correctly assessed India's predicament at that
time. If Pakistan captured Jammu and cut the vital Indian road linking Srinagar with the plains of India, "Indian forces in Kashmir would be encircled. Thus India was left with the choice of yielding or expanding the war. She decided to escalate the war"(4).

It was India's XV Corps that bore the brunt of Pak infiltration campaign and Pak Army's thrusts into Jammu and Kashmir. It met with resounding success against the Pak infiltrators, especially in capturing the Kargil heights, Haji Pir Pass, OP Hill and the Kishanganga bridge. Indian officers and men proved their mettle and regained their honour, lost in the 1962 debacle. However, in Chhamb-Jaurian they tasted defeat due to lack of proper military appreciation, purposeful planning and appropriate preparations. The Indian army top brass was under the misconception that the initial Pak military thrust would come through Punch, and not through Chhab. That is why, in spite of the field commander's warnings that the Pakistan Army was moving towards Chhab, the XV Corps HQ did neither construct adequate defence works nor provide sufficient armour and artillery to stop the Pak advance. On the other hand, the Pak Commanders, expecting strong opposition at the crossings of the Munwar Tawi, delayed their advance to regroup and strengthen the offensive.

On 1 September, the Indians brought in their Air Force, but their old Vampires and Mysteres could not achieve much. Moreover, they attacked some of their own armour, ammunition depots and troops. This was due to lack of proper wireless network and lack of adequate Army - IAF coordination. Overall the Indian troops fought well in this sector. However, at some places the raw and inexperienced Indian troops showed lack of determination to fight. Ultimately, the Indian offensive in the Punjab on 6 September forced the Pak Army to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the Chhab Sector.

In the Punjab theatre, India's XI Corps mounted the offensive against Pakistan. Although it succeeded in blunting the enemy armour offensive in Khem Karan, and winning the battles of Dograi and Barki, it failed in its aim of capturing intact the bridges on the Ichhogil Canal and all the Pak territory up to that canal. Of course, there was no plan to capture Lahore.

There was not only lack of good generalship, but also absence of spirited infantry offensive in some areas. Adequate defences were not organised in the Khem Karan Sector, and the initial success in Dograi
was not vigorously followed up. With imagination and proper preparation an important military thrust could have been mounted through Dera Baba Nanak, which unfortunately witnessed a stalemate. Although the Corps captured 360 sq km of Pak territory as compared to meagre 50 sq km of Indian territory lost to Pakistan, the net result of the military action in its sector was an indecisive deadlock.

In the Jammu-Sialkot Sector, the Indian Army massed the largest chunk of its might, i.e. I Corps consisting of one Armd Division (one Armour Brigade and one Lorried Bde), two Inf Divisions and one Mountain Division. However, I Corps did not achieve proportionate results. Although it had captured about 500 sq km of Pak territory in this sector and taken a heavy toll of the enemy armour, especially at Phillora, it could neither achieve a clear break-through, nor destroy the Pak war machine in this area. Here again, bad generalship at the Corps and the Division levels, and lack of cooperation among the formations, were responsible for their poor showing.

As planned by the Chief of Army Staff, the Rajasthan Operation was only a diversionary move to tie down the maximum Pak forces in the Sind area and prevent Pak capture of Indian territory in this Sector. Due to the difficulty of the terrain and logistical problems, the Indian troops could not achieve much except the capture of about 390 sq km of Pak territory, including Gadra City, as compared to the Pak capture of a small Indian outpost at Munabao.

It needs to be mentioned here that although India had mustered some of her forces on the Indo-East Pakistan border in September 1965 for defensive purpose, Indian political leadership was not in favour of mounting any offensive here on land or sea, or in the Air. There was only some limited exchange of air actions between the IAF and PAF in this sector, in which India suffered heavily at her Kalaikunda Air Force base, on 7 September.

