Amrish Sehgal

"China will be a persistent competitor of the United States...A stable and powerful China will be constantly challenging the status quo in East Asia.  An unstable and relatively weak China could be dangerous because its leaders might try to bolster their power with foreign military adventurism." - Andrew W Marshall[1]

Judging by the published views of Marshall and the Office of Net Assessment, the likely principal new challenger of US dominance is China, and "India bears close watching". Marshall's focus though, has been on China. In 1999, he sponsored war games and analyses concentrating on threats in Asia generally and from China specifically. "Most US military assets are in Europe where there are no foreseeable conflicts threatening vital US interests ... The threats are in Asia," he wrote at the time. His "Asia 2025" study concluded that "the view that Chinese-American relations might evolve gently and fruitfully" had to be rejected. His game plan scenario imagines that this economic giant has intimidated Taiwan into effective submission, persuaded Korea and Japan to close the US bases on their territories, and made a deal with India to divide Asia into spheres of Chinese and Indian influence at America's expense.

According to the Asia 2025 study group report, China "will be a persistent competitor of the United States" and "will be constantly challenging the status quo in East Asia". And on the other hand, "an unstable and relatively weak China could be dangerous because its leaders might try to bolster their power with foreign military adventurism. An Asia it dominates but does not conquer or occupy is China's goal." The US, as is its normal practice, has been studying Chinese strategic and military thinking very intensively for a long time now.  In 1996, the Office of Net Assessment commissioned a translation of hundreds of books and journal articles by mid-level Chinese military officers. These translations reflected Beijing's future military leadership's perception of US military power as waning, and should conflict occur, these officers planned to exploit weaknesses in US weaponry and supply lines.

While experts on Chinese military power accept that China's forces remained decades behind those of the United States, they argue that China could catch up with power-leveraging weapons such as highly accurate cruise missiles and torpedoes. US Navy task forces, strung-out supply convoys, logistics bases, military computers and even stealth aircraft could become vulnerable if China exploited the proper technologies. And even prior to 2025, off-the-shelf cruise missiles will be available to China and other Asian nations on the global arms market. Satellite-based navigation systems will make those weapons highly accurate. And, of course, such missiles can be nuclear-armed. But with the Chinese, in any confrontation with the USA, the main threat lies not in any technology race but in "asymmetric warfare", leveraging inexpensive technology to defeat expensive US technology, like a Chinese boxer with a knowledge of vital body points who can bring an opponent to his knees with a minimum of movement. Let us not even for a moment forget that Osama bin Laden's jihadi's who demolished the World Trade Towers and a part of the Pentagon with devastating and demoralising effect did not use any high-tech military weapons.

Another such asymmetrical military response (denoting the use of unconventional tactics in combat rather than the use of forces of comparable size and quality and employing similar tactics) was demonstrated by Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War when he decided to fire primitive but effective Scud missiles at declared non-combatant but close US ally Israel and at US and allied logistics bases in Saudi Arabia. US defence forces armed with the Patriot anti-missile missiles proved ineffective in countering that threat. Another example was the attack by Islamist terrorists on the US missile destroyer Cole in the port of Aden. In their book Unrestricted Warfare[2], the senior Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, have proposed various methods of non-military warfare including inter-alia hacking into websites, targeting financial institutions, engaging in terrorism, and using the media. In an interview with Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, Qiao stated that "the first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden".

The evolution of Chinese strategy can be traced back to its written history itself. The military strategy of China is identified with its pre-eminent military strategists like Sun Tzu, Sun Bin and others. However, later Chinese writings do not restrict this to a narrow military dimension only. They trace their strategic heritage to a very broad spectrum of ancient Chinese thinkers and scholars, starting from Confucius. The Chinese are a very traditional people. Their traditional roots are very deep and an integral part of their lore is the treatise on military strategy, The Art of War, by Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu was a great proponent of asymmetrical war, as were other strategists like Sun Bin and Mao Zedong. China's history of war is replete with examples of the successful use of asymmetrical war, where wisdom rather than valour was used to subdue the opposing forces. In particular one finds great use of D-3 viz. diversionary tactics, deception and disinformation.[3]

In recent years, many Chinese leaders and diplomats have claimed that, "China is a country with 5,000 years of civilization, and a peace loving tradition."  But statements like these should not confuse or be taken at face value by China's neighbours as factually expressing its long-term intentions. China usually suffers from a "Middle Kingdom" psychosis where all its neighbours paid tribute and obeisance to the "heaven born king."[4] Therefore, it will be better to approach the Chinese policies from a pragmatic view-point, always keeping in mind that they still follow the traditional strategic approach set by Sun Tzu and others, a strategy tempered with pragmatic wisdom, the art of compromise, and the willingness to use a blend of power, deception, and the present day real politik, in order to achieve the desired goals. All of China's strategy is, of course, not home-grown. There is strong evidence that some of the early influence exerted by Russian military thinking, by and large moulded by Clausewitzian concepts, has played a key role in forming China's own strategic approach. The interplay of these ideas together with China's own traditional thinking, has given it a certain complex dimension.

