Indian Experience in RMA
Air Commodore A K Tiwary (Retd.)
"No civilisation was so little equipped to cope
with the outside world; no country was so easily
raided and plundered, and learned so little from
its disasters."
VS Naipaul -
"India
- A Wounded Civilisation"
The world is abuzz with the acronym RMA. Everyone
talks about RMA, and everyone wants to implement
the RMA. The exciting promise of the RMA seems to
convey to all and sundry that merely embracing the
new technology will lead to victory against all
kinds of threats. It is like the proverbial
"distant mirage" now within easy reach, if only a
nation could invest in the miracles of technology.
The acronym RMA may be new, but
the history of revolutions in military affairs
began with the start of warfare itself. At
periodic intervals, new discoveries and inventions
have resulted in war fighting capability
increasing by leaps and bounds. We too in India
are excited about the possibilities RMA may usher
in. More often than not, our expectations far
outreach the realms of the possible. Why such an
assertion - one can rightfully ask? It is because
our past experience in relation to understanding
and successfully implementing the technology for
war fighting is not too successful.1
Hopefully, if we critically examine our past
experience with RMAs, we might discern the
pitfalls and thereby process properly in the
future. Hence, this study of the Indian experience
in RMA.
Before considering the Indian experience in RMA,
we might as well define what RMA is and when it is
said to occur? RMA has three main constituents.2
These are:
(a) Doctrine
(b) Technology
(c) Tactics &
Training
Often, people consider that an RMA
occurs only when new technologies emerge and are
implemented. This is not entirely true. For
example, Tipu Sultan was the first Indian military
leader to use rockets in warfare. But this did not
lead to a military revolution at least in India.
Gunpowder was discovered in China. It did not
create an RMA there. In recent times, nearly the
same level of technology was available in the USA
and the erstwhile Soviet Union. Indeed, the
theoretical mention of RMA, started in the
erstwhile Soviet Union in the early 1980s. It was
called Military Technological Revolution (MTR).3
But RMA proper did not occur in the Russian state,
thereafter. The way the Chechnya conflict has been
fought underscores this assessment. Nearly the
same technology was available to the Arabs and the
Israelis in the Middle East in 1967. But the
Israeli lightning victory against numerically
highly superior forces certainly comes within the
category of RMA.4
Therefore, one needs to
remember that RMA has three major components.
Amongst these, the Doctrine must be considered as
the most important component. The word Doctrine is
being used loosely here. It encompasses the
essential ingredients of pure doctrine and in some
measure strategy too.
Simply stated Doctrine means our beliefs about how
we use the armed forces: purely defensively;
purely offensively, or in a mix of defence and
offence. Do we use the three services jointly, or
individually which will inevitably result in a
lack of coordination. Do we use the military
jointly along with other instruments of national
power, i.e. diplomacy, financial muscle and most
important with the willing support of our citizens
or otherwise? These doctrinal factors, therefore,
need to be kept in mind when we examine the Indian
experience in RMA. The
next component of the RMA is Technology. Other
factors being equal among the opposing forces,
technology as a component of RMA can be considered
as next in importance. The complexity of modern
day technology has increased manifold. So
acquiring technology is one thing. Understanding
it and employing it most optimally is another. It
requires years of training under realistic
conditions. Tactics
derive from a mix of doctrine, strategy and
technology. Training refines or perfects our
tactics. So, the tactics that we want to use
during actual war need to be developed under
realistic war conditions or conditions as close to
actual war as possible. Naturally there is a great
difference between war conditions and conditions
for peace-time training.
As we simulate war conditions our chances of
accidents and loss of lives and military equipment
increase. So, then, how does one train to derive
tactics that will work during war? This is one of
the most difficult problems facing military
commanders everywhere. It must, however, be
acknowledged that technological advances are
reducing the gap between simulation and reality.
If we accept the doctrine, the
technology and the tactics as the components of
RMA, what then is meant by the term RMA? RMA is a
new term and a western follow-on to MTR
originating in the erstwhile USSR in the early
'80s. RMAs have continued to occur throughout the
187 generations of mankind though in varying
degrees and intensity.5 As other
nations learnt and incorporated the new RMA
occurring in the lead country, the RMA were again
replaced by wars of attrition. Till another RMA
came about to break the deadlock.
RMA can be considered to occur
when a combination of the three components of the
RMA i.e. the Doctrine, Technology and Tactics, in
varying degrees permit one side to achieve a quick
and decisive victory over the other. Napoleon's
RMA was a mix of the doctrine of massed troops in
manoeuvre and associated training and logistics.