On the Western front, the story of the air effort was different. Although on 6 September, the Indian Army initiated the war in the Punjab, it did not launch the IAF in a pre-emptive strike against the enemy's air bases. This appears an unpardonable mistake on the part of the Indian military! There was lack of joint planning between the Indian Army and the Air Force, and it appears that the Indian Army top brass ignored the potentiality of a modern air force like the IAF to destroy the bulk of the PAF on the ground on 6 September itself. Pak cooperation between her army and air force was better than India's, and
the PAF did not lose the opportunity of launching a pre-emptive attack against the Indian air bases on 6th evening, causing a lot of destruction and damage. Had the IAF struck first, it could have destroyed or damaged a large number of Pak aircraft, thus considerably weakening the air effort of the smaller PAF, denying close PAF support to the Pak ground forces, and preventing the PAF's pre-emptive attack of 6 September against the IAF air bases.

There were no strategic air bombardment missions, no airlifts, nor any air-bridge supply operations. Attacks on enemy air bases were few, and not very effective. Both the combat air forces mainly provided low-level support for their ground forces. In ground attack role, Pak F-104 C and F-86 proved less efficient than the slower and less sophisticated Mysteres, Hunters and Gnats operated by the Indians. While Pak napalm bombs were reportedly less effective against Indian tanks and artillery, Indian rockets and armour-piercing bombs proved comparatively more effective. French-made 5" rockets, and 20mm and 30mm aircraft cannon fire was also effective. Initially, the PAF fared better than its Indian counterpart, but towards the last stage of the war, the numerically superior Indian air power started prevailing over the smaller but more modern Pak air force. Had the war continued, the smaller PAF would have felt the pinch of its losses more than the larger IAF. On balance, the IAF did fairly well against superior types of Pak aircraft. With low level of professionalism, lack of proper planning and cooperation with the army, and the aircraft of old vintage, the IAF could not be expected to perform much better. Interestingly, both sides tried to conserve their precious equipment, especially tanks and aircraft, to enable them to continue to fight if the war was prolonged.

Pakistan paradropped a substantial number of commandos during the war. However, in the absence of air-borne formations, helicopter forces and well-trained commando squadrons, very little was achieved. With proper resources, training and planning they could have made a decisive contribution to the effort.

Anti-aircraft defences were far from satisfactory on both sides. The main Indian cities and air bases were protected by obsolescent 3.7" guns and 40mm Bofors; and on Pak side, by the 90mm US guns. But frontline formations had to bank upon 50-caliber Browning machine guns and 20mm cannons mounted on trucks and weapon carriers. Their fire proved ineffective against modern jets. Thus, both sides lacked modern radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns and

-330-
motorised anti-aircraft batteries for protection of convoys and armoured forces.

The Pakistanis also erred in their tank deployment. They sent their Pattons across the Indian defences in Chamb without proper flank protection. Similarly, in the Khem Karan Sector of Punjab, when the Pak Patton brigade streamrolled through the rain-soaked muddy ground, covered by tall grass and sugarcanes, without screening its advance with jeeps and motorised patrols, they found it difficult to manoeuvre freely. The Pakistani tanks had to operate blindly, and to direct their fire, their commanders had to climb up on the turrets and scan the field with binoculars, thus falling prey to Indian sniping, and mortar bursts. The Pak Pattons failed to breach the Indian defensive lines of dug-in tanks, mine fields and tank traps.

The reason for the better performance of the Indian tanks was the good training and confidence of the tank crew in their machines as well as their tactical ability. Especially, the Indian Centurion Regiments carried out hard and prolonged training for war for nearly eight years, while the Pakistani tank crew reportedly saved their practice ammunition and tank mileage in order to conserve their precious equipment and ammunition for use in the actual battle(5). The Pak armour was reportedly used in an anti-tank role, partly because of the shortage of infantry, but largely because of unimaginative and timid leadership(6). The launching of the Pak armour in the Khem Karan area suffered from bad timing and inadequate preparation. The cutting of the Madhopur Canal by the Indians resulted in the waterlogging of the area, unknown to the Pak GHQ, that led to the defeat of the Pak armour. "This is how Khem Karan became a grave-yard of Pakistani tanks"(7). The less sophisticated Centurions and Shermans were better handled by the Indians than the highly sophisticated, computerised Pattons by the Pakistanis. Pak tank crew reportedly fed misleading information into the Patton's electronic brains, the heavy guns were operated manually, and the crew were confused with the modern tank gadgetry(8).

