The Vice President of India, Shri M. Hamid Ansari has said that India has a vital stake in peace and stability in this sub-region and in the security of the sea lanes connecting it to the outside world. He was addressing the International Relations Conference ‘Link West - India, GCC, Iran and Iraq’ at Symbiosis International University, Pune today which was attended by the Governor of Maharashtra, Shri Chennamaneni Vidyasagar Rao, Guardian Minister for Pune, Government of Maharashtra, Shri Girish Bagpat, Chancellor, Symbiosis International University, Dr. S.B. Mujumdar, various diplomats from the Gulf region and other dignitaries.
The Vice President of India said that peace, stability and security in the Persian Gulf are critical to global security and prosperity, and establishes a convergence of local, regional and global interests. He added that the centrality of the region to global supplies of hydrocarbon energy and to its relevance as an important destination of exports from major trading nations is evident.
He raised some questions that need to be addressed which are critical to any discussion of peace and security in the region. What is the threat perception of individual countries of the littoral, whether it is internal, or external, or both, is there a convergence in some of these, is the perceived external threat from within the region or is it extra-regional, is it physical or ideological, traditional or Non-Traditional and do extra-regional powers have an interest in disrupting peace and security in the area.
The Vice President said that in the past two decades a number of efforts, principally focused on the GCC, have been made to address security challenges of the region. He added that any new security agenda should be more inclusive and address not only military aspects of security, but also issues such as regional economic development, counter-terrorism, disaster response, and environmental, social and cultural topics as well. In addition, a more cooperative approach to inter-state relations as a basis for a new security architecture is called for, as this is essential to an understanding of security that leaves behind zero-sum calculations of national security”.
The Vice President recalled that the Saudi Foreign Minister, Mr. Saud Al Faisal had drawn attention to “an urgent need for a collective effort aimed at developing a new and more solid framework for Gulf security” having a national, a regional and an international component. He opined that once the foundations of a sustainable dialogue on these matters has been established, and progress made in search of acceptable responses, a more inclusive security dialogue could be initiated to identify shared interests and put in place understandings and procedures to respond to threats to peace and security.
The Vice President listed the Indian requirement as: (a) friendly regimes and stability in the littoral states (b) access to the region’s oil and gas resources (c) freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and through the Straits of Hormuz (d) security of sea lanes and (e) continued access to the markets of the littoral states for Indian trade, technology, workforce and two-way investments. The Vice President said that keeping eventualities in mind, prudence suggests the creation and reinforcement of an autonomous interdiction capacity geared to India’s requirement of free movement of tankers from the Persian Gulf to India, eschew marginal roles in Western security arrangements for the Gulf, and lend support, in principle, to inclusive security arrangements for the future that may be proposed for discussion.
Following is the text of the Vice President’s address:
“A first reading of the general theme is somewhat confusing since geographically-speaking there are several “Gulfs” to the West of India – Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, and Persian Gulf. Mercifully, the doubt is dispelled on closer reading! The terminological clarification given by the UN Secretariat in 1999 is somewhat helpful.
The sub-themes for participants cover subjects of perennial relevance to governments, strategists, energy supply and world trade specialists, and the general public.
I propose today to speak about some aspects of the security scenario since it provides an overarching perspective to all political, economic and social activities.
The context is relevant. The Persian Gulf is a body of water 989 kilometers in length and 55 km in width at its narrowest point. Ever since the British withdrawal from the area in November 1970, the question of the security of the sea lanes for the flow of hydrocarbon supplies to different destinations in the world has been on the strategic and tactical agenda of the beneficiaries of these supplies. For this reason, as noted by a Saudi scholar many years back, “Gulf regional security was an external issue long before it was an issue among the Gulf states themselves.”
The centrality of the region to global supplies of hydrocarbon energy (holding 54% of the world’s oil reserves and 23% of its gas reserves), and to its relevance as an important destination of exports from major trading nations, is evident. Thus peace, stability and security in the area are critical to global security and prosperity. This establishes a convergence of local, regional and global interests.
Consequently, some questions critical to any discussion of peace and security in the region need to be addressed:
- What is the threat perception of individual countries of the littoral?
