Naval Diplomacy: Indian Initiatives

Vijay Sakhuja

India's first integrated military command at the Andaman & Nicobar Islands at Port Blair hosted  'MILAN 2003' (11-15 February 2003), a confluence meeting of navies from Indian Ocean countries. Warships and naval delegates from several nations (Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Singapore) participated in the event. The mascot of MILAN 2003 was a dolphin, symbolizing friendship and a desire for reaching out for peaceful co-existence. The MILAN logo shows the outline of a Hody, a traditional boat used by local fishermen in the Nicobar Group of Islands. The nature of this congregation was expressed as follows:

To our friends across the seas we hail
Ahoy! To visit us you must set sail
Like Dolphins leap and plunge to bridge the gap
We may converge to "Give way together"

The event was flavoured with both formal and informal interactions amongst the participants. At a seminar, the delegates discussed the fast changing regional security environment. The issues included Ocean Governance, Sea Piracy, Terrorism and Disorder at Sea. The event also provided an opportunity to the local population to learn more about foreign navies. An 'International City Parade' was organised in which all participating countries fielded one platoon each. The parade culminated with a fly past by Indian Naval aircraft and a performance by a naval band. MILAN is a Hindi word that means meeting. It signifies interaction and mutual understanding.

The Indian Navy has been hosting 'MILAN' meetings since the 1990s. These biennial meetings that began in 1995 are aimed at fostering closer cooperation among navies of countries in the Indian Ocean region. In February 1995, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Sri Lanka participated with their warships.  Two years later, in February 1997, eleven warships from seven countries (Malaysia and Bangladesh were the new entrants) were present at Port Blair. During the third MILAN, (30 March - 4 April 1999) only Malaysia did not participate. There was no MILAN during 2001, as the Indian Navy hosted the International Fleet Review at Mumbai.

Interaction With Foreign Navies

The Indian Navy's Strategic Defence Review [i] notes that navies, the world over, are being increasingly used to build maritime bridges and CBMs. Since its inception, the Indian Navy has been actively engaged in building closer relations with several navies across the globe. It has participated in international fleet reviews, royal functions, offered humanitarian assistance, carried out disaster relief activities, search and rescue, anti-piracy patrols and joint exercises aimed at building confidence and trust. Currently, India is an active member of several international and regional arrangements for maritime cooperation. It is a signatory to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea and an active participant in several other arrangements - such as IOR-ARC, IOMC, BIMST-EC, CSCAP and IOC - that are related to the maritime environment.  Indian naval vessels have participated in United Nations peace-keeping operations off Somalia under the UNOSOM.

Joint Naval Exercises

The Indian Navy has institutionalised interaction with several foreign navies. These include: US, France, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. Besides, the Navy has also conducted Passage Exercises with visiting warships from Germany, Mauritius, Seychelles and Japan.  These have contributed to a greater understanding among navies, built trust and contributed to transparency. Between 1989 and 2000, the Indian Navy conducted forty-five joint naval exercises with at least twenty countries. The Indian Navy has held the Malabar series of joint naval exercises with the US Navy in 1992, 1995 and 1996. These were suspended as a fallout of the 1998 Indian nuclear tests.[ii] However, the two sides have now agreed to revive the Malabar series of exercises.[iii] At the beginning, the exercises were basic in nature and progressively improved in content and complexity with the introduction of advanced surface ships, while submarines and long range maritime patrol aircraft acted as a catalyst to the nascent naval cooperation.  It has also been agreed to recommence joint operations that include search and rescue exercises to help vessels in distress in the Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, safety of sea-lanes, and issues relating to order at sea. 

Soon after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the United States, Washington requested New Delhi in October 2001 to support the international war on terrorism by undertaking escort duties in the Malacca Strait. It is important to note that the Malacca Strait waters are home to both pirates and terrorists. Consequently, under Operation Sagittarius, Indian naval ships engaged in escorting US flagged High Value Vessels through the Strait.  Indian Naval Ships Sharda and Sukanya escorted 24 US vessels between April 2 and September 16, 2002. Indo-French joint naval exercises were held in 1993, 1996 and 1999, with another two exercises in 2000. In May and November 2002, there were two joint exercises. The former involved the French nuclear powered aircraft carrier, Charles De Gaulle. In the past, the two navies have held passage exercises as and when opportunity was available. The two navies appear to have formalised their interaction and have agreed to hold joint naval exercises annually. Similarly, annual exercises are held with the Singapore Navy. With Indonesia, it has been decided to undertake coordinated patrolling to prevent illegal fishing, poaching, migration and smuggling of arms. These are conducted twice a year in March and September.