In the deployment of artillery, both countries followed the old British pattern. The lack of self-propelled artillery and armoured assault guns, mobile mortars, and motorised rocket launchers was felt, as the day of conventional towed guns was over. The Pakistanis made an attempt to mount heavy mortars on trucks, but the latter broke down under the impact of recoil.

-331-
The bulk of both armies consisted of infantry formations. However, compared to Pak infantry, Indian infantry was deployed more extensively, and in some cases their defensive positions slowed down Pak armour drives, inflicting considerable losses.

Following old British patterns, both the armies were deployed with two coys up in front and two in reserve; two battalions up in front, and one in reserve; and two brigades up in front and one in reserve, thus rendering the bulk of a Division, i.e. 28 reserve rifle companies, idle, while only 8 rifle companies had to bear the brunt of the enemy's attacks(9).

As regards the Indian Navy, it played the role of an almost silent spectator. This was not the choice of the naval Commanders, but due to the decision of the Indian political leadership and perhaps apathy of the Indian Army, which considered the naval role as not that important. Although naval officers and seamen were itching for a fight, they were, it is claimed, not allowed to undertake any offensive role against the Pak ports and installations, and were engaged only on defensive patrolling of the seas. However, the Pak Navy showed more initiative and bombarded Dwarka off the Gujarat Coast, although causing little damage. It is unfortunate that during a war, the Indian Navy was not allowed to play its role, for which it was trained. This demoralised the naval personnel to some extent.

Indian para-military forces stood their ground well in Kutch, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Jammu and Kashmir, and provided worthwhile support to the regular forces. They played their part well in detecting and capturing the Pak para commandos, who were airdropped during the war.

It will be unpardonable if no mention is made of the great support and succour given by all sections of the civilian population to the Indian armed forces during this war. In Punjab, it appeared that India was fighting really a people's war, such was the drive, enthusiasm and sacrifice of the common people everywhere.

On the diplomatic front Indian leaders performed well. They kept the Soviet Union on Indian side and stood up to the Chinese threats and ultimatum. Some arms and equipment were supplied to Pakistan during the war by Indonesia, Iran, Turkey and China. However, USA and UK banned arms supplies to both India and Pakistan. But according to a recent publication, even during this arms embargo, Pakistan received
90 F-86 sabre jets, exported by West Germany ostensibly to Iran, but in fact for the use of Pakistan. The deal went through Gerhard Martins, credited with connections with US Intelligence agencies and the Pentagon(10).

The role of the Soviet Union in establishing peace between the two major powers of the sub-continent was very important. While the US and UK exerted their political pressure, through UNO and otherwise, to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table, the Soviet Union invited the leaders of India and Pakistan to Tashkent to resolve their dispute, and a peace agreement was signed there on 10 January 1966, on the basis of restitution of all territories captured by both sides during the 1965 war. While India got back lost territories in Khem Karan and Chamb, she had to return Tithwal, Haji Pir and Kargil which had been captured by the Indian troops at a great cost of human lives. The Agreement created mixed reaction in India and Pakistan. It was difficult for the Pak leaders to explain to their people, who were fed with the myth that Pakistan had won the war, why Pakistan had agreed to moth-eaten peace, which failed to solve the Kashmir problem. In India, the Army was not happy with the return of hard-earned Haji Pir and Kargil, through which the Pak infiltrators could come again.

