The counterterrorism operation Sarp Vinash
(Operation Destroy Serpents) was carried out in
four phases, from January to May 2003. The
operation took place in the Surankote area of
the Pir Panjal Range that separates the Kashmir
valley from Jammu. The operations were
initially conducted in the region bounded by the
Ranjati, Wansi, and Said Baker ridges (Figure 1).[1] The
target of the operations was a terrorist complex
southwest of Poonch (Figure 2, Figure 3). The main portion of the
terrorist complex was near the village of
Hilkaka, a center for transient Bakarwal
herders.
Figure
1:
An aerial view of the area of operations (from
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1030524/asp/nation/story_2000769.asp)
Figure
2:
A map of the Poonch district
(from
http://poonch.nic.in/map/map.htm)
Figure
3:
Detailed topographic map of the region
(based on US Army Topographic Service Maps,
courtesy Manku Thimma)
http://www.geocities.com/mthimma/sarpvinash.html
Key Features of the Operation
The operation was carried out primarily by
Counter Insurgency Force (R). CIF (R) is
commonly referred to as Romeo Force. The
operation took place in four phases. In the
first phase, from about November 2002 to January
2003, CIF(R) developed the physical
infrastructure necessary for conduct of
operations, by constructing helipads and mule
tracks. In the second phase, bases surrounding
the target region were established, and migrant
herders from the area were resettled elsewhere
and compensated by the state government. Around
21 April 2003, in the third phase, a cordon was
thrown around the entire region to prevent any
unauthorized entry or exit into the Hilkaka area
and the forces moved in to attack or occupy
tactically vital positions within the area.
Finally, in the fourth phase (which began on 3
May 2003), attacks and sweeps were mounted to
eliminate terrorists taking shelter in the area[2].
The operation resulted in extermination of about
65 terrorists and the loss of some 4 soldiers.
Army estimates indicated about 100 terrorists in
the Hilkaka area, and some 3,500 in the state at
any time3. The 9th Battalion of
the Parachute Regiment (Special Forces) played a
vital role in leading the attacks on terrorist
bases, and they were supported by sweeps and
ambushes mounted by six other units of 163
Infantry Brigade (Thana Mandi Brigade) and 12
Sector Rashtriya Rifles: 2/4 Gorkha Rifles, 15
Garhwal Rifles, 4 Garhwal Rifles, 16 and 20
Rashtriya Rifles[3].
Follow-up operations have
been planned to exploit the success of Sarp
Vinash[4].
Analysis
The purpose and potential impact of operations
undertaken in Sarp Vinash can be
understood by reviewing the geography and recent
history of the Poonch and Rajauri districts.
These districts are isolated from rest of India
by the steep flanks and thick forests of the Pir
Panjal range. At the same time, the spurs of
the Pir Panjals are in Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir, and they provide easy and sheltered
access for terrorists infiltrating into Indian
territory. The inaccessibility of vast tracts
within the Pir Panjals, and the inadequacy of
civilian government institutions, has made them
a terrorist sanctuary[5].
The Indian security forces can, at best, contain
terrorism in these areas by mounting area
dominance patrols in the surrounding lowlands
and periodically mounting operations to flush
out terrorists from their mountain lairs,
even for the
Surankote area[6],[7],[8].
Most notably, 6 Infantry Division conducted
sweeps of the region after Operation Vijay, in
1999[9]. However,
since the thinly stretched security forces have
lacked adequate manpower, the gains of the
flushing operations have been fleeting. The
winter months, in particular, large parts of the
region are totally cut off from the rest of the
country.
As a result, the terrorists escape to
sanctuaries in the upper reaches of the Pir
Panjals, and spend the winter months
recuperating and rebuilding for another season
of terror. The presence of migratory Bakarwals
and Gujjars in the region further complicates
anti-terrorism efforts. Many of these herders
have been bribed or intimidated into becoming
the eyes and ears of the terrorists and their
Pakistani mentors. Furthermore, terrorists can
evade detection by disguising themselves as
herders. The remoteness of the region and
harshness of terrain exacerbate the difficulty
of anti-terrorist sweeps. Since military forces
have to patrol over well-known trails, their
approach can be detected by well placed
lookouts. The terrain affords plenty of places
for the terrorists to melt into, once they have
been forewarned of the approach of security
forces. Finally, the weakness of civilian
government and lack of adequate police forces
means that quality intelligence is not available
on the movements and lairs of terrorists in
these areas.
Pakistani terrorists took advantage of the
adverse geography of the region to build up
important terrorist nodes in this area. Bases
destroyed during Sarp Vinash contained
large stocks of foodstuffs, communications
equipment, arms, ammunition, and even medicines[10].