As regards Sri Lanka, the two navies have rich experience in joint operations. The Indian Navy participated in Operation Pawan in pursuance of a request made by the Sri Lanka government to counter the ethnic crisis created by the LTTE. The Indian Navy was required to undertake maritime operations in the waters around Sri Lanka and particularly in Palk Bay, north of Sri Lanka. Palk Bay has been frequently used by the LTTE for carrying out strikes against Sri Lankan naval forces and to keep its arms supply lines open at sea. The LTTE had hired/chartered several small vessels to transport arms, ammunition, stores and logistics to sustain themselves. These vessels would originate from several South East Asian countries and transit through the Bay of Bengal. The two navies have been conducting regular patrols along the International Maritime Boundary Line to check arms trafficking and other illegal activities along the coast.

Despite the ongoing peace talks with the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE remains active. Recently, in November 2002, a mystery ship reportedly controlled by the LTTE was spotted 100 nautical miles north east of Mullaitivu. It offloaded weapons into small boats before the crew noticed that they were being watched by Indian forces and began dumping items overboard. Sri Lankan naval forces intercepted a dingy with six-armed LTTE cadres and communications equipment. Reportedly, the navies of Sri Lanka and India have agreed to a range of measures to step up surveillance to prevent the LTTE smuggling arms across the narrow northern strait separating the two countries. Yet LTTE activities seem to have continued unabated, since even in February 2003 three Tamil Tiger rebels blew themselves up after monitors boarded their heavily armed boat off the northern coast of Jaffna as they tried to smuggle arms to the island.

Preserving Order At Sea

The standoff between the hijacked MV Alondra Rainbow, a 7,000-ton Panama registered vessel belonging to Japanese owners, and an Indian warship in November 1999 was a classic case of Indian efforts to maintain safety of sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean. The vessel was hijacked en route from Kuala Tanjung, Indonesia, to Milke in Japan. The Piracy Reporting Centre of the International Maritime Bureau had announced through a worldwide broadcast that pirates had captured the vessel and were heading towards the Arabian Sea.[iv] Following the alert, Indian maritime forces swung into action. Maritime surveillance aircraft shadowed and tracked the vessel. The hijackers were a determined group and did not heed to warnings. The vessel was stopped after firepower was used and Indian maritime special forces boarded the vessel and apprehended the culprits. The pirates have been found guilty and convicted on 11 counts including charges of attempt to murder, forgery, criminal conspiracy, assault and using deadly weapons. They have been awarded sentences of imprisonment from six months to seven years by a sessions judge in Mumbai. Similarly, in 2000, the Indian Navy along with other security agencies had intercepted a major gang of international gunrunners supplying weapons to different secessionist groups in North-Eastern India. A joint operation resulted in the capture of a clandestine shipment of weapons valued at around US $1 million.[v]

Regional Diplomacy

On 3 November 1988, two trawlers carrying 150 PLOTE (People's Liberation Tamil Tigers Eelam) mercenaries landed in the Maldives.[vi] The mercenaries quickly overpowered the Maldivian Militia using rockets and machine guns and attacked the President's residence. A 'panicked' Maldivian government sent out calls asking for assistance and India responded. Operation Cactus was launched and a large contingent of paratroopers made an unopposed landing at Male. Shortly afterwards, an Indian Navy maritime reconnaissance aircraft detected the ship with mercenaries and hostages including the Maldives Minister of Education fleeing the island state. Indian warships later captured the PLOTE vessel. The island was secured within 30 minutes after the arrival of forces. In a show of force, fighter aircraft of the Indian Air Force were also deployed to the island and helicopters landed commandos to the outlying island to search for any mercenaries.

