Manning the
Siachen Glacier
Nikhil Shah, Sunil S and B. Bhattacharjee
The Siachen Glacier is a mighty river of ice that
brings forth many descriptions. Some authors
characterize this place as the 'roof the world',
and yet others call it the 'third pole'. Both
descriptions are quite apt, the glacier is at
least 15,000 feet above sea level, and peaks
lining the glacier rise comfortably to over 23,000
feet. Biting winds routinely sweep through the
region. Temperatures here frequently drop to
–40°C. The glacier highlights nature's dual
personality - majestic beauty and sheer brutality.
This region is home to some of the least explored
parts of the Himalayan mountain range. Most people
would be hard put to explain a mountaineer's
desire to venture into this frigid and unforgiving
land, so it is perhaps even more difficult to
explain why a battle rages there.
For the past 19 years, the Indian Army has been
engaged in a frigid battle to protect the region
from Pakistan's territorial aggression and keep it
free of interference. The Indian Army's presence
on the Siachen is frequently viewed from under the
rubric of national security, all manner of
explanations are extended and all sorts of
significance are attached to this task. Although
experts have written several books on the topic of
the Siachen Glacier conflict, reading them is
difficult even for the most seasoned observers.
The result is a vague public understanding of the
issues underlying the Siachen Glacier conflict.
The Bharat Rakshak Forum offered a unique
opportunity to discuss the issue of 'Manning the
Siachen Glacier' on a recent thread. Several forum
members weighed in with their views on the topic.
With great enthusiasm, the utility and futility of
the Siachen Glacier conflict were hotly debated.
The result was a thread regarded by several forum
members as one of the best discussions on the BR
Forum[1].
In this article, we will try to sketch out the
salient features of that discussion. Every attempt
is made to source a view to a particular
participant in the discussion. We have taken the
liberty of assuming that the members are who they
claim to be and no effort is being made to
ascertain their true profession and/or identity.
We have attempted to minimize redundancy by
posting select views. Readers can get in touch
with the members by contacting them on the forum.
However, we cannot guarantee a response. We
dedicate this article to those brave men and women
of the Indian Army who have scaled the 'roof of
the world' to guard India's soaring borders.
Quartered in snow,
Silent to remain,
When the bugle calls,
They shall rise and march again.[2]
A brief history of the conflict
Pavan Nair initiated his discussion with the
comment that:
"Gen Hoon then commanding 15 Corps says in his
book published in 2000 that Khardung La and Leh
would have been threatened had we not done so
(i.e. taken the glacier). Gen Chibber-the then
Army Commander says that Pakistan would have
occupied Saltoro (a ridge west of the glacier) in
the summer of '84 - for which we now know they had
the plans."
The forum member Bishwa clarified that the Indian
Army's move into the region was not without
provocation,
"India did not initially occupy the ridgeline. It dropped troops on the 2
passes initially to block entry to the glacier
from POK side which was legitimate. It tried to
send troops to a third – Gyong La- by foot but
failed. The race to move up vertically on the
ridgelines started when the PA was not able to
dislodge the Indian Army and tried to jockey for
position IMHO. They lost out is their problem."
Citing excerpts from books by Gen. Chibber of the
Indian Army and Gen. Jahan Dad Khan of the
Pakistan Army, Bishwa categorically dismissed any
suggestion that the Indian troops had illegally
occupied the area.
"1. The first party to occupy
Bilafond La (pass) with military force was
Pakistan in 1983: This is from the book
by Gen Jahan Dad Khan then commander 10 Corps -
"Pakistan Leadership Challenges"
When the SSG
company got across Bilafond Pass (in 1983), the
helicopter pilot reported an Indian location one
thousand yards ahead in the Siachen Area. After
seeing our helicopter, the Indian troops,
comprising Ladakh Scouts, left their location in a
great hurry abandoning all their rations and
tentage. The SSG Company stayed in this area for
ten days but was ordered to withdraw in the first
week of September 1983 as it had started snowing
and the company did not have equipment for
survival in the winter season under thirty to
forty feet of snow, which is the normal snow
range.
