Stephen P Cohen: South Asia
Analyst
A Review
J L
Khayyam Coelho
Introduction
"Would you" he asked, in that winsomely beguiling
voice that editors use when they want you to do
something particularly unpalatable, "be interested
in doing a review on Cohen's latest article? It's
just a short thing, in the Washington Quarterly,
won't take much time".
Editors too, can be quite economical with the
truth when they have to be. But I had been aware,
peripherally at any rate, of Dr. Cohen's work for
quite awhile - as is anyone who is interested in
the American view of India, although I had not
read him "seriously" before. So when the editors
of the Monitor asked me to review his latest
article in The Washington Quarterly, I was
quite happy to oblige as it would give me an
opportunity to get to grips with one of the better
known of the US nomenclature on the
Subcontinent's affairs.
So this article began as a review of Stephen P
Cohen's recent article "The Jihadist Threat to
Pakistan".1 It became clear, however,
that to properly understand Cohen a somewhat more
in-depth look at his work was required.
Consequently, I began to look through his body of
work on India and Pakistan. It was not, as I had
imagined, an easy task. In fact, I can only
describe the entire experience as more than a
little "jarring". For it becomes evident soon
enough, that his writings on India although strewn
with all the correct phrases, are twisted just
enough to give any Indian reading his work, that
strange feeling you get when you try and read
something using your wife's glasses.
I
kept at it of course, although primarily because
the Monitor's editors simply wouldn't accept my
"it's completely weird" excuse. "Just describe
your experience", I was told in soothingly dulcet
tones, "maybe others get the same feeling reading
him". I'm not quite sure about that, but I think
the editors are correct, the Cohen phenomena
certainly needs an explanation. After all, Dr
Cohen and his colleagues are supposedly experts on
our region which they label, strangely enough, as
"South Asia" (more on that a little later); and
are frequently cited as "advising the US State
Department" on Sub continental affairs.
Consequently, it is well worth the time and effort
to try and understand his point of view and to
take a closer look at his work.
The aim of this article is to explore a way for
Indians to read and understand the phenomena
of the "South Asia" analyst, whose advise forms
the framework within which the decision making
elites of the United States act. Look on this
article not so much as a review of Cohen's article
per se but instead as a first attempt to
deconstruct the proto-typical "South Asia expert
advising the US State Department". Consequently,
while the article is "embedded" (to use a
currently fashionable term) here, this review will
actually range across a number of articles written
by Dr Cohen recently. By embedding his article
within this review but not being limited by it, I
hope to be able to draw out the essence of Dr
Cohen's work and his relationship to the
Subcontinent.
In the next two sections, I'll set the stage to
explore the Wonderland like world of Dr Cohen and
explain his methodology. The fourth and fifth
sections, on what I refer to as "Cohenism", form
the core of this article. They detail and critique
some of Dr Cohen's recent writings on India and
Pakistan respectively. Those two sections, in
effect, look at what our proto-typical South Asia
analyst actually does and how he uses his
methodology to do it. And while someone else would
no doubt be better qualified, I'll ask you to bear
with me as a guide into the fascinating world of
the "South Asia" analyst in the Washington
Beltway.
Into the Looking Glass
Now is not this ridiculous, and is
not this preposterous? A through paced absurdity,
explain it if you can.
-Chorus of Dragoons in "Patience" by Gilbert and
Sullivan
Where to begin? Lets start with the usual. Stephen
Philip Cohen, his bio data informs us,2
is a former Professor of History and Political
Science, at the University of Illinois at Urbana;
former Director of the Program in Arms Control,
Disarmament, and International Security,
University of Illinois; Member, Policy Planning
Staff, U.S. Department of State (1985-87);
Scholar-in-Residence, Ford Foundation, New Delhi
and current Senior Fellow at The Brookings
Institution.
The titles are as impressive as
Dr Cohen's long association with the Subcontinents
affairs. Cohen began his ascent to his current
position as the US doyen of "South Asia" strategic
studies in 1979 when he co-authored a book called
India: Emergent power?
Since then he has been the author of a number of
books3-8 and innumerable articles on
Indo-Pakistan affairs. He has long been the
epitome of US political scholarship on the
Subcontinent.
Dr Cohen's knowledge of the Subcontinent is deep
and wide ranging. It would not be an exaggeration
to say that his knowledge of the Subcontinent
probably has no equal anywhere outside India. The
strange part, is the use that he makes of his
knowledge. Specifically, there appears to be a
long standing and fairly clear agenda, which can
only be described as "anti-Indian".
Cohen is incredibly careful not
to appear overtly hostile to India in any one
article. But; taken as a whole, his constant
disparaging remarks and contemptuous style display
a clear pattern. He writes cleverly enough,
however, so that he is just "nice enough" to the
Indians to, on a naive reading, come across as
being "balanced" instead of biased.
How he does this I will explain
below, and it is a process well worth knowing.
Dr Cohen has reached the happy state of a "South
Asia" analysts nirvana, where right wing Pakistani
commentators call him pro-India while others see
him as pro-Pakistan and where some Indian's see
him as anti-Indian and some as pro-Indian. He even
has a smallish constituency in both India and
Pakistan that see him as pro-India and
pro-Pakistan. Sadly, despite what all his happy
little groupies believe, and as we shall see,
Professor Cohen is anything but what they believe
him to be. If there is
one thing that is absolutely guaranteed to hold
the interest of any person, it is to find out what
others say about you. It's even more interesting
when the "other" is someone vaguely familiar and
whom you'd assumed had very little antipathy
towards you. Finding out that this vaguely held
assumption is false can be more than a little
disconcerting, and in Dr Cohen's work, it is
decidedly unsettling. He
spends an inordinate amount of time sniping
cattily at India which is at first surprising,
then wearying and after a while, tedious - he's
not inflammatory, I thought, just silly. While
reading his various articles, I kept asking myself
the obvious question, what's his problem? Why the
deliberate contempt? Had some Indian been
particularly nasty to him in his younger days?
It wasn't until I stumbled on an
article written by Shekhar Gupta in the Indian
Express that the pieces began to fall into
place. Consider this little vignette that Gupta,
who calls himself a "disciple of Cohen", reveals:9
Many Indians see him as
being overly friendly to the Pakistanis. Many
Pakistanis similarly say he has flipped to India's
side. Cohen, however, has written landmark books
on both armies and loves them. Can you imagine, he
asks, if India had not been partitioned and this
was one army? He recalls Field Marshall Auchinleck
telling him in an interview more than three
decades ago that his greatest regret was that
Mountbatten had partitioned such a fine army. "If
India had not been partitioned," Cohen says to me,
"I would have been sitting here not with you but
with a Chinese and we would be talking about how
to contain this mighty India that straddles all
the oil routes, dominates central Asia and so on."
The first time I read this statement I was simply
flabbergasted. I kept reading it again and again,
wondering what on earth was this Cohen chap all
about? Can a "scholar" truly reduce one of the
great tragedies of the 20th Century to the banal
statement that the Partition of India, with his
horrific consequences, was a "Good Thing" because
otherwise he might have had to chat with a Chinese
on how to "contain" India?