When the balance-sheet is drawn, it is seen that both sides lost comparably in both men and equipment, except in armour. India's tank casualties were 128(11), as against Pakistan's 200 approximately(12). Although after the Tashkent Agreement, Z.A. Bhutto started an agitation against President Ayub Khan on the ground of failure to take Kashmir, it was a political move to oust Ayub Khan from power. Both countries must have learnt some lessons from the war, and it was not possible to resume the hostilities soon. Few people outside the Pak "armed forces realise how close Pakistan came to disaster in the 1965 War due to inadequate preparation, facile assumptions and criminal Foreign Office advice"(13). On the other hand, "when Ayub Khan visited East Pakistan soon after the Tashkent Agreement, the people there were reported to have welcomed the Agreement and to have said that since there would now be no war with India, Ayub Khan should give them autonomy(14).

It is interesting to note that towards the end of the war, the Indian Prime Minister enquired from Gen J.N. Chaudhuri whether India could win a spectacular victory if the war was prolonged for some days. The General replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up and there had
been considerable tank losses also. But later it was found that by 22 September only about 14% of India's frontline ammunition had been fired, and the number of tanks still held by India was twice the number Pakistan had"(15). Indeed, Gen Chaudhuri was a cautious General, and perhaps initially he was afraid of the much touted, ultra modern Patton tanks.

However, full credit is deserved by Gen Chaudhuri for expanding the armed forces, both qualitatively and quantitatively, after 1962. As many of the formations were new and hardly battleworthy, the power of these formations was not reflected in the war proportionate with their numerical strength(16).

Analysing the Indo-Pak War 1965, certain reflections are unavoidable. The war was essentially a limited one, geographically, Service-wise and in time frame. East Pakistan remained almost untouched; the engagements came to an end in 22 days; and the Navies were not really involved. Neither strategic planning nor strategic struggle was made, and no strategic decision was reached. Neither side appeared to be concerned with grand strategy in which military moves are dictated by politico‐psychological‐economic considerations. The Field Commanders were not very clear about their goals. Was it an all-out general war, a limited war for certain objectives, a war of conquest to annex territories, or a war of attrition to weaken the enemy's striking power?. The Field Commanders did not know, although at the later stage of the war Gen Chaudhuri spelt out that it was a war of attrition. The result was that, in the absence of a clear-cut objective, they slugged it out, without much advantage accruing to either side at the end of the war.

Both sides were trained in standard British war tactics, and blindly followed orthodox British methods of fighting, and never deviated from them. Although British military system was undergoing drastic changes, both the countries deployed their infantry and armour in the Second World War style. Again, both used armoured cars, and Pakistan suffered heavy losses. In their place, jeeps with bazookas or machine guns were more effective as recce vehicles and light screening forces.

The September 1965 war confirmed the old theory that it was not the machine but the man behind it which finally decided the fate of the battle. The Pak Army and the Pak Air Force were equipped with sophisticated equipments, such as tanks, aircraft, etc., but the latter were not matched with the
training and skill of their users. Thus, instead of being assets, they proved to be a liability sometimes. Compared to them, the Indians with their less sophisticated equipment performed better. Most modern Pakistani armour met with debacles on the fields of Asal Uttar and Phillora. Although the Pak army used its armour and artillery lavishly in initial stages of the war, following the US doctrine of applying massive fire power to save manpower, but without the close support of the infantry their armour thrusts failed to be effective.

India's strategic concept of attacking the enemy at many places along the border did not prove to be sound. Excepting the offensives in Haji Pir and Kargil, no other Indian thrust proved to be entirely successful. Instead of delivering a large number of inconsequential jabs, the Indian army could perhaps have gone for a few selected, powerful thrusts to unbalance the Pakistanis. Faulty strategy led to stalemate, with no strategic decisions whatsoever.

Likewise, the rigid application of the old tactical doctrine led to failures to win victories at different places. Instead of fighting against well-defended enemy positions, the formations could have bypassed, to encircle, and finish them later. This would have conserved both men and material.