- Is it internal, or external, or both? Is there a convergence in some of these?
- Is the perceived external threat from within the region or is it extra-regional?
- Is it physical or ideological, traditional or Non-Traditional?
- Do extra-regional powers have an interest in disrupting peace and security in the area?
In politico-strategic terms, the eight countries of the Persian Gulf littoral are to be considered in three categories: (i) the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, (ii) Iran and (iii) Iraq. The political systems and ideological orientations of the six GCC states do not converge with that of either Iran or Iraq. An obvious consequence is a predilection for exclusive, rather than inclusive, security.
An early effort to make the littoral states themselves shoulder the responsibility of peace and security in the area, made in the Muscat Conference convened by Oman in November 1975, was not fruitful on account of the conflicting perceptions of these states. The latter were aggravated following the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War.
In January 1980, in the context of Cold War and regional considerations, the Carter Doctrine was promulgated asserting that “any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” It was reiterated later in the year after the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War: “it is imperative that there be no infringement of… freedom of passage of ships to and from the Persian Gulf region.” This approach was sustained through the period of the Iraq-Iran War though Iraqi attempts to disrupt the outflow of Iranian crude did invite blunt warnings by Rafsanjani in October 1983 and May 1984. “We would close the Straits of Hormuz,” he said, “if the Persian Gulf becomes unusable for us. And if the Persian Gulf becomes unusable for us, we will make the Persian Gulf unusable for others.”
The formation of the GCC in 1981 and subsequent efforts to explore GCC-focused collective security arrangements alongside bilateral ones with external powers made limited progress in the 1990s. Iran, on its part, proposed in 1994 the establishment of a forum to discuss threat perceptions and security concerns amongst the littoral states; this was followed in 1995 by the suggestion of a non-aggression pact amongst them.
In the past two decades a number of efforts, principally focused on the GCC, have been made to address security challenges of the region. These tend to suggest that “ a return to the status quo ante (e.g. the old realpolitik balance-of –power approach which depends on the US to guarantee regional stability) is no longer workable and that in order to overcome regional challenges, cooperation is needed …(and that) most parties suggest that any new security agenda should be more inclusive (and) address not only military aspects of security, but also issues such as regional economic development, counter-terrorism, disaster response, and environmental, social and cultural topics as well. In addition, a more cooperative approach to inter-state relations as a basis for a new security architecture is called for, as this is essential to an understanding of security that leaves behind zero-sum calculations of national security.” More specifically, it has been suggested that “what the Gulf needs is a series of overlapping and bilateral relationships” on the model of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
In December 2004 Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal drew attention to “an urgent need for a collective effort aimed at developing a new and more solid framework for Gulf security” having a national, a regional and an international component. The national component, he said, involves “the urgent need for comprehensive reforms in our countries with some variation in the speed of implementation depending on the individual social conditions”. The regional framework “should be based on four pillars: the GCC, Yemen, Iran and Iraq” and the international aspect of it should involve international guarantees, underwritten by the Security Council, for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all the littoral states. “The international component of the suggested Gulf security framework should engage positively the emerging Asian powers as well, especially China and India”.
An evolution in the perception of the littoral states of the Persian Gulf is thus evident notwithstanding publicly stated disagreements, laced with atavistic premonitions, on hardcore security and foreign policy issues. A promising development has been the resolution of the Iranian nuclear question through the Iran–P5+1 Joint Comprehensive Plan of action (JCPOA) of April 2, 2015 and the carefully worded welcome accorded to it in the US – GCC statement of May 14 and the US – Saudi statement of September 4, 2015. Also to be noted is Qatar’s recent offer of hosting a GCC-Iran dialogue to address existing disputes that are “political regional Arab-Iranian difference rather than being a Sunni-Shiite disputes.”
In this changing context, the framework proposed earlier could become the basis of discussions on comprehensive, inclusive, security. To give shape to it, threat perceptions would need to converge beginning with an enunciation of common threats on non-political matters like natural or man-made disasters, response to pandemics and environmental challenges that transcend borders, counter-terrorism, drugs smuggling, and related matters.