As I re-read the statement, I wondered, how to
explain or even describe such a world view. It
beggars the imagination. (Not, of course, that
this is unusual in US thinking. In fact Dr Cohen's
attitude is rather reminiscent of Nixon and
Kissinger's irritation with Indira Gandhi, when
she moved to stop the Pakistan Army's genocide in
Bangladesh, because it interfered with their
wooing of Beijing - but those were mere
politicians, Dr Cohen is supposed to be a
"scholar"!) Bemused, I wondered what next? Would
Dr Cohen, (Cohen is a Jewish name), also be of the
opinion that the Holocaust was a "Good Thing"
because of it's role in the creation of Israel?
That the best cure for a headache is a lobotomy?
Or is such an attitude only reserved for us?
I also wondered why Shekhar Gupta
was so pleased about being a "disciple" of Dr
Cohen? And about the influential Pakistani, Khaled
Ahmed's description of Dr Cohen as a "friend" of
Pakistan's while writing that:10As
an American, his views may differ from ours but
his consideration of the Indo-Pak equation does
not give proof of a pro-India bias. His latest
book, India: Emerging Power, actually tilts quite
obviously in favour of Pakistan when it criticises
India's conduct of foreign policy and the
behaviour of its foreign policy elite. In
diplomacy he gives more credit to Pakistan,
despite its limited resources, than to India. His
earlier books on Pakistan army and the Brasstacks
military exercise show a fine preference for
Pakistan.
Although the degree of subservience inherent in
the characterisation of an individual as a
"friend" of an entire nation is a little strange,
I understand why a Pakistani may look for friends
in funny places. Pakistan's has worked long and
hard to ensure that it has none in it's
neighbourhood. What is difficult to understand is
why supposedly "intelligent" people such as Gupta
and Ahmed would be so foolish as to miss the
obvious? Khaled Ahmed is
wrong. Dr Cohen is no friend of Pakistan or it's
people. He is in truth, a friend and supporter of
the Pakistani Army, and even then it is certainly
not because he "loves" them. Ahmed is however,
correct in describing Dr Cohen's anti-Indian
tendencies.
To grasp Cohen's world view one needs to
understand a fundamental truth, a truth so simple
and commonplace that it seems to miss most Indian
and Pakistani commentators: and that is that
Cohen, like all his compatriots, is neither friend
nor foe of either India or Pakistan. His
fundamental purpose is to protect what he
believes to be the interests of the United
States within the Subcontinent. And what he
believes is that India is a threat to US
interests. Reading his work as a body makes this
one truth jump up and grab you by the neck. He
seems to be utterly convinced of this, and
absolutely determined to ensure that Pakistan is
protected so that it can act as a US ally to
"contain" whatever monsters he sees in India.
It is not clear whether Cohen even understands
what US interests in India actually are, or
even whether he cares. It seems to be enough for
him that he considers India dangerous and
that therefore defines what he believes US
interests to be - containing India via Pakistan.
And that, in essence, is the problem with Dr
Cohen. At the heart of Cohen's vision of US
strategic interests in India, lies this facile
idea: That India must be "contained" and
only Pakistan is vituperative, and foolish enough,
to try to do that openly.
Cohen is a friend of the
Pakistani Army precisely because he knows that it
is the only institution in Pakistan capable of
maintaining it's "hate-India" rage decade after
decade. In this sense, Cohen's pro-Pakistani
leanings are simply part of the balancing act
required to ensure that the US has leverage over
India. Nothing more. Or as Pakistan's General
Aslam Beg has so eloquently put it: Pakistan is
simply a condom that the US uses and discards at
will. It is Cohen's job to ensure that this
prophylactic is always available for American use.
Although I shall, through necessity, be a little
unkind to Dr Cohen - while giving credit where
credit is due - during the course of this review,
I do not fault him for his views. He simply does
what he must to further what he believes to be the
interests of the United States. And he does it
extremely well. His acolytes in India and Pakistan
are living testimony to his superb skills. He is
neither anti-Indian nor pro-Pakistan per se.
These terms are utterly irrelevant to
understanding Cohen, or for that matter, the
"proto-typical South Asia expert". He would be as
much "pro-India" and "anti-Pakistan" were Pakistan
to be in India's place and have a population of
over a billion with the natural resources,
economic base and technological skill to dominate
the Indian Ocean and possibly challenge US
supremacy within the region.
If there is a fault, it lies in Indians and
Pakistanis like Shekhar Gupta and Khaled Ahmed,
vacuous enough to overlay terms such as "friend"
or "foe" to Dr. Cohen and his colleagues in the
various "South Asia" studies departments of the
US. (Of course, the more general query as to why
the US and it's academic cohorts so despise
democracies in developing countries and prefer to
maintain ties with every tin pot third world
dictator is another question entirely. And outside
the scope of this article).
The key therefore, to ensure
that we do not career madly and haphazardly
through an intellectual fog, a la our
friends Gupta and Ahmed, and to understand Cohen's
body of work, is to situate it in the correct
Indo-Pakistan context. From an Indian point of
view, Cohen is certainly no "friend" as he seems
to consider India a threat to US interests. From a
Pakistani point of view he is indeed a "friend" of
Pakistan's provided it's understood that his
primary aims are US interests. Furthermore, he is
a cheerleader of Pakistan's Army only in so far as
it is obedient to US diktats and does not
challenge the US - an increasingly difficult
position to hold in a post 9-11world.
To maintain the viability of Pakistan as a
counter-weight to India requires the Americans to
constantly massage the fragile Pakistani ego. To
large sections of the ruling Anglophone Pakistani
elite anything with the word "India" in it is
anathema. And that's where the term "South Asia"
seems to fit in. It's a rather curious fact that
the only three groups of people who seem to use
this term with a religious fervour are Americans,
Pakistanis and elements of the Indian left,
primarily the Marxists. The Americans, like Cohen,
use it in a dual sense, as a geographical region
to indicate the Subcontinent and otherwise to play
down the significance of India within the
Subcontinent. They seem to dislike the term
"subcontinent" as it gives too much "special"
status to India since the word itself is almost
automatically prefaced with the word "Indian".
Were it not for the certainty of universal
derision, not to mention giving their silly little
psy-war game away, we'd soon hear talk of
the "South Asian" ocean as well.
The Pakistanis of course, never use "India" at all
if it can be avoided. Rather unfortunately for
them, since 9-11 the word "Pakistan" is quite
de trop these days, so they prefer to use the
ambiguous "South Asian" terminology. And the
Indian left/Marxists, whose first instinct is to
deny the reality of India itself, are still lost
in their dream of the Withering of the State and
prefer the "South Asia" terminology to avoid any
possible accusation, (from whom, I wonder?), that
they may be "nationalistic" or - God forbid - be
thought of as being unsophisticated enough to
value their country. At any rate, the provenance
of this curious term, "South Asia", should be
noted: for it will become more and more common as
India's role on the world stage grows, as a method
to subtly downplay the nation's
achievements and significance.
In fact, the use of this term has already become a
partial identifier for a clique of Americans,
Pakistanis and Indians who seem to share a degree
of "like-mindedness" with respect to India. A
note:- Although I do, it may not be entirely fair
or correct to either Dr Cohen or other US
specialists on the Subcontinent to use the term
"South Asia analyst" interchangeably with Dr
Cohen. However, if any Indian spends some time
exploring the US political view of India it soon
becomes clear that; while various analysts differ
in their opinions, there exists a cadre with a
degree of commonality in their views, based on a
wariness of India, and which occasionally
manifests itself in their contemptuous utterances
about India. Consequently, they can be safely
tucked under the "South Asia analyst" rubric. So,
while it may not be "fair", it has a degree of
accuracy that I think justifies the interchange
ability.