At many places, such as Mirpur, Dograi and Dera Baba Nanak, whole-hearted offensives were not undertaken out of defensive mentality on the part of the commanders. The Mirpur offensive was given up on the excuse that artillery ammunition needed to be conserved for subsequent actions. Almost everywhere, forces were held in unnecessary reserve. In the Sialkot Sector, many Indian armour thrusts failed for want of concentration of all available resources at the critical time and place, while large forces stood idle in futile reserve.

In the area of command and control on the part of the Indian commanders from battalion to Corps level, deficiency was seen in many cases. Commanders of I Corps and 1 Arm Division did not show appropriate initiative to control the battles or monitor the attacks effectively. The result was Indian reverses in places like Chawinda. Similarly, GOC 15 Infantry Division failed to support the initial thrust across the Ichhogil Canal at Dograi, due to the failure of control through wireless communication and the will to exploit the initial success. Commander 29 Inf Bde also faltered at Dera Baba Nanak in the initial stage. In the XI Corps Sector, although the
early reverses suffered by the Indians at Khem Karan, were turned into victory by 4 Mountain Division later, the disintegration of Col Anand Singh's tough 4 Sikh was a dark spot in the otherwise good record of this formation. However, the responsibility was not solely Col Anand Singh's, but that of the Corps Commander and even the Army Commander, who had selected a tired battalion for a difficult task against an underestimated enemy formation supported by tanks.

The failure on the part of officers in actual war indicated flaws in selection and training. The qualities which stand officers in good stead during war, such as courage, both moral any physical, aggressiveness and initiative, needed to be sharpened in peace-time exercises and manoeuvres. Officers at higher levels of command had not conditioned themselves psychologically not to accept defeat, however adverse the battle situation might be. They did not dominate the situation by bold action. When the Commander showed weakness and diffidence, and appeared adversely influenced by dark apprehensions, this pessimistic outlook percolated down to the rank and file, leading to chain reaction of demoralisation. Commanders of battalions and brigades often failed to influence their battles with their personal presence. The Divisional and Corps Commanders did not visit the frontline whenever possible, in order to properly control the situations and course of battles. Instances were many in this war when due to lack of aggressive spirit, favourable situations were not exploited, attacks tapered out, and defences collapsed.

Although Intelligence about the enemy's intention and capability is never fool-proof in any war, in the September War it proved to be very inadequate and sometimes inaccurate. During the war, as the IB's sources dried up, the most important source of information on the enemy was air photography. But this was centralised at Army HQ and Air HQ, causing unnecessary delays in its availability at the lower levels. The developed copies of air photographs mostly arrived too late to be of any tactical use. A definite need was felt of decentralising the facilities for air photo cover to at least Corps and Joint Operations Centre level. Besides, the Intelligence staff needed better training in the collation and interpretation of intelligence on the enemy under realistic conditions.

Enemy artillery barrages, especially in cooperation with close air support during day time, played havoc with Indian troop movements and actions in day light. This emphasised the need for proper training for night operations.
One mistake noticed during this war was of bringing troops to a new area and launching them immediately against the enemy without proper briefing or reconnaissance of the ground, in order to surprise the enemy. Even the best plans failed because the commanders at lower levels were not thoroughly conversant with the terrain, nor the rank and file fully briefed and properly launched into battle. The advantage of surprise did not off set these severe handicaps.

Another important need for victory in war is battle inoculation. In the September War, some of the Indian units, especially those with a large proportion of greenhorns, were visibly shaken when subjected to tank and artillery fire and air strafing. Battle inoculation exercises organised in peace-time, catering for air, artillery and tank fire in addition to the fire by normal infantry weapons, proved their value again.

Some units were found tired after fighting for two or three days. A formation or unit needed to be trained to develop stamina to fight continuously for at least a week without loss of efficiency. Similarly the importance of digging in was again highlighted as the best means for the infantry to survive in war. During the September conflict, 75 per cent of Indian battle casualties were caused by shelling(17). At places the Indian infantry arrived without digging tools, and the result was a hasty retreat. Units which could not dig-in well or early could not withstand enemy counter attacks, launched with speed and supported by air, armour and artillery.