I believe the scout who warned the Indian
location of the approaching SSGs was awarded an
Ashok Chakra.
2. From The Indian point of view this
triggered action: This is what Lt. Gen
M.L. Chibber who was Army Commander North has to
say on this incident,
The problem
precipitated on 21st August 1983 when a protest
note from Northern Sector Commander of Pakistan
was handed over to his counterpart in Kargil
stating that Line of Control joins with the
Karakoram Pass, also that all the area West of
this extended line belongs to Pakistan. When Army
Headquarters saw this and also got information
that Pakistan troops had occupied Bilafond Pass,
they ordered Northern Command to prevent the
occupation of the Glacier area by Pakistan during
the mountaineering season in 1984.
3. The fact of the matter is in 1984 the
Pakistanis lost out due to poor intelligence:
This is what Lt. Gen Jahan Dad Khan, Corp
Commander 10th Corps, has to say on the
matter
The withdrawal of
the SSG company was followed by many meetings in
the GHQ to decide our plan of action for the
summer of 1984 when the Indians were bound to come
in greater numbers. Also taken into consideration
was the fact that whoever succeeded in occupying
the passes first would be able to hold them, as it
was impossible to dislodge them from these
positions due to the terrain and the conditions.
As Corps Commander, I gave the following
assessment to the GHQ:
Next year (1984), India is most likely to pre-empt
the occupation of the main passes of Baltoro Ridge
with two-battalion strength for occupation and a
third battalion as reserve. It would need another
brigade to provide them with logistic support.
Maximum helicopter force will have to be utilized
for logistic support. Their air force will be
available for air cover and airdrop of
supplies/equipment. We will need a brigade group
with a battalion plus to occupy these passes and
the rest of the force to provide relief and
logistic support. We would also need maximum
porter force to carry supplies and ammunition from
Goma to the glacier position. All our helicopters
force, both Alouette and Puma, will have to be
mobilized for recce and logistic cover. The PAF
has to stand-by to provide air cover. I had also
cautioned GHQ that this operation will be very
costly in logistic support. Our Military
Intelligence must be alerted to keep us informed
of all enemy movements beyond Leh to forestall
their occupation of the glacier area.
A meeting was held in December 1983, in the GHQ
Operation Room under the chairmanship of President
General Zia ul Haq. After listening to the 10
Corps Plan, the COAS thought that the operation on
both sides would be on a limited scale, involving
not more than a brigade on the Indian side and a
battalion on Pakistan's side. The COAS had
obviously underestimated the quantum of force
required by both sides. He had also
under-estimated the logistic problem of this
operation as presented to him by the logistic
staff of the GHQ. In this meeting, it was decided
to incorporate the PAF in this operation and Ma.
Gen. Pir Dad Khan (Commander of the Northern
Areas) was given the task of pre-empting
occupation of the passes, reaching there not
before May 1984, as weather conditions before that
period would not allow the use of helicopters and
the PAF. This decision was to be approved by
Defence Coordination Committee (DCC) attended by
Chairman Joint Staffs Committee and all service
chiefs. So preparatory work was started on the
procurement of high altitude equipment and
clothing, improvement of roads and tracks,
recruitment of porters etc. All these preparations
were to be completed by April 1984.
I handed over
command of the 10 Corps to Lieutenant-General
Zahid Ali Akbar Khan on 31st March 1984
after completing my tenure of four years. I gave
him a detailed briefing about this operational
plan and particularly stressed the importance of
Intelligence keeping a watch on Indian moves
beyond Leh. However, I learned later that when our
troops approached the Baltoro Ridge passes during
the third week of May 1984, the Indians were
already in occupation of Gyong
Pass in the south, strategically important because it could interfere with
the enemy's line of logistic support. As it was
impossible to dislodge the Indians, we had no
option but to occupy the next highest feature
opposite them. This was a great setback for
Pakistan, although
all plans, including the timing of troop movement,
had been laid down at the highest level. We had
obviously failed to appreciate the timing of the
Indian move and our intelligence agencies had
failed to detect the movement of a brigade-size
force in this area. It was learnt that the Indians
had moved up their troops from Leh in the second
half of April 1984.