Cohen's methodology
"Is not my logic absolute? Would
not a three-year-old child of most deficient
intellect be convinced by it?"
-Jules de Grandin in "Satan's Stepson" by Seabury
Quinn
So how does Dr Cohen do what he does? If indeed,
he is a supporter of the worst aspect of Pakistan,
how does he do it? What exactly is his methodology
to get away with his perpetual support for the
Pakistani Army against India, and against the
Pakistani people? They are after all the worst
bunch of mass murderers since the Khmer Rouge had
free rein in Cambodia.11 And how does
he still do it in the post 9-11 world? His
standard methodology is a dual prong strategy. For
India, he uses a subtle form of repetitive
reinforcement of a set number of anti-Indian
points that he emphasizes in virtually every
article he writes. The only difference is in the
set of points he uses in any given article. But
where Dr Cohen really excels is in a brilliant
smoke and mirrors trick that he uses to
devastating effect to promote the welfare of the
Pakistani military. The main aim here is to
understand this trick. His critiques of India,
although clever, I will detail in the next
section. But to explain his Pakistan defence I
first need to take a little detour.
During the height of the cold war, when the US
seemed to be supporting every tin pot third world
dictator around, American journalist developed a
neat little trick to cover US behaviour abroad
which contradicted the US' much talked about love
of democracy. I call it the American Journalists
Information Trick or AJIT for short. (The acronym
is pronounced as "ah-jeet", a Goan word for an
enema, quite appropriate as you'll see).
Common sense
dictated that these journalists had to inform
their readers of at least part of the truth.
Clearly, bald faced lying about what some US
backed psychopath was doing wouldn't do. To easy
to get caught. So they developed what they
referred to as "balance". They would freely
indicate that so-and-so wasn't a terribly nice
man, but, they said, under the circumstances, the
other option would be even worse. And anyway, the
poor put upon psychopath had no choice. He was
defending freedom. And people really ought to
understand that that was a difficult task.
Fairly standard so far? But there's a bit more to
it than just that. The AJIT has been adopted
almost wholesale by any journalist who wants to
push a barrow. There are two key ideas necessary
to understand and practice the AJIT effectively.
The first is to appear balanced. So if you don't
like X and want to push Y what an AJIT
practitioner says is: "Sure X and Y are both
rotten scoundrels, but what the heck, Y is just a
little less rotten than X so lets support Y". Note
that anyone questioning said practitioner is
immediately told that the article was "balanced".
This is the mirror part of the trick.
But by itself, that is not
enough. The heart of the AJIT trick is something
else, the "smoke" part. The "smoke" part of the
trick which blindsides you is to ensure that
the only alternatives available to the reader are
X and Y.
That is the magical bit.
You see, the key is not to inform the reader or
lie to them, but to keep them ignorant of
alternatives. It's not to influence
your choice but to constrain the very choices
you have so that the only reasonable choice to
make is the one that they want you to make.
Simple, brilliant and effective. For the illusion
of choice and freedom remains, but there is no
danger of you making the "wrong" choice. Whatever
you choose, out AJIT practitioner wins.
For example, what if there were
X, Y and Z choices? The trick is that our
practitioner doesn't really care if you choose X
or Y. He just wants you to think he does. What he
really wants is to hide Z from your sight. Once he
does that he wins.
This is the key to the trick. During the cold war,
there were only two choices, "their side" or
"ours". Those were the only options given to the
world. In India, we of course know that there was
a third option. Neither side.
Cohen's methodology pulls the same little AJIT
"smoke &
mirrors" trick on us. When faced with
the obvious question such as "how do we solve the
Pakistan problem", Cohen's
invariant reply is "by backing the Pakistan Army".
And, to those who quibble with his solution, he
pulls out the AJIT. And correspondingly, the only
options he offers are "crazy mullahs" or "the bad
but not crazy Pakistan Army", keeping at all times
the idea of Pakistani democracy at bay, knowing
full well that within those parameters the choice,
after 9-11 must be, even for a "deficient
three-year-old", the Pakistani Army.
Of course, Dr Cohen has a number of other tricks
that he uses with superb aplomb and effect. For
example, a standard variation of the AJIT is to
separate the smoke & mirror parts, although it
is most effective when combined. I will detail
some of these in the next two sections along with
the use of his heavy cavalry, the AJIT. (I really
regret saying this but; while there is no doubt
that Dr Cohen is certainly the most vehement
non-Pakistani anti-Indian writer anywhere, he is
also without a doubt very, very good at what he
does).
Cohenism I: The "South Asia" analyst at work on
India
I dare say that's an idea which has
already occurred to you, but with the weight of my
great mind behind it, no doubt it strikes the
imagination more forcibly.
-Lord Peter Wimsey in "Strong Poison" by Dorothy
L. Sayers
Having, hopefully, set the stage, lets have a look
at the actual output of our South Asia analysts
great mind. In this section, I'll concentrate on
India and on the essence of the set of ideas that
Dr Cohen repeatedly uses in his writings, and in
the next on Pakistan. Naturally, given the nature
of the subject there will be a certain degree of
overlap between these two sections.
Let me begin with the article that's the genesis
of this review. Barely two pages into a supposed
article on Pakistani Jihadis, Cohen takes his
customary side swipe, in passing as it were, at
India with the statement that: All Pakistanis
value their state's role in various international
Islamic organizations and favour support for
oppressed Muslims elsewhere, particularly in
Palestine, Bosnia, and Kashmir. [Ref. 1; p.9]
Now, how long do you think it took the good Dr
Cohen to speak to all Pakistanis? Putting
that aside, note how he casually slips in the
"oppressed" Kashmiri line? Oppressed as compared
to whom? The free people of Pakistan? Saudi
Arabia? Or perhaps some other US ally, Egypt say?
Since Kashmir is a part of India, all he has to do
is compare whether or not any Indian anywhere else
in India enjoys rights and privileges denied to
the Kashmiri? Of course, he's not going to do
that.
This is a theme that
Dr Cohen hammers at again and again in his
articles. His primary aim is to draw the US into
the Kashmir dispute and he is not above a little
blood libel while trying to do so. Consider the
following quote:
Nevertheless, there are steps
that could be taken by both sides even before
negotiations begin. Pakistan cannot always argue
that India, as the bigger state, must take the
first step; to do so would doom the Kashmiri
people to the full weight of the Indian military,
with the danger that their very culture will be
destroyed.17
I
read that that sentence again. Nope no change.
Dazzled by the logic, I begin to wonder if Dr
Cohen bothers to think before he writes, or
whether there is some sort of Oliver Sacks type
short-circuit between his brain and fingers. The
problem in Kashmir is not the Pakistani backed
Islamic terrorists who kill, rape, loot and throw
acid in the face of women who don't wear the
burka. No, the problem is the Indian Army trying
to defend these folks from Pakistani terrorists.
Of course, that article was written before 9-11.
Since then Dr Cohen hasn't stopped supporting the
Pakistani Army, as the next section details, but I
shall hazard a guess that the US' Homeland
Security people will make him a tad more
circumspect in his defense of Islamic terrorists
in Pakistani magazines.
