Engagements in Asia

S Sharma

The author would like to examine the numerous US–India engagements currently in the news and some of the underlying reasons for the same. When discussing Indo-US relations in Asia, people often talk in terms of economic benefits, a mutual engagement in Iraq and strategic alliances against a third party. In examining the various proposals, one must look at the gains of each party. The author suggests that India must contemplate these proposals with an eye on its future, and act cautiously to not jeopardize long-term goals for perceived short-term gains.

Some of the utility of India as a nation, for the U.S is;

Economic: India is a market for American goods and companies, with its growing middle class and educated masses. American corporations are gradually increasing their presence in the Indian market. Companies like Intel, IBM and GE have been moving some of their research operations to India.  Microsoft has set up offices for software development and Ford Motors has set up manufacturing units in India for domestic and export purposes.  Much has been written about the software industry and the call-center explosion in India.  These are but nascent examples of the opportunities offered to the United States by an educated, and English-speaking India.

Strategic: India due to its size and expanding military and economic power is likely to dominate the sea lanes from Western Asia to the regions east of India. This gives it a great deal of economic and strategic importance.  In addition, India represents the only non-Islamized military power with significant expeditionary capacity in the region, other than China. In particular, there are two key aspects to the strategic utility of India – the China factor, and the Energy factor.

The China factor: Many U.S. analysts have noted that India could be a counterweight to expanding Chinese power. China has sought to contain its primary natural competitors, India and Japan, by proxy – through Pakistan and North Korea, respectively. This containment by proxy is also observed in China’s increasing influence in Myanmar. In addition, it is becoming more assertive in its relations with Southeast Asian countries. Due to historical reasons, there is considerable animosity towards Japan and expansion of Japanese presence in Asia would inflame old sentiments in the U.S. In addition, Japan is geographically constrained and vulnerable to Chinese presence along its vital sea-lanes. Domestically, Japan would also have to abandon its long existing pacifist policy in order to exert significant geopolitical power. This is likely to take some time. India's role, in any potential containment of China by the US, would be significant as Japan's role may be limited.

Energy Factor: As India continues to grow, its requirement for energy will expand rapidly.  India requires stable sources of energy and the natural sources of energy are West Asia and Central Asia.  As an end-user and processor of hydrocarbon products, India may be expected to continue to gain leverage, through the many proposed pipeline projects in the region.  In addition, there are a number of chemical plants being constructed in West Asia (taking advantage of the cheap raw materials that are available).  India is a large market for these chemicals and polymers as well.  Because of its dependence on energy from these currently troubled regions, India may be expected to desire to play a larger role in stabilizing these regions.

Similarly, India is affected by the U.S. in many ways, the most important of which are;

Military: The American presence in Pakistan has directly affected India’s security situation.  American presence acts as a guarantor of Pakistani security and therefore softens India’s response to Pakistani sponsored terrorist attacks on Indian soil. Equally, the American presence may be considered to act as a means of leverage on Islamabad.  As recently as a year ago, US intervention preempted a military retaliation by India to the Pakistani sponsored attack on the Indian Parliament.  The absence of a strong Indian response allows Pakistan to indulge in its policy of terrorism with little or no fear of retaliation.  In addition to this, is India’s interest in American weaponry and Israeli weaponry (i.e., weaponry of quasi-American origin).  The acquisition of both of these is highly dependent on the warming relationship, and US perceptions of the India.

Economic: India is a developing country with a developing, and growing economy. The United States is India’s largest trading partner. India expects to develop technologically because of competition for the American market.  India’s economy and technology sectors would gain considerable stimulus to innovate as free exchange of ideas and market access occurs.  The effect that the United States can have on the Indian economy was highlighted during Operation Parakram in the summer of 2002.

These dependences and interests may be expected to shape policy in a reasonable predictable manner.  American policy in Asia has traditionally relied on an engagement with the Middle East, China, Japan and the "good parts" of East Asia as partners. India has figured only peripherally, and from the Cold-War point of view of containment. Recent events have made changes to this policy.  Post 9/11 the U.S. has dramatically expanded its presence in West Asia - giving the impression that terrorism has caused a major overhaul of American policy.  In reality, it has merely altered the pattern of human asset investment in the region, and long-term strategic goals are unlikely to be altered significantly. The United States is presently in the process of making corrections in its network of supporting actors in the region through its policy towards Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Has there, therefore, has been any significant change in its policy towards India? This author believes that the facts indicate a "retuning" of policy towards India. This is most evident with stance on nuclear issues. Until 1998, the U.S had a regime of denying key technologies and sanctions to hamstring and contain India's nuclear and other science & technology programs. When the utility of this policy expired in 1998, there was a period of readjustment to ensure that India did not go onto the next stage of transferring technology to others.