After the occupation of these positions by both
sides, opposite each other, the border became
active. Both sides started inducting heavy
weapons, including artillery guns, rocket
launchers, and anti-aircraft missiles. Fire duels,
patrol clashes, and engagement of helicopters
through anti-aircraft guns became a daily affair.
Both sides also brought up more troops to counter
each other. Since then, there has been no
substantial change in the relative position of
both sides. It was in the winter of 1984 that the
Pakistani troops first experienced operating at
that altitude. But the troops were provided high
altitude equipment and there was no abnormal loss
of life due to weather conditions. Pakistan was
also able to induce French Lama Helicopters to
make up for our disadvantage vis-à-vis the
Indians.
4. Now what were the Ladakh Scouts doing
there? Well, this is what Lt Gen ML
Chibber has to say,
In 1978, when I was
DMO we got information about a foreign expedition
from the Pakistan side visiting the Siachen
Glacier. The Line of Control terminates at NJ
9842. The Glaciers are not demarcated. We sent a
patrol next year and it was confirmed that
Japanese expeditions had visited the Siachen
Glacier. So routine patrolling started."
This should give the readers a real background of what
happened in 1983-1984. It will show that
India did not act unilaterally."
This closed the discussion on the matter of 'who
started this war' on the Siachen Glacier. After
this, the discussion focused on other aspects of
Pavan Nair's first post.
Image 1:
Map of the Siachen Glacier Conflict Zone
Pavan Nair
had asserted that the Pakistani threat might have
been misread; he posed the following questions,
"The issue is that was there ever a real threat to
Leh or Khardung La? Could this threat have been
avoided by keeping a strong reserve in the Nubra
Valley rather than occupying punishing heights (of
the Saltoro Range)? Have we not made our point
that the line runs along Saltoro and not to
Karakoram Pass from NJ9842? Should not the
military take up this issue with the political
leadership and arrange a honourable pull out from
Saltoro?"
Here Pavan Nair highlighted a common motif
presented in discussions on the Siachen Glacier
conflict; i.e. what is the exact strategic
significance of the glacier? Moreover, could it be
handled differently?
In a reply to this, participants Praneet N, Y I
Patel, and Ray responded with the following
points;
1) Keeping the Pakistanis off Siachen is critical
to maintaining the security of the Nubra Valley.
If the Pakistanis were to somehow secure the
village of Dzingrulma at the snout of the glacier,
they would be able to put the entire Nubra Valley
within artillery range.
2) Holding the Saltoro Ridge on the west of the
Siachen Glacier opens up the possibility of
interdicting any Pakistani moves towards the
Indian town of Chalunkha. The town of Chalunkha
has very little depth due to its geography on the
Indian side; the loss of Chalunkha would impose
immense costs on the main lines of communication
in the region.
3) By deflecting the threat to Chalunkha and
Dzingrulma, we protect key passes (the Khardung
Pass and the Saser Pass) in the region and close
the gap that existed between the Shyok and Nubra
rivers. This is essential to preserving the
security of Leh and other key military positions
along the Northern end of the Line of Actual
Control with China.
In another post, Y I Patel added another aspect to
the strategic significance of Siachen:
"The Saltoro Ridge, simply put, acts as the wedge
that keeps India's door to Central Asia open. It
may be pertinent to note here that during Mughal
times Surat and Bharuch were among India's richest
cities, thanks to the trade between India and
Arabia. The prosperity was further boosted by
commerce resulting from the Silk Route paths that
passed over the Himalayas and connected China and
Central Asia to the Middle East via India. The
glory of Bharuch port is but a memory, but
geographical verities remain constant with time.
It is still shorter, for example, to get to Urmuqi
(the capital of Chinese Xinjiang province) from
Kandla rather than Hong Kong."
"There are Buddha statues in Mongolia, even in
Siberia. They bear witness to the Indian cultural
values that were transmitted to the remote reaches
of Central Asia by Indian traders and monks. The
geography remains the same, and those ancient
routes can now be transformed to interstate
highways and broad gauge railways."