It's quite amazing the lengths to which he goes to
push his views. Consider for example, his comment
in a recent interview12 on Indo-Israeli
ties, where he: expressed concern this could
degenerate into an anti-Pakistan alliance of
Hindus and Jews against Muslims. A remarkable
statement considering that India's most celebrated
living scientist, Abdul Kalam, the man responsible
for India's nuclear weapons and missile technology
is not only a Muslim, he was also elected as the
President of India (!) barely a few months
before Cohen made this statement.
Another favourite theme of Dr
Cohen's is the so-called "equal-equal" idea. This
is a Pakistani idea that Dr Cohen adopts wholesale
in many of his writings with a pretentious
verbiage that conceals the vacuity at the heart of
the idea: which is that India, with one-fifth of
humanity within it's borders and a democracy ever
since it's emergence into the nation state, must
at all times be equated with Pakistan, a tin-pot
third world dictatorship that has never quite
managed to figure out how to govern itself, to put
it bluntly.
Pardon my annoyance. To an Indian this equating of
India and Pakistan is intensely annoying, as
annoying as an American might find arguments about
the moral equivalence of American actions and
Osama bin Laden. To a Pakistani, it is the
ultimate expression of self-realisation. In fact,
it's astonishing the degree to which Cohen spouts
Pakistani propaganda as his "analysis".
For an example, that epitomises the
Cohen South Asia view, consider the following
quotes:13
India and Pakistan
in particular have learned that short-circuiting
democracy only make things worse in the long run.
In several cases,
these "wars by other means" too had terrible
consequences, most notably India's support of
Tamil Tigers. Pakistan's support of the Taliban is
also problematic.
A culturally and
economically dominated India still feels deeply
insecure. . .
Yet, the smaller
regional states, again Pakistan is the most
important case, are afraid of being left alone in
the region with a dominant India, and regard their
cultivation of outsiders as legitimate insurance
against a wrong turn in Indian policy.
This puts outsiders
in a difficult position. Classic geopolitics
offers them two strategies. One is to ally with
the region's dominant power, India, and allow
Delhi to limit one's ties with Islamabad, Dhaka,
and Colombo, Kathmandu and even Male. The other is
to maintain ties with India's neighbours as a way
of keeping up the pressure on India.
I would be the first
to note that the policies of the US have, at
times, made things more difficult in South Asia.
This is also true of China, and, in the past, the
Soviet Union. Yet, American policy was never
guided by a strategy of countering India. . .
Firstly, it starts of with what could be
considered as a fairly innocuous statement about
"short circuiting democracy". So what? Well,
consider the audience that Dr Cohen
addresses in general. This audience is not
Indian or Pakistani, although he is clearly aware
that Indians and Pakistanis read him. His primary
target, as an advisor to the US State department,
are economic and political decision making circles
within the US itself.
These circles are certainly not
going to be aware of the subtleties of
Indo-Pakistani relations. In fact, Cohen's value
is precisely because they can turn to him for
advice. And what Dr Cohen gives them is that as
far as democracy goes,
India, a
democracy since the start of it's nationhood, is
entirely the same as Pakistan, a tin-pot military
dictatorship for decades!
Note how brilliantly Dr Cohen does this. A simple
statement that India and Pakistan "have learned"!
The setting and execution of his view is superb.
Then comes the second statement. Post 9-11,
everybody knows about Pakistani support for
terrorist groups, but this article was written in
1998. Note how casually Dr Cohen, in 1998, tries
to insert the view that India also supported
terrorists, the Tamil Tigers. Dr Cohen can do this
fully aware that 99% of his readership in the
decision making circles he's addressing will not
have the faintest idea of the complexities of the
Sri Lankan political situation, hence his little
knife in the ribs and equation with the Taliban.
Then, after a swipe at India
being insecure that sets the stage, there follows
the classic implication that India may therefore
be dangerous. Again, superbly executed with just a
single line about a possible "wrong turn" in
India's foreign policy. Note too the cleverness in
implying that this is not Dr Cohen's view. It's
other nations that "are afraid". The good doctor
is merely voicing their fears. This is immediately
followed by the policy prescription that India
needs to be pressured, (=contained) nicely written
as if India's neighbours ask for this
pressure/containment.
And the entire scenario is back
ended by the claim that the US
is not seeking to counter India. But remember, his
readers are decision makers in the US without the
keen grasp and knowledge of Dr Cohen. Given the
preceding statements, the final statement would,
in any competent security manager, naturally raise
the question that perhaps India does need
to be countered! Do you see, gentle reader, how
marvellously adept the good Dr Cohen is? And were
we to ask him this, he could instantly deny it.
After all, only a paranoid lunatic would interpret
all those innocuous statements that way, right?
Certainly, entirely possible. Unless you read his
work in totality. Then, and only then, does the
pattern emerge.
Note too, how well
Dr Cohen gives his readers - recall, these are US
decision makers - a variation on the AJIT. Two
factors X (India) and Y (Pakistan) are set up. X
and Y are as bad as each other. X and Y both do
bad things, but X might have a capacity to do
worse things - even to innocent "others".
Therefore, and cleverly he does not say it
explicitly, better support Y. Note how X and Y are
carefully setup so that the correct choice is
obvious. And the complete determination to hide Z.
Here Z is the real India, not the fictional one
that Dr Cohen invents by implication.
Another theme that Dr Cohen
develops to back up his primary view of India is
to treat India with a finely developed
contemptuous style when writing or speaking about
India: Consider the following quotes from a paper
presented to the Harvard/MIT Transnational
Security Project Seminar14discussing
India's nuclear tests in 1998:
Without much of a sense of
irony, Indians worship science, particularly
nuclear science. This worship of science and the
adulation of scientists is widespread among the
Indian strategic elite.
However, when various technologies were denied by
others, as in the case of the second US
supercomputer, the enhanced effort put into
developing an indigenous technology was thought to
make India that much stronger, because the country
was forced to be self-reliant. The
scientific/strategic enclave, and their
publicists, boast that technology denial thus
helps India. Lacking an
accurate understanding of how little such advanced
technologies actually contribute to development,
and the opportunity costs incurred by trying to
cobble together advanced systems given India's
poor industrial and technology base, the programs
have become totems, and are patriotically
supported and defended by a wide variety of
scientists, journalists, and politicians.
Ominously, the BJP's Home
Minister (L.K. Advani) has stated that the new
"threat" to India comes not from the "secularists"
(by which he meant Indians not sympathetic with
the BJP's notion of Hindutva), but from
"liberals," i.e. those few Indians who dared to
speak out openly against the tests.
The tests were gleefully
welcomed as evidence of the great accomplishments
of Indian culture. The
long-held if fantastic Indian view that the United
States was guided in its Asian policy by a desire
to contain India, and a willingness to use both
China and Pakistan for that purpose, remained one
of the core assumptions of a good portion of the
Indian strategic elite.