There has been much talk of the role of India in an American containment of Chinese ambitions. This author believes that this particular "area of convergence" is a particularly dangerous strategic minefield. American leverage over China is wide ranging from the economic to geo-strategic. China's economy is dependent to a significant extent on healthy relations with the U.S. and China, like India needs access to technology. American presence in Central Asia ensures leverage over Chinese energy security. U.S has a large presence and influence along China's eastern borders, in South Korea, in Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and as far away as Australia and New Zealand. There has been much made of burgeoning military contacts with the United States military, including joint patrolling of the sea lanes from West Asia to South East Asia.  These military links have not resulted in any tangible military advantage to India, particularly in terms of advanced weapon-system acquisition, and technology sanctions. This author believes that while India and China are strategic competitors, any attempt by India to aid American containment strategies of China, would constrain India's policy towards China.  It will be a challenge for India to use mutual interests over "local" issues to smoothen the achievement of her long-term policy objectives with regard to China – particularly in terms of territorial disputes and economic issues.

The other major front for the Indo-American engagement is India's West Asian policy. Recent events seem to indicate that the Americans have established a long-term presence in Pakistan, and will consequently attempt to foil any Indian attempts to aggressively disrupt Pakistan's capability to wage terrorism against India.  There is likely to be continuing pressure from the United States on India to negotiate with Pakistan over Kashmir, potentially centering on a land-for-peace deal. American policy towards Iran is also likely to determine the shape of the Indo-US engagement in Afghanistan. From the American perspective, Pakistan is an effective lever to keep India's strategists occupied.  However, it is very important to note that the present state of equilibrium vis-à-vis Pakistan is not in long-term Indian interests.  Indian policy towards Pakistan has to contend not only with Pakistani terrorism, but also with American support to the Pakistani Army and its allied terrorist infrastructure. The challenge facing Indian policymakers is to foil Pakistan's policy of terror while simultaneously convincing the US of the folly of supporting the Pakistani Army.

Recent diplomatic activity on the part of the Indian government clearly illustrates the changing nature of the geopolitical challenges facing India. On the one hand, India is moving towards a greater engagement with American interests. India has been asked to participate in peace keeping and nation building in Iraq by the U.S.  On the other hand, India is attempting to change the state of relations with China, as evidenced by Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to China. While these developments are welcome, they also present challenges to the Indian policy of balance.  Economic priorities dictate a closer engagement with the United States and India's strategy must consider this fact. In a sense, the Indian dilemma is that of increasing strategic space at cross-purposes with the U.S while continuing to strengthen economic ties. This is not a novel dilemma, and has been faced by other nations.  If India resolves this, by sacrificing strategic independence, it will have been a failure of monumental proportions given her civilizational history.

A lot of the questions and choices that India faces today linked with India's conception of her role in the world. Indian strategists talk of India taking her ‘rightful’ place in the comity of nations.  What does this imply?  Does India aspire to Great Power status?  Does it aspire to Super Power status? Does India wish to pursue an aggressive, militaristic approach to achieve these objectives? Alternatively, does India simply wish to grow economically prosperous and enrich her citizens, while at the same time being the benign and peaceful civilizational power that she has historically been? These and other questions are growing to be increasingly important today. Their relevance to the course of foreign policy lies in the nature of India's position today. India is at the crossroads; she is powerful enough to attract notice from the dominant powers of the world, simultaneously she is still vulnerable to the many great problems that beset her internally and externally. India could choose to conduct a policy of direct, overt confrontation and competition towards hostile neighbors and other nations, or India could choose to confront and aggressively use her power on specific issues, while cooperating in other areas where her interests converge.  India's ability to act flexibly in her dealings with her competitors and the U.S. will have considerable implications for her place in the world. Personally, this author hopes that India continue to be what she has historically been - a benign civilizational power that retains its ancient wisdoms.

Sarvebhavantu Sukhinahah
Sarve santu niraamayah

Sarve bhadrani pashyantu
Ma kashchid du:khabhaagh bhaveth