"It is in my appreciation of the importance of
Saser and Karakoram passes. I do not see them as
letting China in; I see them as letting India out
to China and through it to the other countries of
Central Asia. That thought may have been too
"visionary" just a few months ago, but if Nathu La
will see traders plying their wares to Tibet
again, can Karakoram La be far behind? This,
ultimately, is what India's young sons are
shedding blood in Siachen for. ....But portraying
the Battle for Karakoram as a senseless or petty
struggle does grave injustice to the brave young
Indians who have paid in their blood to keep this
door open."
The poster Ray appreciated the originality of Y I
Patel's thesis, and its relevance:
"Pakistan could link up POK to China - that was
their original intention. That is why they
extended the line from NJ9842.
While I (Ray) was inward looking, he (Y I Patel)
is outward looking and aggressively fresh. I
looked at Karakorum as China connecting to it. Y I
Patel looked at it better – (as) our gateway
into
China!"
However, Pavan Nair was not convinced by these
arguments; in a short note, he subsequently opined
that:
"The very basis of the operation was flawed in a
strategic as well as a legal sense. Whatever
threat to national security was perceived-rightly
or wrongly- could have been countered by means
other than the physical occupation of ground."
He continued, saying:
"The Eastern most stretch of the border was not
demarcated after the Karachi Agreement of 1949
after a point called NJ9842 since it was
inhospitable and uninhabited. The language used
and now famous is that from NJ9842- the line would
run 'thence North to the glaciers'. The Glaciers
in question are the Siachen which feeds the Nubra
River, the Rimo which feeds the Shyok River and
the Baltoro which lies further to the North of
Siachen."
"The Pakistani stand since the 1962 Chinese
aggression was that the line extended North East
from NJ9842 to the Karokorum Pass. They produced
maps to prove it and encouraged mountaineering
expeditions in the area, which prompted us to do
the same-a perfectly correct reaction. It was a
case of cartographic aggression and should have
been dealt with as such. The approaches to
Khardungla and Leh via the Nubra and Shyok Valleys
were held by India as was the approach to the
Karakoram Pass. Even if Pakistan had occupied
Saltoro-there would have been no tactical or
strategic advantage and they would have literally
been left high and dry."
In this way, Pavan Nair lays out the basic
geography of the Siachen region. He points out the
most important part of the Siachen Glacier
conflict that escapes many who write about it i.e.
the physical battleground is not the
glacier itself, but a high ridgeline that
dominates the western approaches to the glacier,
the Saltoro Ridge. These approaches lie
through four passes, the Sia La, the Bilafond La,
the Gyong La, and the Chulung La (see map).
Control of the towering peaks of the Saltoro Ridge
is vital to preserving control over the Siachen
Glacier, and as always holding this high ground
proves enormously costly. Pavan Nair's basic
point appeared to be that a Pakistani military
campaign through the Shyok – Nubra gap would have
to entail crossing this very adverse terrain. This
negates the possibility of an incursion.
Y I Patel did not agree with Pavan Nair's
comments, suggesting:
"Technology
never remains static, and Gen Bhagat (who was
responsible for delineating the LoC in 1948-49)
erred primarily in assuming that since the
glaciers were humanly uninhabitable, they would
pose a similar obstacle to military occupation. He
would not have dreamt that a handicapped person
would attempt to climb Everest either, but an
attempt was made this year, and technology may yet
permit such a person to conquer Everest! By
leaving the glaciers un-demarcated, Gen Bhagat's
team not only failed to foresee the impact of
modern medical research and mountaineering
equipment on high altitude warfare, he also
grossly disregarded the possibilities of plainly
foreseeable advances in weaponry such as induction
of artillery guns with extended ranges and with
greater traverse capabilities!"
Ray, also rebutted Pavan Nair with an example from
the Kargil War of 1999,
"The area Pt. 5299 to Bhimbat LC as also the
Mashkoh area was supposed to be 'glaciated' and
none could traverse the same and hence (it was
left) unoccupied (by the Indian Army). The
Pakistanis 'did a Kargil' and now it is
choc-a-bloc full of troops!"