Further, the aura of
crisis and danger that surrounds nuclear weapons
demands a powerful political centre as well as a
correspondingly powerful administrative mechanism
to guard them and decide upon their use. This is
very appealing to once-powerful regional elites,
and the bomb lobby has a disproportionate number
of high-caste Hindus, members of religious
minorities and others who have been dispossessed
from regional politics by the emergence of mass
politics. The nuclear
program is one in a series of important symbolic
projects that the centre has undertaken to develop
a sense of Indian nationhood and identity. The
content of that nationhood is, when projected
through the prism of the bomb, a scientifically
adept, multi-cultural people, capable of achieving
great things with minimum resources. Originally,
these symbolic meanings were attached to the
civilian nuclear program, and its leadership often
boasted of the way in which Indian talent and
innovativeness thrived under the adverse
conditions brought about by Western economic
sanctions and technology restraint regimes.
The selection of these quotes isn't to bore you to
tears, nor is it meant to prove that Dr Cohen was
born with an extra bile duct. Instead I'm trying
to point out the type of statements Dr Cohen
brings to the table during a "strategic"
discussion on India's nuclear tests. Note the
singular point: these comments are completely
gratuitous. Dr Cohen informs his audience of the
unsophisticated Indians who worship science. The
scientists themselves are nothing but braggarts,
hardly deserving of this "worship". And anyway
they don't really understand science. Indian
senior ministers are "ominous" sounding about
India's liberals, giving a shaded reference to
far-right authoritarianism.
The foolish immature population gleefully welcome
matters which they obviously know nothing about,
which is just as foolish as the fact the US may
wish to contain India. (Although if the US wasn't
interested in India, how the good Dr makes a
living is a mystery). Then the implied insult to
India's democracy with the careful statement that
only Brahmins and religious minorities wanted the
nuclear tests, followed by a contemptuous
dismissal of India's technological success in the
face of stringent Western opposition again, as
mere boasting. And what
of Dr Cohen's views on Kargil, the recent conflict
with Pakistan that has defined so much of India's
attitude to national security in these times?
Well, here's the good Dr. again:
Kargil is nested within the larger
Kashmir problem . . . the current crisis is the
result of a bold Pakistani attempt . . . India
responded to the incursion by unleashing its
airpower in Kashmir for the first time,
representing a significant escalation of the
conflict. . . . The Indian army was inept, failing
to detect. . .15
The military conflict between India
and Pakistan over the Kargil road in Kashmir could
yet turn into a major regional crisis. Hard-liners
in both countries mistakenly believe that they can
exhaust the other side by a slow-motion,
low-intensity war.16
Note how Kargil is not Pakistan's fault, it's part
of the Kashmir problem, Pakistan's stab in the
back is "bold" and India's response is
"escalation" with it's army being "inept". Note
too, the clever and blatant insinuation, by using
the word "hardliners" that both sides are to blame
for Pakistan invading India!
Dr Cohen's bias is certainly
recognisable. For example, in one of his more
revealing interviews, his bias is so badly exposed
that even his interlocutor tries to reason with
him.39 In the interview with the
Harvard Asian Quarterly, (HAQ), in the
discussion on the Kashmir issue he argues India's
policy is one of "great risk". HAQ picks
this up, note the question and answer and Cohen's
quick retreat into, "but I say nice things about
the Indians at other times".
HAQ: On the
contrary, I would argue that if anything, we have
not seen any Pakistani political or military
strategy that does not run great risks. Which
country in the Cold War attempted anything like
Kargil? Surely you are being one-sided in your
condemnation.
SC: No. I've written
at length on the many strategic mistakes committed
by Pakistan. In my most recent book, India:
Emerging Power, I do provide an assessment of the
overall success (or failure) of India's use of
military power-it is a mixed record. But this
shouldn't be seen as a competition as to who is
worse!
But that of course is precisely the point, and he
includes, gratis, the equal-equal theory as well.
The fascinating part is the next section of this
interview:
HAQ: Can India
really deal with the problem itself-doesn't the
advantage of terrorism lie in the asymmetric
benefits for Pakistan? During the Gulf War,
Israel's security was strengthened through
American defenses in return for Israeli patience.
Will we see anything of this sort in South Asia?
SC: We couldn't
guarantee the Israelis' security against
Palestinian terrorists...
HAQ: I was
suggesting an analogy between Iraqi attacks and
the mujaheddin trained in Afghanistan.
SC: I see your
point, but I don't think we can get that involved
in South Asian politics to make that distinction
and enforce it.
Marvellous is it not? Dr Cohen has always demanded
that the US should be involved in the Kashmir
dispute, but when it's suggested that the US could
possibly help India prevent terrorist attacks, Dr
Cohen immediately backs off. Heavens no! Help the
Indians against terrorism? Not if the good Dr
Cohen can help it! Dr
Cohen does seem to have a lovely talent to find
all that is wrong with India, but to list and
dissect every single one of them would be boring.
Instead, let me summarise some crucial points
necessary to grasp the good Dr Cohen's attitude to
India.
1.
Dr Cohen's knowledge of the Subcontinent is
superb. His writings on India are can be extremely
shrewd and perceptive18 - and the
application of his agenda is all the more
effective because of it. I cannot stress this
enough. It would be a vast error to underestimate
his knowledge. Furthermore, his academic
credentials enable him to access a significant
number of knowledgeable Indians within India
itself to supplement the gaps in his knowledge
base and; which are available to defend him
against criticism as Gupta does.
2.
Dr Cohen's methodology is not some form of crude
hate propaganda. It is in fact the skilful
application of psy-war methodologies honed over
years of practice. There are no silly lies or
blanket condemnations of India within Dr Cohen's
work, although there are some slip-ups. Instead,
there is always the "balanced" approach, of the
sophisticated academic engaged in his work, (which
requires the occasional praise of India and
condemnation of Pakistan when it does something
particularly egregious.) And all of this
brilliantly executed so that any critique can be
easily be dismissed as a misunderstanding of the
process of academic discourse.
The fundamental reason Dr
Cohen's methodology works so well is precisely
because he is viewed as an academic without a
barrow to push. It is only when we let go of this
facile view, and understand that he is at all
times working to further what he considers
to be the interests of the United States within
the Subcontinent, is it possible to re-interpret
his work accurately.
3.
It's necessary to read Dr Cohen's work in totality
and not as isolated articles to understand the
underlying framework and the methodology that he
applies when dealing with India. It is only within
that framework, the totality of his
work, (not individual articles or books) that he
can be understood. Most important of all, it's
necessary to recognise the constituency that Dr
Cohen addresses in his articles. And these are
the economic, business, political and security
decision-making elites of the United States.
It is worth remembering that to
accomplish his fundamental aim to "contain" India,
he needs US decision makers to recognise
India as a potential threat. That is all.
Everything else will then follow automatically if
the US accepts this view. Even Indo-US strategic
cooperation will be moderated by US attempts to
insure that India does not obtain any advantage
from the US. This will in turn lead to an Indian
response and subsequently create the dynamics of a
non-friendly (but not necessarily hostile)
relationship. Since a "wariness" dynamic already
exists between the US and India, all Dr Cohen has
to do is to use a simple repetitive reiteration of
Indian "faults" to ensure it's permanence.
Again, I cannot overstress how
important it is to bear these points in mind while
reading Dr Cohen. As an aside, another question
that crops up is; how do we counter the Dr Cohen's
of the world? Frankly, I have not the slightest
idea, other than being aware of them. And why
bother? India is India. And the Cohen's of the
world will come and go. If there is any advice I'd
give, I would recommend the old saying: Forgive
your enemies. But remember their names.