The nature and quantity of supplies and the
presence of bunkers has led to media comparisons
with Kargil infiltrations. Such comparisons are
fundamentally flawed because terrorists operate
very differently from regular military
units. All insurgencies, even those in the
destabilisation phase (i.e. as opposed to the
full blown guerrilla and conventional phases),
require logistical bases to sustain them. Unlike
the Kargil intrusion, these kinds of retreats
have existed in the State's more remote areas
from almost the beginning of the insurgency in
1989. Terrorists have no interest in holding
territory, and they are unlikely to stand and
fight like regular army units. Their survival
depends on being elusive and mobile; their bases
are chosen not for dominating territory but for
ease of concealment. The rugged terrain along
the LOC makes a total cap on cross-border
infiltration impossible, so there is no way that
security forces can prevent well concealed
support bases such as the ones in Hilkaka from
coming up. In such a situation, security forces
have to rely on patrols, anti-terrorist sweeps,
and intelligence to keep such bases from taking
root, much as gardeners have to be continuously
vigilant against weeds.
The Rashtriya Rifiles (RR) were raised to free
regular army units from counter terrorism
duties, and to operate in these remote areas.
CIF (R) came into being after Kargil, to relieve
39 Mountain Division of counter terrorism duties
and to act in concert with CIF (D) (Delta Force)
and CIF (V) (Victor Force). Recently, as a
result of continuing raisings of new RR
formations post-Kargil, the CIF (U) (Unicorn
Force) was raised to further augment RR presence
in the Pir Panjal region. The scale of manpower
requirements for policing the Pir Panjals can be
gauged from the fact that more than a corps
equivalent of RR formations is now operational
in the area: CIF (R) in Rajauri area, CIF (D) in
Doda area, CIF (V) in southern Kashmir Valley,
and CIF (U) in the Udhampur/Banihal area.
During Operation Parakram, about four
infantry divisions were moved to Northern
Command areas. At least one of these (27
Mountain Division) is known to have stayed
behind even after Operation Parakram
wound down. CIF (R), the force responsible for
mounting Sarp Vinash, is currently
estimated to operate in the Rajauri region. The
other forces with operational areas abutting CIF
(R) operations area are estimated to be 25
Infantry Division to the west and north, CIF (V)
to the northeast, CIF (D) to the east, and CIF
(U) to the south and southeast.
Sarp Vinash is a watershed in counterterrorist
operations because it represents the
crystallization of three positive trends in
India's conduct of its war against terrorism:
the steady rise in dedicated anti-terrorist
force strengths and improvement in their
fighting ability through specialized training,
weaponry, and intelligence gathering means;
greater attention to development of
infrastructure; and a substantial improvement in
the political climate of the valley following
the 2002 state assembly elections.
As previously noted, Indian security forces have
been unable to do more than containing terrorism
in the Pir Panjals due to the vastness and
inaccessibility of the region. While India does
field substantial military and para-military
forces, the intrusions in the Kargil region
brought forth the realization that the forces
were thinly stretched and inadequate for the
task of manning the harsh terrain of Jammu,
Kashmir and Ladakh[11]. This
resulted in the belated but wise decision to
significantly ramp up force levels in
paramilitary forces such as RR, Assam Rifles,
BSF, and CRPF, with a view to free the army up
from anti-terrorist duties. Since 1999, an
estimated 20 battalions of RR have been raised,
and force levels in the other paramilitary
agencies have also witnessed similar
increases. The manpower levels are finally
approaching the critical mass required to
effectively take the war to the terrorists in
the Pir Panjals. Perhaps the most significant
difference between Sarp Vinash and previous
operations is that an additional 10 battalions
were introduced to the Pir Panjal area after
the conclusion of Phase 4 of Sarp Vinash[12]. One
battalion will be stationed in the area even
after the mopping-up operations are completed.
The permanently deployed battalion will ensure
that the gains of Sarp Vinash are not fleeting,
as in previous occasions when terrorists managed
to regroup in the area after sweeps by security
forces.
The increased force levels have also been
accompanied by a steady buildup of
infrastructure to support them. The laying of
tracks and building of helipads in preparation
of Sarp Vinash indicates that the intent of
security forces is to secure their gains by
improving accessibility, and thereby permitting
security forces greater mobility and logistic
sustenance. This focus on improving
infrastructure as a means of denying terrorists
freedom of movement is also seen on a broader
scale. To prevent
Pakistan
backed infiltration efforts, BSF battalions
continue to build fences on the international
border in the Jammu area, despite Pakistani
shelling. The army also has plans to install
surveillance devices along the Line of Control,
and to block known infiltration routes with
barbed wire fences[13]. Improved
infrastructure acts as a force multiplier by
affording greater mobility to security forces,
fewer hiding places for terrorists, and fewer
reasons for the general populace to be
disgruntled against the government or
intimidated by terrorists.