Other participants also offered similar views and
highlighted the general lack of trust in Pakistan.
Surya eloquently stated these as follows:
"I simply do not trust Musharraf. An Indian
Special Forces officer once said to me – If you
want to find out how Musharraf thinks, ask us. He
will do anything to gain the advantage."
For his part, Pavan Nair was not deterred by the
lukewarm reception of his premise. He acknowledged
the objections of the other participants, but
insisted that cost of India staying up on the
Saltoro Ridge was unacceptable,
"Members should think of the thousands who have
been wounded and have been 'boarded out' from the
army with a measly disability pension. No sir! It
is not worth holding an inch or even thousands of
square kilometers of strategically useless terrain
when the purpose can be served by moving into a
position of strength below."
To bring down the cost, he offered a de-escalation
proposal.
The Proposal
Pavan Nair proposed that India engage in what he
termed, a 'Unilateral Strategic Withdrawal'. He
suggested that a token force be maintained as
observers on the glacier itself and that the
de-inducted force be converted into a reactive
reserve to be located in the Shyok and Nubra
Valleys. This proposal set the stage for the real
debate. On its face, the withdrawal was
highlighted as a sign of defeat; however, Pavan
Nair argued that this unconventional thinking
could work to India's advantage.
The Counter-Punch
Having examined the pros and cons of Indian
unilateral withdrawal, Rudra Singha, asserted
that:
"Perhaps a mutual pullout can be organized when
Kashmir peace moves fructify",
Though the idea to link Siachen with a resolution
of conflict imposed by Pakistan in the Indian
state of Jammu and Kashmir was never fully
accepted or debated, the idea of a mutual pullout
as opposed to an Indian unilateral pullout found
much support. Almost uniformly, participants felt
that a 'Unilateral Strategic Withdrawal' will be
interpreted in Pakistan, as an 'Indian Defeat' and
that would surely bring adverse consequences for
India.
Forum member Shiv was somewhat more open to the
idea but with caveats:
"Knowing
Pakistan I am sure that there will be two definite
responses to a unilateral strategic withdrawal
from Siachen.
1) Militarily I guess that Pakistan will do what t
can and occupy some areas at least in a token
fashion to show victory and progress in their war
against the infidels.
2) Politically - the leader of Pakistan if we do a
withdrawal - whether it is Musharraf, or Gen. Aziz
or anyone will automatically claim that the
"Unilateral Strategic Withdrawal" is a lame excuse
and that Pakistan's policies are paying off, and
that India is getting "tired" and that a few more
years of jihad will get them Kashmir. This is the
premise on which the military in
Pakistan keeps links with Islamists and keeps a grip on
Pakistan.
So my opinion of a unilateral withdrawal by
India is that the idea is good if it is backed by a "big danda" (an element
of coercion aimed at the Pakistanis)"
The sub-issues of the 'mutual pullout' were;
·
Whether a mutual pullout is indeed feasible, and
if so, what shape is it likely to take?
·
Whether the pullout is sustainable – can a few
limited posts on the glacier actually defend it?
·
What are the costs and benefits of not being
physically present on the Saltoro Ridge?
Is a Mutual Pullout Possible?
On the issue of the feasibility of a mutual
pullout, most participants expressed cautious
enthusiasm keeping in mind treacherous Pakistani
intentions. Pavan Nair himself felt it would very
easy to do this.
Sunil S opined that irrespective of whether it is
a unilateral or a mutual withdrawal, there were
inherent risks in the proposal:
"Should Pakistan move onto a peak after an India
has withdrawn from there, they could subsequently
claim that they had "conquered the Siachen
Glacier". The Indian army would then incur high
costs in bringing them down. Given that the
Pakistani Army is desperately looking for a
victory against India to bolster its image back
home, it will be tempting for them to pursue this
path."
Other participants (Jagan and Bishwa) pointed out
that in technical discussions between the Indian
and Pakistani Government, a possible withdrawal
zone was discussed. This zone would put all Indian
forces back to Dzingrulma and all Pakistani forces
to Goma (See map). Most participants concluded,
after looking at the map, that such a proposal was
(prima facie) acceptable.