Let me end this section with a couple of points
that I think necessary. Firstly, despite any
impression this section may give, I really don't
have any problem with Dr Cohen's anti-India
nonsense. While it is undoubtedly annoying, I am
in fact, slightly in favour of it. An occasionally
adversarial (but non-hostile) relation with the US
is, in my view, a long term strategic necessity
for India if we are to maintain our strategic
independence and position ourselves for the long
term. Moreover, the Republic went through it's
hardest years without the help, (in fact at times,
active opposition) of the United States. We didn't
miss them then, and we won't miss them if Dr Cohen
is successful. As such, I certainly have no
quibble with Dr Cohen's aims although, of course,
I wish he'd be honest about them and use a
different methodology.
Further, from an American perspective what Dr
Cohen does may be fine, although I would think
that perhaps his readers could decide for
themselves rather then be carefully lead down a Dr
Cohen's chosen path. From an Indian point of view,
which is all this article is concerned with, much
of what Dr Cohen writes can be broken up into two
parts. The facts that Dr Cohen presents and the
spin/presentation imparted to those facts in his
analysis. It's this second part that we need to be
aware off when we read his work.
Cohenism II: The "South Asia" analyst at work on
Pakistan
In order to attain the impossible,
one must attempt the absurd.
-Miguel de Unammuno y Jugo
In this section I'll concentrate on describing Dr
Cohen's views on Pakistan. Fortunately, this job
is made a little easier since Dr Cohen has,
recently, been kind enough to provide a précis of
his views on Pakistan called "The Nation and State
of Pakistan"19. Along with [Ref. 1],
these two articles will be used as the basis for
this section while not being limited to them.
Cohen begins in [Ref. 19] with
the standard mythologized canard about the
creation of Pakistan:
Pakistan was to be an extraordinary
state--a homeland for Indian Muslims and an
ideological and political leader of the Islamic
world. Providing a homeland to protect Muslims--a
minority community in British India--from the
bigotry and intolerance of India's Hindu majority
was important;
[Ref 19, p 109].
Since this is the standard rubbish that finds it's
way into Pakistani textbooks, it's possible to
simply accept it as a given and move on. Except
for one thing: It is false and obviously so.
Consider the terms "protect",
"bigotry and intolerance" used so cavalierly. The
implication, and the style of writing, implies
as a given that the Muslim community was
persecuted and in need of protection from India's
"Hindu majority" before Partition. You
don't need a PhD in Indian history to know that
before Partition India was governed by the
British. Obviously, if anybody was being
persecuted at that time, then said
persecution was conducted by those with the power
to persecute. Therefore, if there was any
persecution then
it must have been be conducted
by those with the power to do so, i.e.. by the
British!
This is such an elementary
application of logic that even the proverbial
"deficient three-year-old" could understand it.
But, apparently not Dr Cohen. He prefers to tar
something called the "Hindu majority" and thereby
change the reality of the diversity of India into
a mythical monolithic entity to provide, as we
shall see, the cover necessary for his Pakistani
agenda.
(As an aside: While anyone familiar with India's
history and the lead up to Partition would
consider this view a typical case of advanced
cretinism, it's clear that Dr Cohen is aware of
what he does. Consider that Pakistan was created
on the most bigoted principle imaginable. That if
Person A's prayers were different to Person B's,
then neither A nor B could live with each other,
or even near each other. i.e. That different
beliefs exclude the possibility of coexistence. By
extension, if you were to believe that blue is a
nicer colour than red, then quite obviously you
would need a separate country to anyone fond of
the colour red. I doubt if there's anything more
ridiculous that masquerades as an ideology. But Dr
Cohen is, in my view, well aware of all this.
Nevertheless, he repeats the refrain, because he
must for his agenda to be successful. Further, A
brief glance at his India Rising18
article is all that you need to realise that he is
fully aware of India's reality and diversity. But
again, that's irrelevant to his purposes, so it's
ignored when necessary.)
Dr Cohen then goes on to inform his readers,
(remember, he's addressing people in the US who
have no knowledge of the Subcontinent's history),
that Pakistan's "founding father" Jinnah, had a
vision of a liberal, secular, and democratic
Pakistan. . . . Its most ardent advocate is
General Pervez Musharraf and also states that:
Most officers believe in the Jinnah model of
the Pakistani state but are unable to achieve it.
[Ref. 19, pp.110-113].
To anyone with even a cursory knowledge of
Pakistan, this would leave you breathless. But Dr
Cohen can get away with it because he essentially
acts as a gatekeeper about the Subcontinent for
his US readers. These readers will simply be
unaware of what the Pakistani's call the Triple A,
i.e. the Army-Allah-America alliance. (This refers
to the decades long cooperation between the Army
and the Mullahs by which the elite maintain their
control of the Pak state, with economic and
military sustenance injected by America.) And
therefore what Dr Cohen feeds his readers may well
define their attitude and response to events in
the Subcontinent.
Hilariously, he also adds that: So far, the
armed forces have not accepted the idea that
ruling Pakistan is good for the army, . . . [and
that] it believes [in] land reform and social
justice in the countryside. . . [Ref. 19,
p.113].
Not surprisingly however, Dr Cohen is unable to
explain to his readers how, despite this "not
accepted idea", the Army has been "forced" to rule
Pakistan for nearly 30 years, or how they sadly
failed to implement any land reform
whatsoever in those 30 years. The only land reform
ever tried was by Pakistan's civilian Prime
Minister, Bhutto. And he was, naturally, hanged by
the Army (although not primarily because of the
land reform issue). The
importance of this is the way Dr Cohen sets up his
X and Y options. Here X is the Army which he
implies to his readers are "non-Islamic normal
folk who would probably vote for the Democrats if
they were American". No, of course he doesn't say
that, but the context is clear. He then sets up
his Y. The bad and nasty (some of them) Islamists.
These we are told, are mad Jihadi's and are:
. . .bitterly angry at the military
and other members of the Pakistani establishment
who are reluctant to sign up for the crusade.
Their vision of Pakistan is so radical that the
political and military branches of the Pakistani
political establishment hold them in contempt.
[Ref 19, p.114].
So we have the scene for the AJIT for his readers,
the US decision-making elite. The Islamists are
"bitterly angry" implying that the Pakistani Army
is somehow opposed to the mullahs. And not just
any opposition, but contemptuous opposition. Which
implies that there is little if any chance of the
Pak Army joining with the mullahs!
If you begin to ask yourself,
how in heavens name can he get away with such
nonsense, then note the brilliance of the good Dr.
a page later, and in half a paragraph, in passing
as it were, he mentions that: The power of the
religious parties derived from the patronage of
the state; from Zia's time onward, the leaders
used the religious parties to balance the secular
(and more influential) Pakistan Muslim League and
Pakistan People's Party. The religious parties
have never polled more than 2-3 percent in a
national election, and some now question whether
the parties' street power can threaten any
military regime or democratically elected
government or whether they will ever have the
votes to win a free election.[Ref.19, p 119].
See the care with which he uses the words "the
state". But in Pakistan, the Army is the
state, and has been for decades. But Cohen saves
the situation and simultaneously prevents any
possible accusation that he's got it wrong. For in
that one paragraph he's told the whole truth. That
the Islamists have been fostered by the state,
i.e. the Army. And that the Army-Mullah combine
are simply two sides of the same coin. But he has
carefully buried the truth . . . in the open! Note
too how he mentions "Zia", without his proper
title. In fact, in the entire article [Ref. 19],
when General Zia's name comes up, as it must in
any discussion of the Islamist factor in Pakistan,
the "General" part is never mentioned.