International Fleet Review

In 2001, the Indian Navy hosted the International Fleet Review (IFR), the first of its kind, since independence.  Addressing the gathering of naval ships from 23 countries, the Indian Prime Minister noted that Indian Navy plays a crucial role in India's co-operation with other countries, especially those that share maritime borders. Active co-operation between navies is a must in [these] times of sea piracy, gunrunning and drug menace, which are all part of international terrorism. He said that by institutionalised arrangement we can actually say that we [India] have built 'bridges of friendship' which happened to be the theme of the IFR.[vii]

Gunboat Diplomacy

The Indian Navy's Strategic Defence Review notes that naval diplomacy is also designed to influence the adversary in situations short of full hostility'.[viii]  This is to be achieved through three distinct ways:

(a)   Presence

(b)   Preventive and precautionary diplomacy

(c)   Pre-emptive diplomacy

One of the traditional ways of naval presence is achieved through port calls to remind local inhabitants of the effectiveness of the navy and the state that owns it. These visits are not intended to represent threat of force; instead the ships act as goodwill ambassadors for a favourable impression. There are occasions when states influence the adversary in the initial stage of a crisis by positioning naval forces and carrying out offensive manoeuvres. This demonstration contributes towards crisis prevention. Several incidents / events have proved that the Indian Navy has the capacity and capability to further national interests. In that context, power projection platforms like aircraft carriers, destroyers, submarines and frigates have added to India's prestige and provided the opportunity to showcase India's resolve to safeguard maritime interests and also to project Indian naval capability.

The Indian experience with gunboat diplomacy presents a mixed bag of successes and failures. In the past, on two different occasions, the Indian Navy was a victim of gunboat diplomacy. During the Indo-Pakistan War in 1965, Indonesia had dispatched its submarines to Pakistan to deter India against Pakistan as also to threaten the opening of another war front in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. During the second event, the US Seventh Fleet consisting of the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise and its escorts sailed through the Bay of Bengal to deter India against Pakistan during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan conflict. It is believed that the motive of this display of force was 'to insure the protection of US interests in the area'. But no Indian naval vessel encountered the US Seventh fleet.

Operation Parakram

One of the most significant events during 2001-2002 was the enhanced deployment of the Indian Navy against Pakistan. The Indian Navy had deployed more than a dozen warships including the aircraft carrier INS Viraat in an offensive posture. The ships were on a high alert, fully armed and carrying out regular patrolling in the Arabian Sea.  Five warships from the Eastern Fleet were also rushed to the Arabian Sea to contribute to the naval build up. The Navy was in a high state of alert in the shortest ever time frame. The high operational availability of its material assets i.e. ships, submarines, aircraft, naval support infrastructure was amply demonstrated.

Earlier, a similar deployment had forced the Pakistan Navy to stay close to its harbours and hastened the end of the eleven-week Kargil intrusion in 1999. The Indian Navy had forward deployed frigates, destroyers and submarines within striking range of Karachi harbour, through which more than 90% of Pakistan's trade, including oil supplies, are received. This display of force was aimed at challenging Pakistan to vacate the Indian territory in the Kargil sector in North India. The build up was also aimed at imposing a naval blockade of Karachi port.

The Indian fleet conducted offensive manoeuvres in the Arabian Sea resulting in the Pakistan naval fleet sticking very close to its coast. Pakistan had interpreted the initiatives to mean that the Indian Navy was preparing to enforce a quarantine or blockade of Karachi and prevent the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf. Naval planners in Islamabad have remained preoccupied with the Indian threat of a naval blockade of Pakistan's seaports. As a matter of fact, the threat of a naval blockade finds a prominent place in the Pakistan Navy's strategic thinking and tactical plans. This is primarily due to past experiences during the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan wars. Islamabad was not keen to open another front for itself against the Indian military and chose to withdraw from Kargil.

Concluding Remarks

The United Nations World Commission on Oceans has suggested that navies should cooperate and uphold international law and order at sea. Despite differences in political, economic, social, cultural, linguistic and national interests, as well as in military structures and threat perceptions, the Indian Navy has cooperated with other navies on issues of common security concerns such as terrorism, piracy, gun running, marine pollution, search and rescue, etc. It has actively participated in UN Peace Keeping and Multilateral Track II arrangements like the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).

Navies are flexible forces and can be deployed or withdrawn in short periods unlike land forces.  They take pride in their right of free passage.  In the past, states have used navies to further their national interests. This is so because it is only the naval forces that enjoy flexibility, mobility and visibility. Importantly, naval diplomacy is a term that has found an important place in the lexicon of theory and practice of international relations. The Indian Navy has great strengths of strategic mobility and inherent strategic deterrence that plays an important role in shaping national destiny. Any Indian aspirations to emerge as an independent regional power, among other initiatives, would have to be achieved through strength at sea.

 Vijay Sakhuja is a maritime security analyst