The forum member Bishwa pulled out paragraphs from
Gen. M. L. Chibber's book that highlights that the
positions held in the Saltoro Ridge by Indian Army
were acquired sequentially, and in a manner that
provided maximum overlapping coverage to each
other. Undoing such a defensive line appeared to
be a formidable proposition. In the later part of
the thread much discussion centered on the
positions of some of the posts on the Indian and
Pakistani sides. Given that Indian and Pakistani
armies refer to each other's posts on the ridge by
different names, correlating the posts with names
proved quite challenging.
Several participants such as Ashutosh, Bishwa, and
Jagan spent a lot of time seeking out maps of the
region. A very impressive write up of a journey to
the Siachen Glacier was found in an account of the ROSE expedition of the Indian Mountaineering
Federation [3].
The veteran Indian mountaineer Harish Kapadia led
this expedition. Another account of a journey to
the Saltoro Ridge was found in the
Outside Magazine [4].
These maps and accounts helped increase the
general understanding of the difficult topography
of the region.
Is the Pullout Sustainable?
Pavan Nair opined that holding the glacier after
withdrawing from the Saltoro Ridge could be
feasible in the days of modern technology.
"The Glacier should continue to be occupied by us
by keeping a few observation posts and blocking
positions. We have an existing infrastructure and
can block the approaches using surveillance
devices. In fact, we may also continue to occupy
the Southern part of the ridgeline where a road is
now under construction-if so required. This would
entail a much smaller force at considerably lower
expense in terms of casualties and cost."
Pavan Nair also discussed the possibility of using
close air support and satellite based surveillance
to minimize the need for human presence on the
Saltoro Ridge. Among the others, however, there
were equally grave doubts about the ability to
hold the glacier once the posts on the Saltoro
Ridge had been vacated.
Ray noted that:
"If we moved into to block the Pakistanis at
the Snout [flat and wide] as suggested, without
heights, to my mind, the hasty defenses that would
have to be taken would not have the defensive
potential desired. Also reacting in the High
Altitude Area [to take up defenses at the Snout]
has attendant problems like acclimatization etc
and it cannot be perceived to be in the same light
as in lower hills and plains. Likewise, without
road communications, it would be slow…. in fact,
very slow since helicopters or even aircraft carry
very low payloads [if operating from High Altitude
air bases]. Moving in artillery too, which is
essential, would be immense problem."
Ray countered that the idea of reactive force was
ineffective;
"In the High Altitude, there is no question of
'rushing in' troops to stop any enemy. .... It is
worse in the Siachen since apart from the rarefied
atmosphere, the terrain obtained in the Siachen
[moraine, ice walls, crevices etc] negates any
movement. As far as 'Blocking Positions' go, there
is no such thing for the Infantry. It is in armor
warfare… Similarly the atmosphere played a
significant role in making the PGMs (laser guided
bombs) ineffective during the Kargil war."
Y I Patel also added;
"Our current deployment is really no different – a
few observation posts to keep an eye on Pakistani
movements. In fact, our posts on the heights of
Bilafond La and northwards do nothing more than
that. The real fighting is done by their calling
on arty to prevent any Pakistan movements up the
slope. Please let us not judge the current
fighting by the accounts of Subedar Bana Singh's
exploits (refer Operation Meghdoot). Thanks to men
like him, we are now in a position to maintain a
minimal presence in actual "posts" Indirect
records such as Republic day award lists point out
that the overwhelming majority of units deployed
to Siachen are logistics and engineering units."
Sunil S further elaborated on the constraints of
using technology by stating;
"The performance of PGMs in Kargil was patchy. It
is difficult to use PGMs in mountains, and
accuracy matters a lot. Even if we use a PGM I see
little chance of doing away with a ground based
spotter team to illuminate the target. You have to
have feet on the ground."