Because; Dr Cohen is writing for American readers
and he knows what acts as triggers to make them
identify with his agenda.
Another example of this little trick is his claim
that Pakistani's debate various matters: . .
.in a press that the military regime did not
censor. . . [Ref. 19, p 115], a claim that
will come as news to those reporters who have been
beaten, tortured and driven out of the country.
Media censorship in Pakistan has been extensively
commented on by journalists,20-22
newspaper editorials,23-24 and human
rights groups25. Of course Dr Cohen
isn't actually interested in press freedom, like
any good public relations expert he simply
includes keywords that will resonate with his
target audience. And he needs to do this. It's the
only way he can sell the "Pak Army is our friend"
line to US decision makers.
To reiterate the "Pakistani Army is our friend
line", Dr Cohen then sets out to sell General
Musharraf to his readers. Having set the scene
earlier by claiming that Musharraf was liberal,
secular etc, he now pushes the point by saying
that Musharraf gave:
. . .a possibly historic speech
delivered in Urdu over Pakistan television on
January 12, 2002.9 He bluntly set forth the goal
of turning Pakistan into a moderate Muslim
state--the word "secular" is still contentious. No
internal extremism would be tolerated and no safe
havens for terrorists operating across Pakistan's
borders provided.
[Ref. 19, p.116].
Certainly true. But what Dr Cohen conveniently
fails to tell his readers is that Musharraf had in
an earlier "historic speech" a few days after
9-11, while switching to Urdu, likened his
cooperation with the US to the Prophet Mohammed's
tactical peace with the Jews of Medina which gave
him the time necessary to re-group and eventually
attack them again. More
to the point, Dr Cohen is well aware of the
reality in Pakistan. Consider his participation in
a PBS interview26 with Margaret Warner
and Selig Harrison, the former Washington Post
bureau chief in South Asia and author of five
books on the region, just after President
Clinton's historic trip to India. Harrison
characterises the Musharraf junta as:
. . .General
Musharraf, who is a front man for a regime that is
really controlled by Islamic fundamental generals
who are powerful behind the scenes . . . the
fundamentalists elements have used the military,
infiltration of the high levels of the military,
to get power that they really don't enjoy among
the people and that they wouldn't have if you
could return to elections properly prepared for
with redistricting and other reforms that would
make them really representative . . . this regime
is dominated by a group who have, keeping the pot
boiling in Kashmir as their main agenda.
It's instructive that in the interview Dr Cohen
doesn't disagree with any of the points that Selig
Harrison makes. But adds that . . .the Pakistan
military wants to get out of power . . . if they
stay in power, they have a prospect of ruining
their own country. In fact, Dr Cohen would
probably argue that he has made the same points
himself. And he has, but only within a specific
context of support for the Pakistani Army and he
never quite manages to explain how the Pakistan
Army, despite not wanting power, has been forced
to run the country or decades.
Consider the following, US
support for Pakistan post 9-11 has been strongly
predicated on Musharraf staying in power. The over
reliance on a single individual to act as a US
proxy in the region is a danger that Cohen
recognises for the United States. Because,
if Musharraf were to fall in the time honoured
fashion of transferring power in Pakistan - either
by a coup or assassination - the US may react with
excessive haste to prevent Pakistani nuclear
weapons falling into the wrong hands.
To prevent any such excessive reaction, Dr Cohen
informs us that the view of other South Asia
experts such as Robert Kaplan27 and
General Anthony C Zinni that: . . .the U.S.
interest in Musharraf is not so much his personal
qualities but the likelihood that "what would come
after him would be a disaster." This conclusion is
false: if Musharraf stepped down or was removed,
he would be replaced by a colleague or peer who is
unlikely to be enthusiastic about radical Islam.
Musharraf's successor would be replaced in turn by
still another general with a similar semi secular
outlook. The army may use Islamic extremists and
may not be able to reconstruct and build a normal
Pakistani society, but for the foreseeable future,
it is most capable of blocking anyone else from
coming to power. [Ref. 1, p. 23].
In effect, therefore, what Dr Cohen suggests is
the classic AJIT. Sure the Pakistani Army is bad.
Terrible even. But hey folks look, they can
"block" the even worse lunatics from taking
control. So we'll just have to put up with them
the way we do with other terrible regimes because
the alternative is even worse. Unlike Selig
Harrison, Dr Cohen is, careful, without
disagreeing with him, to not highlight the truth.
That the Islamist phenomena in Pakistan is a
Pakistani Army creation, without the Pakistani
Army, there is no such problem.
In fact, throughout [Ref 1], Dr
Cohen manages the quite stupendous feat of
discussing, accurately mind you, all the
problems inherent in Pakistan's state support for
terror via it's military establishment, but
superbly manages to not highlight the
simple fact that everyone of the Jihadi
groups in Pakistan are simply tools of the
Pakistani Army. In the
revealing HAQ interview,39, note
how he tries the usual AJIT trick, that Pakistan
will be taken over by Jihadi's and given HAQ's
response, immediately tries to shift the ground by
bringing up, of all things, the
Israeli-Palestinian problem!
SC: . . . I think
that is the view of most moderate Pakistanis who
fear that the US will declare Pakistan a terrorist
state. India would have on its border a state that
was really run by the jihadis.
HAQ: Then again, why
should India, or indeed the West, continue to
believe this doomsday scenario? If anything, the
West's intransigence is breeding extremism in
India, of the same sort that we are also seeing in
Israel. So is it not time for the international
community to come down on one side of the fence?
SC: Many countries
use this argument. Now, because there are some
radical Palestinians, or Israelis, should we only
support one or the other?
And of course, there's the usual: . . .I do not
think that the typical Pakistani Army officer is a
jihadi, but by now that should have a familiar
ring to it.
When it comes to Pakistan, Dr Cohen views can be
quite remarkable. He refers to Pakistan as
"surrounded by enemies". Which is true. But the
context implies a desperately poor nation pluckily
sticking it out despite all it's evil neighbours.
Which is quite a variant on the reality that
Pakistan has spent a decade engaged in
sub-conventional warfare against India, Iran,
Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Russia in Chechnya, China
in its Muslim dominated province and against the
US by it's overt support of Osama bin Laden prior
to 9-11. (China however, unlike these other
countries, backs Pakistan for the same reason the
Dr Cohen wants the US to - wariness of India. Of
course, neither the US nor China has been spared
from Pakistan's terror wars against all and
sundry. The Chinese are however, more popular with
the Pakistanis for the rather simple reason that
they have been able to hide their contempt of
their Pakistani "allies" rather more successfully
than the US. This is not a paper on Pakistani
links and support to terrorism. However, for those
interested, please see [Ref. 40-45]).
Note carefully the genius here. Dr Cohen never
lies, nor does he hide things about Pakistan. He
does gloss over them in throw away lines
sometimes, but it's always in the open. His real
strength lies in his very openness and brutal
frankness about Pakistan. Because that is what
he uses, superbly I might add, by his construction
of a false duality of Islamists versus the
Pakistan Army, the AJIT. Of course, there is no
such duality. The Islamists are the
Pakistan Army.