Once the foundations of a sustainable dialogue on these matters has been established, and progress made in search of acceptable responses, a more inclusive security dialogue could be initiated to identify shared interests and put in place understandings and procedures to respond to threats to peace and security. Doubts and misgivings are nevertheless likely to persist since, as the old proverb put it, “the wound of words is worse than the wound of swords.”
A critical impediment to any cooperative security arrangement to be entered into by the littoral states relates to the presence of foreign forces. The position of the United States, spelt out in some detail in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report of June 19, 2012, has been reiterated in the recent announcements made with the GCC states. Iran, on the other hand, has hitherto stressed that the region “be free of trans-regional powers.” This impediment can only be overcome if the circle is widened and a future arrangement is premised on the participation of principal users and beneficiaries, underwritten by an international agreement or convention.
How does the foregoing impact on India and Indian interests? Some prepositions with regard to these are self evident:
- Locating the Persian Gulf, with reference to India, is an exercise in geography and history. For India, the Persian Gulf littoral is proximate neighbourhood and part of our natural economic hinterland. The distance from Mumbai to Basra is 1847 nautical miles; it is 1802 to Kuwait, 1630 to Dammam, 1265 to Bander Abbas and 1046 to Dubai.
- Even before the advent of modern age and modern means of communication, there was a vibrant trade between the west coast of India and different points on the Persian Gulf littoral. This association generated and nurtured people-to-people contacts cherished on all sides. A good number of proverbs complementary to India are to be found in the colloquial Arabic of the lower Gulf.
- These ties were sustained in the colonial period when command of the sea ensured the supremacy of British power.
- The governments and public opinion in the littoral states are India-friendly and Indian-friendly.
- India today receives 65% of its energy supplies from this region, has an overall trade of 163 billion US dollars, and a work force there of about 8 million whose remittances amounted to 35 billion US dollars in 2014-15.
- Around 170,000 Indian pilgrims go to Saudi Arabia every year for the Haj pilgrimage.
In addition, India and GCC states have initiated important steps to engage with each other politically and strategically in a more rigorous manner, particularly in regard to combating terrorism and extremism, supply of narcotics and drugs and movement of criminal elements. There is also a growing interest in initiating and strengthening defence ties and the first steps in this regard have been taken with Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
The GCC States look at India as a vibrant economy that could be a good destination for investments, as is evident from the India-UAE statement of August 17, 2015 and the earlier Delhi and Riyadh Declarations with Saudi Arabia. They view India as an important player on the global scene, as a large and growing market for their principal export commodity, and as a possible provider of food security and trade partner.
Iraq remains an important source of crude and has the potential for wider economic cooperation under normal conditions.
The Indian interest in a multidimensional – strategic and economic - relationship with Iran, highlighted after President Khatemi’s visit in 2003, remained subdued until very recently on account of third-country considerations. The current impetus to rejuvenate these is promising.
For all these reasons, India has a vital stake in peace and stability in this sub-region and in the security of the sea lanes connecting it to the outside world. The Indian requirement is thus fivefold: (a) friendly regimes and stability in the littoral states (b) access to the region’s oil and gas resources (c) freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and through the Straits of Hormuz (d) security of sea lanes and (e) continued access to the markets of the littoral states for Indian trade, technology, workforce and two-way investments.
A first requirement is to sustain and intensify the bilateral relationships with all the littoral states of the Gulf littoral. The question of domestic stability is squarely in the domain of domestic politics of individual states and suggestions of inputs into it should be eschewed. The other two would best be achievable in an inclusive security framework underwritten by the international community through an appropriate mechanism. Together, these would facilitate the furtherance of the fifth.
Pending this, and keeping eventualities in mind, prudence suggests the creation and reinforcement of an autonomous interdiction capacity geared to India’s requirement of free movement of tankers from the Persian Gulf to India, eschew marginal roles in Western security arrangements for the Gulf, and lend support, in principle, to inclusive security arrangements for the future that may be proposed for discussion.
I wish you all success in your deliberations.
Jai Hind.”
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KSD/BK