"Satellite surveillance is in its infancy in our
part of the world, it is notoriously inaccurate in
mountain terrain. Given that even an average
mountain can have inclines at 80 degrees, the
1-meter resolution actually compresses feature
about 4-5 times the size. This renders the image
useless. A polar orbit satellite can be over a
location for a very short period, it is possible
to predict the period that the satellite will be
over the spot and to cover movement in that region
over that period. I remain skeptical if even the
most advanced western satellite technology can
really maintain round-the-clock surveillance on
the region."
"As far as ground based sensors go, the complexity
of the task of putting up surveillance equipment
on the Saltoro Ridge (~ 22000 feet) will be
comparable to that task under taken by M.S Kohli's
team when placing SNAP-19C powered sensors on
Nandakot and Nandadevi in 1962."
Y I Patel felt that;
"If the authors (of an article linked by Pavan
Nair) could spot the glaciers from the Nubra
valley, then someone sitting on the glaciers
could, in turn, spot anyone coming up Nubra
valley. By occupying the snout of the glacier,
Pakistanis can interdict the lines of
communication (LC) running up Nubra Valley.
Without the logistics, the posts on either side of
the Nubra Valley would become unsustainable.
Likewise, Saser La would suffer the fate of Dras,
with Pakistanis occupying commanding positions and
indulging in turkey shoots."
Sunil S also discussed the paradox at hand and the
difficulties it imposed;
"'Good tactics' says "higher is better" - 'good
logistics' says "higher is harder to re-supply"
thus the only way to beat this paradox is to use
the higher altitude and suppress the enemies
supply routes asymmetrically (otherwise the
enemy will return the favor). If you look at the
battlefield, you will notice that our supply lines
have to go across the vast expanse of the Siachen
Glacier, by comparison the Pakistanis have roads
all the way up to the mouth of the much smaller
Bilafond, Kondus, and Gyong glaciers. (The lack
of) Depth appears to be a serious issue (on the
Indian side)."
What are the costs and benefits of not being
physically present on the Saltoro Ridge?
Pavan Nair suggested that there would be many
positive effects of not occupying the Saltoro
Ridge. By minimizing its posture on the Saltoro
Ridge, India would reduce its expenditure in men
and materiel and Pakistan would have to follow the
suit. This move of statesmanship would gain India
much goodwill in the international arena, and thus
put pressure on Pakistan to behave. This would
lead to winding down of the crisis and effectively
the threat posed from that region (if it ever
existed) would subside.
Y I Patel disagreed with that notion;
"There is no reasonable basis to believe that
abandoning Siachen on moral grounds will engender
a whit of international goodwill; as far as
Pakistan goes, it will only be seen as an act of
weakness that should be exploited by raising
rather than lowering the ante on other issues."
"Remember, even in 1999, Chalunka and other vital
Indian positions were shelled because of Pakistani
infiltrators observing and directing arty fire. By
handing them Saltoro heights on a platter, we
invite much worse treatment. We will not be saving
any lives, sir. We will be losing them by the
hundreds."
Sunil S and Bishwa pointed out that the
infrastructure on the ridge has been painstakingly
built up. Currently the Indian army has the
ability to support upwards of a brigade on the
ridge at about a hundred or so posts. Inclement
weather ensures that these posts have to be
occupied if they are to remain viable. Abandoning
them would necessitate a higher cost and time to
rebuild in response to a Pakistani aggression.
This had pretty much rounded out the discussion.
There were a number of important detours,
including a discussion of the living conditions of
the soldiers on the Saltoro Ridge. The
participants also discussed several big name
operations that took place on the glacier.
Quite a few notes were exchanged on mountaineering
and altitude sickness and the effects of High
Altitude Pulmonary Edema, and High Altitude
Cerebral Edema. Participants Shiv, Ehsmang, Daulat,
and many others contributed volumes to these
discussions. It was at this point in the thread
that forum member Daulat put forth a very
interesting question. Daulat noted that given that
the Indian Army was holding the heights, things
were exceedingly nasty for the Pakistani Army
soldiers manning posts under the Indian Army's
positions. So, by an extension of Pavan Nair's
logic, would the Pakistani Army withdraw from the
ridge? Our next section discusses this aspect of
the debate.