Helicopters proved to be specially useful in Jammu and Kashmir for the following tasks:

1. Transportation of urgently required defence stores, arms, ammunition and other equipment during critical moments or operations.

2. Evacuation of serious casualties from difficult areas, with consequent good effect on morale.

3. Speedily reconnaissance over large areas, especially in sectors where other means of transport were not available.

4. Tracking and hunting of enemy infiltrators in terrain almost inaccessible to regular columns.

5. Use as Air Observation Posts.
However, an acute shortage of helicopters was experienced during this war.

As regards the employment of para military forces, experience showed that they could be suitably posted on pickets, especially in the hills. For example, Jammu and Kashmir Militia could be put on many pickets in Jammu and Kashmir, so as to release regular troops for deployment in battalion groups at strategic points, to serve as mobile striking force against any seriously threatening sector. This resulted in economy in the supply of regular troops, mental conditioning of these troops for aggressive action, and the ability to train them up to battalion or brigade level. However, properly trained and well-equipped para military forces were necessary to guard the Cease Fire Line as well as the International Border.

With proper planning, preparation, strategic and tactical execution of the war, the Indians could have crippled the Pak forces, instead of just mauling them. However, that does not detract from the glory achieved by the younger group of the officer cadre. The astounding Indian Officer casualty ratio of 1 to 14, against a rank structure of 1 to 60 Other Ranks, proved their valour(18). This went a long way to restore the honour lost on the battle field of NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh) in 1962. It is reported that, in comparison, the Junior Commissioned Officers, once the backbone of the Indian Army, did not fare so well.

Many lessons were learnt by the Indian Armed Forces from the Indo-Pak War 1965, as could be seen later during the Bangladesh War of 1971. Many of the earlier deficiencies were by then taken care of. While the September 1965 War redeemed the honour of the Indian Army and raised the morale of the Indian Defence personnel, in the December 1971 War all the three Services acquitted themselves well and gave India a decisive victory. But no army, navy or air force can rest on its oars. Their preparations, training, and equipping with the latest weaponry must continue, so that in any future contingency they are not found wanting, in any way.

*** *** ***
1. According to a recent Pakistani research study, while, as a result of the award of the international Kutch Tribunal, Pakistan got about 350 sq miles of northern Kutch, which included some crucial elevated points; India's share, though much larger, consisted of "mostly sea-marsh, often under water" - Mahtab Akbar Rashdi, p.20.

2. Ibid., p.21.

3. Rashid, I, Lt Col, Strategic Digest, IDSA, New Delhi, p.734.


7. Ibid.


9. Ibid.

10. George Thayer, p.173. According to Prof J.K. Galbraith, had the US not supplied arms to Pakistan, the latter would not have sought military solution to the Kashmir problem - S. Anthony, p.181.


12. Estimated. According to Pak Defence Minister's statement of 4 December 1965, (Dawn, 5 Dec 1965), Pak tank losses were 165 only.


14. As told by President Ayub Khan to Shri L.P. Singh, I.C.S., Home Secretary, Govt. of Indian in 1965-66, when the latter visited Pakistan after the war - Interview with Shri L.P. Singh (Retd), dated 13 April 1988.


16. Raising dates of the new formations were:
(a) I Corps 14 Inf Div & 10 Inf Div - 1 April 1965, (b) 6 Mtn Div - 26 March 1963, (c) 15 Inf Div - 1 October 1965, (d) 68 Inf Bde - 1 January 1963, (e) 67 Inf Bde - 17 July 1961, (f) 23 Mtn Div - 1 September 1959, and (g) 41 Mtn Bde - 1 July 1963. From Official Records.

17. From Official Records.

18. Ibid.

*** *** ***

-339-