Given this attitude, approach and mindset, for China to be a threat to USA, parity in armed strength need not be awaited, at least in the East and Southeast Asian region. That some of Andrew Marshall's worst fears are coming true is already evident. Japan's economy has been in the doldrums for the last 7 years. Its biggest market, USA, is itself locked in the throes of a recession. Given the major onslaught of Korean companies, perhaps the only large markets left to Japan are India and China. India's market for range of products that Japan makes, unfortunately for Japan, is already highly competitive, consumer oriented and service-intensive. China on the other hand is still somewhat of a command economy and is as large, if not larger, a market than India. Moreover, political considerations in China allow a better deal to be given to Japan than to South Korea. Indeed, China is going all out to woo Japan Inc. The day is not too far away when China emerges as Japan's largest investment market and trading partner. Chinese political pressure upon Japan to distance itself from USA can certainly be envisioned at such a juncture.

The Calculative Strategy

In this context, it is interesting to note what Swaine and Tellis have to say. I have taken the liberty to quote extensively from their work[5].

"In the last few decades, this hybrid strategy has coalesced into a "calculative" strategy — that is, a strategy calculated to protect China from external threats as it pursues its geopolitical ascent. The purpose of the calculative strategy is to allow China to continue to reform its economy and thereby acquire comprehensive national power without having to deal with the impediments and distractions of security competition. If successful, the strategy will buy China the breathing room it needs to improve domestic social conditions, increase the legitimacy of the governing regime, expand the nation's economic and technological capabilities, strengthen its military, and enhance its standing and influence in the international political order — all of which are important elements in achieving its long-standing security objectives.  The calculative strategy is designed to allow China to increase its power in a variety of issue areas in as non-provocative a fashion as possible. In its policies toward the United States and other powers, the calculative strategy aims to win support for China's expansion, while preventing any efforts that may frustrate its growth. To this end, the strategy focuses on developing and maintaining friendly relations with the major powers and convincing them that the rise of China will be a stabilizing force in Asia. By garnering this cooperation, the strategy aims to forestall a US defensive counter response that could widen the gap in power between China and the other major players. Continued friendly relations also improve China's access to the world's wealthiest economic markets.

"In its policies toward military modernization, the calculative strategy aims to reduce China's existing vulnerabilities while increasing the ability of its military forces to secure diplomatic and political leverage. The modernization — in both nuclear and conventional forces — is going forward slowly and steadily because a rapid military build-up might alarm China's neighbours and the major powers. Further, a sudden build-up would detract from China's current emphasis on civilian economic development.  In its policies toward territorial claims, the calculative strategy aims to avoid using force to settle territorial disputes. Rather, it dictates that China pursue a good-neighbour policy designed to strengthen or mend ties with its neighbours and to delay resolving disputes, at least until the regional balance of power shifts in favour of China.

"In its policies toward international regimes, the calculative strategy aims to secure advantages without incurring losses. Therefore, China's level of participation in international regimes — in such areas as economic development, trade, technology transfer, arms control, and the environment — is determined on a case-by-case basis. "Taken together, these policies display the "calculating"aspect of the calculative strategy. They illustrate how the strategy has encouraged foreign collaboration in underwriting China's rise to power, while temporarily removing external threats that could distract Beijing from its uninterrupted ascent.  If the calculative strategy is not knocked off course by some catastrophic event, it is likely to remain China's guiding strategy for at least the next few decades, until Beijing has completed its ascent into a position of economic, military, and political strength. When this occurs - certainly not before 2015-2020 - a more assertive China is likely to emerge. "Like other rising nations throughout history, a rising China is likely to assert its power."

Conclusion

As MV Rappai so aptly advocates[6], it is high time the mandarins of India's Delhi Durbar, abandoned their narrow South Asia mindset and started looking at matters in a wider context. If the USA is worried about China and its future military potential, India, with its common border and general proximity, has all the more reason to be wary. Perhaps we too should look at ways of waging asymmetric warfare if need be, against more powerful, hegemonistic presences in our neighbourhood.

Bibliography

Swaine, Michael D and Tellis, Ashley J. Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future. 2000. RAND.

Rappai, MV. Research Fellow, IDSA. Changes in Chinese Military Doctrine and Their Implications.

John Q. Garside. The Three-legged Stool. Wanted Enemy to Justify $344 Billion War Budget. The News Insider - 2002.