What are the consequences of a Pakistani
withdrawal from their positions on the Saltoro
Ridge?
In response to Daulat's query, Sunil S wrote the
following:
"The unilateral Pakistani withdrawal from the
Saltoro Ridge will be seen as yet another glorious
failure of the army of Pakistan...It is possible
that factions within the Pakistani army will
attempt to dump blame on each other through a
public washing of some serious dirty linen. This
will erode the standing of the Pakistan Army (PA)
in society.
Since the PA bills itself as the sole agency of
governance in Pakistan, all the public angst about
its style of governance will find an easy route
for _expression in the protests over the
withdrawal. All the negativism about Pakistani
administrative affairs will find a neat little
focal point. Therefore, an atmosphere of
systematic confrontation between the army and the
people (similar to the one that emerged after the
defeat of 1971) will build up.
The result of such a confrontation is
unpredictable. The Musharraf government is already
quite weak, and its grip on power will weaken, as
every political faction will vie for public
attention to replace Gen. Musharraf. There will
most likely be a revolt of some kind within the
Pakistan Army, and trouble of the kind that
Liaquat Ali Khan faced is not entirely out of the
realm of possibility. The Islamists will make a
major bid for power, but as with every other time,
the US will subvert the process and place its own
proxy in power. General Musharraf will be replaced
by "General Whatzizname… you know... the one who
wants to bring democracy to Pakistan."[5]
In terms of international stature, given the
current mess that Pakistan is in, the 'unilateral
strategic withdrawal' will create enormous amounts
of diplomatic and political room for Pakistan to
maneuver in. Pakistan's allies in the American
media will conflate the Pakistani withdrawal from
the region with a material reduction in the
tensions along the LoC (which it has nothing to do
it).
Islamists and other more conservative elements of
Pakistani society will attribute this failure to
American pressure. As a result, there are likely
to be repercussions on US interests in the region.
The Islamists will also conflate the Saltoro issue
with the Kashmir issue and insist that Musharraf
has betrayed a 'Cause of Islam'. The Islamists
will find concordant views among several elements
of the Pakistan Army.
There will actually be a major improvement in
military spending as far as the Pakistan Army
goes. The money freed up from the Saltoro venture
will end up being spent on improving the
conventional posture elsewhere along the border.
It is possible that some of the money saved from
the Saltoro conflict will go into the pockets of
the Pakistani people, but most of it will go into
a process of conventional armament. Quite possibly
towards the purchase of more advanced weapons from
the US or France or UK - lollipops for "good
behaviour".
Conclusion
In this thread on BR, we were able to revisit held
notions about the Siachen Glacier. In the case of
most participants, their views on Siachen were
considerably expanded by Pavan Nair's bold
initiative to propose and defend the idea of an
Indian unilateral withdrawal. Because of this
discussion, we are now able to clearly see the
main strategic motivations for the Siachen Glacier
conflict. We are also better placed to understand
the human cost of this war. A lot of knowledge was
also gleaned by a careful examination of maps
found on the Internet. This has improved the
quality of understanding of the terrain in the
region.
Ultimately, the consensus was that Siachen
continued to represent significant strategic value
to India, and that withdrawal from Saltoro Ridge
runs the risk of undoing years of labor, with no
confidence that the move would result in a lasting
peace. The notion of a unilateral withdrawal was
shown to be deleterious to Indian security in
their implications. The costs of a presence on
the Ridge were shown to be greatly out weighed by
the strategic value of denial, and the costs
imposed on the enemy. The authors would like to
take this opportunity to thank all the
participants of the thread for contributing to the
discussion. For us, the thread was a treasure
trove of information and views about the conflict,
and we hope other readers feel similarly.
[1]
Regrettably, large parts of the original
thread have been lost to a software glitch;
however, efforts are underway to find a copy
that someone may have saved.
[2]
Inscription on the memorial for the war dead
at Siachen Base camp at Dzingrulma in India.
[5]
George W Bush in an interview on foreign
policy during his 2001 presidential campaign.