The second positive trend is the upgradation of
skills and weaponry within the security
forces. The training of anti-terrorist forces
has been upgraded; special automatic weapons,
night vision devices, battlefield surveillance
radars, and other monitoring devices are being
procured[14]. The
ability of security forces to mount night
operations has improved dramatically, as shown
by the high success rate in killing terrorists. Sarp
Vinash was more of an intelligence-driven
operation rather than a fruitless jungle-bashing
sweep, as was the case for operations of this
scale in the past. In Sarp Vinash itself,
far greater reliance was placed on intelligence
collection through high-tech equipment such as
UAVs, and in general, Army sources have been
quoted as saying that in recent times almost 70%
of terrorist kills along the LOC[15]
could be attributed to better intelligence. The
increased capability in intelligence gathering,
in particular, can act as a tremendous force
multiplier by positively impacting the morale of
the security forces; bolstering the confidence
of local populace in the security forces; and
sowing fear, uncertainty and doubt among the
ranks of the terrorists.
Finally, the importance of the improved
political climate in this troubled Indian state
cannot be emphasized enough[16]. The
successful conduct of elections in the face of
terrorist opposition renewed and bolstered the
credibility of India's Kashmir policy, and freed
up political and diplomatic space for a far more
aggressive stance against Pakistan-sponsored
terrorism. The successful resettlement of
migrant herders away from Surankote area is
evidence of the current government's significant
role in creating a new environment in the state
that is far more supportive of India's moves to
heal the wounds of insurgency than ever
before. One definitive indicator of the Kashmiri
acceptance of India's sovereignty over Jammu and
Kashmir is the success of President of India
Abdul Kalam's visit to the state, and the
well-attended political rallies held in Kashmir
by mainstream Indian political parties such as
Congress (I)[17].
The rejuvenated sense of belonging among local
Kashmiris has translated into active support for
Indian troops fighting the terrorist menace in
the region. Operation Sarp Vinash is
reported to have been initiated on the basis of
intelligence provided by locals in the Hilkaka
area, and it was mounted with the active support
and participation of Poonch district citizens
who gave up comfortable jobs in the Gulf region
to defend their homes against terrorists[18]. In
an economic dimension to the political fight
against terrorism, several new infrastructure
initiatives, most notably the proposed Rohtang
Tunnel project[19]
and the construction of a railway line between
Udhampur in Jammu and Baramulla in the Valley
have been started, to build up the
infrastructure to improve accessibility to
remote areas of the state. Smaller and less
visible projects have also been undertaken since
1999 to improve accessibility to posts on the
LOC in previously inaccessible areas. The
economic boost provided by these projects
(through direct employment as well as increased
opportunities for year-round commerce and
tourism) will
further help in improving the lot of the people
of Jammu and Kashmir, and reduce their sense of
isolation from the Indian heartland.
Conclusion
Operation Sarp Vinash was certainly not
the first counter-terrorist operation of its
type or scale. There have been other similar
operations in the
Indian State
of Jammu and Kashmir. What set Sarp Vinash
apart from the other operations was the
meticulous groundwork laid before the operation
commenced, and the follow up steps taken after
the conclusion of the first phase of the
operation, to consolidate gains. The operation
is a coming of age story for the Rashtriya
Rifles Force Headquarters, which have now have
the resources to mount and lead division level
operations of their own. The scale of operations
and their attendant success were made possible
by several ongoing trends in India's
counter-terrorism strategy: a willingness to
invest in dedicated manpower, attention to
infrastructure development for supporting
counter-terrorism operations, better equipment
and training of forces, and last but not least,
a dramatically improved political climate in the
state that supports anti-terrorist efforts.
The national and state administrations and their
security and intelligence services deserve to be
congratulated on a well-conceived and executed
operation. It is hoped that the success of this
operation will be a harbinger of even greater
victories against the global scourge of
terrorism. The best benchmark for the success
of the operation would be reduction in terrorist
activity emanating from bases in the Hilkaka
area. While this may not translate into
improved statistics in the fight against
terrorism in the short run, the positive
opportunities created by the removal of an
ever-present threat should do wonders for the
development and well being of the people of
Poonch in particular, and the people of the
troubled state of Jammu and Kashmir in general.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Mr Johann Price
for his insightful comments and his help in
enhancing the quality of the article, and Gen
Afsir Karim for his painstaking review. Members
of Bharat Rakshak Forum, particularly Mr Sunil,
provided links that eased the author's burden of
collecting references, and Mr Manku Thimma
kindly provided an annotated topographical map
to accompany the article. The thoughts
expressed in this article are the author's
personal opinions, and they do not reflect the
views of his employers, or of the administrators
of Bharat Rakshak Forum and Bharat Rakshak
Monitor. Any factual errors are the author's
responsibility.
References
[10]
The Pioneer Edit Desk, Serpents Defanged,
The Pioneer, 26 May 2003
[13]
Sandeep Dikshit, The Hindu, 21 May 2003
India starts blocking
infiltration routes
[16]
Joanna Slater, The Far Eastern Economic
Review (6/19)
Kashmiris and Tourists Share New Sense of
Optimism