In fact, when
the Army held an election to "return the country
to democracy", it proceeded to rigorously hobble
all but the Islamic parties. The non-Islamists had
their leaders banned, while others were sent into
exile and ordinary members were arrested,
tortured, intimidated and others simply bribed to
toe the military line. The end result of course,
was the Islamic parties "sweeping" into power in
the two Pakistani provinces bordering Afghanistan,
with significant representation in the federal
parliament, and strong influences in Pakistan's
other two provinces. Even terrorist leaders from
groups banned by the US ended up as
parliamentarians. 28-38
It would, as in the previous section, be more than
a little tedious to continue quoting vast reams of
Dr Cohen's predilection for the Pakistani Army. So
instead, I'll end this section by making a couple
of points. As I have already said, I don't have
any real objection to Dr Cohen's anti-India
attitude although I wish he were more open about
it. However, Dr Cohen's pro-Pakistani Army
position is a different matter entirely. The
molly-coddling of a nuclear armed neo-feudalistic
state that has a decades long history of fostering
terrorism against India, Iran, Afghanistan, China
and even the US is, in my view, a recipe for
disaster. And often, there are times when the
majestical stupidity of what Dr Cohen writes can
leave you speechless.
Although a change in Dr Cohen's support of the
Pakistani Army is unlikely, because quite frankly,
if 9-11 couldn't do that, nothing will. And as US
engagement with Pakistan deepens, it will
obviously be impossible to convince Cohen, (and
his colleagues in "South Asia" studies and
therefore the US), of the sheer folly in
supporting a policy so obviously wrong. He will
continue to write articles about "The Jihadist
Threat to Pakistan". There is very little
possibility he will write about "The Jihadist
Threat from Pakistan". And if you ask him
why, his reply will be the AJIT, i.e. that he is
balanced, and that he already has.
But if I were to make a guess, I would say that Dr
Cohen will have to eventually moderate his views
with respect to Pakistan. Because, of course, this
is not a situation that will last. (There are
already questions about the role of the Pakistan
Army in 9-11). The US and Pakistan are locked in
an embrace that can only end in a furious parting
of the ways. How bloody that parting will be
remains to be seen. On
the other hand, it seems unlikely that Dr Cohen
will ever change his view point with respect to
India. I have referred to it as "anti-Indian",
what else can you call it? Ignorance? I don't
think so. For while ignorance can be cured,
stupidity is permanent. Especially the type of
learned stupidity that Dr Cohen deliberately
cultivates about India and Pakistan in the
Washington Beltway.
Journeys End
If all else fails, immortality can
always be assured by spectacular error.
-John Kenneth Galbraith
Throughout this review, I have ascribed a set of
factors that I've claimed, and I think have shown,
which underline much of Dr Cohen's writings on the
Subcontinent. More importantly however, I have
also claimed that I've divined Dr Cohen's
motivation. That is a slightly larger claim then
his anti-India posture and pro-Pakistan leanings
which have been amply demonstrated in this
article.
However, I have
offered only the Shekhar Gupta column as proof of
Dr Cohen's motivation. Quite a bit hangs on that.
Well, lets assume that the motivation that I
ascribe to Dr Cohen is incorrect, i.e. that he
does not wish to see India contained. First note
that it still does not change anything regarding
his anti-Indian or pro-Pakistani leanings. We're
simply left with the mystery of why he is
anti-India and pro-Pakistan.
We could be charitable to Dr Cohen and say that
it's possible that he has simply made a
fundamental error of scholarship and confused
knowledge for understanding. In other words that
his indisputable knowledge about the subcontinent
leads him to believe that he also understands
India and Pakistan, similar, say, to the way a
committed environmentalist believes they are also
experts in ecology and biology. Or it may be that
Dr Cohen's acting as an apologist for those in
power in Pakistan is a classic example of the
intellectual who seeks to influence power. And
falls into the trap of becoming an agent of
influence for those in power and then an apologist
for them. Or perhaps some other reason.
We don't know the "why" of
course. And the reasons given in the paragraph
above do not stand up to scrutiny given the
quality of Dr Cohen's work. But allow me to play a
little childish game with you. So, go back to the
conversation that Gupta describes for us. Read it
again. Now try and visualise yourself as Dr
Cohen. What would be your response if Gupta's
reply was, "but why, Dr Cohen, would you want to
"contain" an undivided India. What did we ever do
to you"? How would you as Dr Cohen reply?
Seriously, do try it as an exercise.
If you think that through for a while, you'll
probably come up with the same solution I did.
Because Dr Cohen automatically assumes a "big"
India would be a threat to the US. And if Gupta
kept asking you, as Dr Cohen, the obvious
questions, such as, "But isn't India today
already big? Don't we already straddle the oil
routes? How much difference would Pakistan be
added to India". (In fact it would be a drag, not
an asset. And I say that as a devoted Akhand
Bharat believer). How would you, as Dr Cohen
answer? You see my
point? India would still need to be contained.
Because we are big. We do straddle the oil routes.
We do have the potential to vastly increase our
influence, if not dominate, Central Asia. And
what if Pakistan falls apart? Wouldn't India
be the biggest winner? Without Pakistan to block
the access routes, India's market would dominate
the economies of Central Asia naturally. So while
I agree that the motivation I describe to Dr Cohen
is based on what seems to be a single tenuous
thread, I think that if you follow the exercise
above, you too will agree with me that the thread
is made of steel. And that the motivations I
ascribe to Dr Cohen's anti-Indian views are in
fact, correct.
I
should also reiterate that the criticisms levelled
at Dr Cohen's work should not subsume the
quality of his articles per se. Each and
every one of his articles is well researched and
have a large "truth value" content in them. There
is no doubting Dr Cohen's
knowledge about India and Pakistan. Nor does he
hide the truth about Pakistan. However, what is at
issue is how he presents his information to his
readers. That's the crux of the issue. And in
that regard, Dr Cohen is certainly assured of
"immortality" in the firmament of "South Asia"
analysts. A final
comment: For any Indian, the journey through the
landscape of South Asia studies in the United
States can be a strange experience.
Within the space of a single journal article it's
possible to go from the bizarre to the weird, from
the inane to mind-boggling and from the sublime to
the ludicrous, all within a few pages! I have
concentrated here on a single field, the political
dimension, and on a single practitioner that
epitomises an aspect of the Indo-US relation. It
has long been problematic that that the
relationship between the clichéd "largest"
democracy and "oldest democracy" have never been
on the best of terms. Ties between the Elephant
and the Eagle have always been bedevilled by
various misunderstandings. And there is no
guarantee that the current thaw in relations
following the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbot
discussions and the post 9-11 exigencies of the US
will last. However, one thing is certain: Over the
Indian Subcontinent, it will be difficult for
eagles to fly if their path is set by turkeys.
References
1. Stephen Philip Cohen; "The Jihadist Threat to
Pakistan", The Washington Quarterly,
26:3, pp. 7-25, 2003.
2. The Brookings Institution:
http://www.brookings.edu/
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The Brookings Institution, 2001.
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Oxford University Press, 1998.
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Contribution to the Development of a Nation,
Oxford University Press, 2002.
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Cheema, Stephen P Cohen, and Sumit Ganguly;
Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management
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http://www.gendercide.org/case_bangladesh.html
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