The German Blitzkrieg was a combination of all the
three. Whereas World War I saw the emergence of
many new technologies like the Maxim Machine Gun,
the Submarine, the Aircraft, and the Tank, it did
not produce an RMA then and there. What actually
transpired at the trenches was carnage on a scale
never witnessed before.6 This carnage
did, thereafter, act as the catalyst for the new
RMA.
However, when Americans today talk of RMA, there
is one more element implicit in it. That is a
quick victory achieved with the least loss of men
and materiel. It is interesting to note that
casualties during the US Civil War were close to 1
million. In one year’s participation during World
War I, the US casualties were well below 100,000.
During the four-year participation in World War
II, their casualties remained below 100,000. In
Korea and Vietnam these were closer to 50,000.
Since then there has been a dramatic reduction.
Similarly, when the Germans astounded the world by
their Blitzkrieg, the Blitzkrieg itself was not
without casualties. In the Polish Campaign the
Germans lost 210 tanks (10 per cent of their
strength), 564 aeroplanes, (about 25 per cent of
the committed force), 11,000 killed and 30,000 /
34,000 wounded / missing. In the French campaign
the German losses were 753 tanks (30 per cent of
tanks) and 1,900 aeroplanes (roughly 50 per cent).
The Israelis achieved one of the quickest and most
devastating air and ground victories in 1967.
However, for their victory they did pay a heavy
price. Out of 800 tanks, the Israelis nearly lost
211 tanks as destroyed and many more damaged, but
subsequently recovered and repaired. That is about
25-50 percent tanks were destroyed / damaged. The
Israelis lost 50 aeroplanes, that is, about 25 per
cent of their Air Force. They also had 778 killed
and 2,586 wounded.8 This loss was by no
means small except when compared to the tremendous
victory.
However, since Gulf War '91, a new dimension in
RMA has occurred. That is the dimension of
complete victory with least losses to the victor.
The MNF casualties were 4 Tanks and 8 AFVs, 73
aeroplanes, 147 killed, 75 missing and 513
wounded. In Bosnia in
1995, a 22-day air campaign achieved the political
objective. The losses to peace enforcers were only
one F-16. In Kosovo in
1999, the 78-day air campaign again achieved the
political objective. Yet the losses were only two
fighters and nil aircrew.
The ongoing war against
terrorism in Afghanistan since 7 October 2001 is
too recent to warrant repetition. The above
examples underscore the new dimension of the RMA.
But we must be careful lest the chip and the
microprocessor overshadow the doctrinal changes
and changes in tactics, which have an equally
important contribution in the American RMA. With
this as the background, let us now examine the
Indian experience in RMA.
Around 321 BC Chanakya provided the doctrinal
framework to Chandragupta Maurya, a young prince
aspiring to be a king. Chandragupta superimposed
the available technology and tactics on this
doctrinal framework, including the creation of a
disciplined, salaried army. An army of 6,00,000
infantry, 30,000 horses, 9,000 elephants plus
8,000 chariots, all permanently employed and paid
well.9 This concept of a salaried army
would emerge much later in medieval Europe. The
combination was akin to an RMA – for it led to the
emergence of the consolidated Indian State. It led
to the largest ever Indian nation state, from the
Hindu Kush Mountains in the northwest including
modern Afghanistan, Kashmir and Nepal to the east
coast and towards the south right up to present
day Chennai, leaving alone only a small portion of
Southern India. The RMA led to almost two
centuries of a stable and prosperous India,
including 40 years under Ashoka the Great.
From 184 BC, for the next 500
years or so, India again broke up into small
states and came under attack from the northwest.
It was only from 320 AD till 455 AD that the Gupta
Dynasty regained the glory of a large united
India. Not much is known about the military means
employed by Samudra Gupta (335-376 AD) when he
conquered most of India. Did he usher in an RMA to
achieve the reconquest or was it pure brute
strength? This is difficult to judge today. Yet,
the only certain fact is that India was again
united and a very prosperous nation as recounted
by the Chinese pilgrim Fa-hien in his contemporary
account of that period in India.
The Indian experience in RMA could be considered
under two parts. The larger part devoid of RMA and
the smaller part with definite sparks of RMA.
From 815 AD
onwards, the Indian experience in RMA can be
described as a "Period of little experience”.
Considering India under the Mughals, there is no
doubt that the Mughal Empire stretched far and
wide. The Mughals had powerful armies and
subordinate allies in India. But can we call this
an Indian experience? It probably belongs more to
the RMA of invading forces in consolidating their
hold over existing Indian states. A result of RMA
brought in from outside - the artillery by Babur,
initiative and military craft by others. Apart
from huge armies, ponderous in nature, and
employing attrition as a central theme of war, one
cannot discern much of RMA even during the Mughal
period. During the 17th and 18th
century – when India was the richest nation in the
world, its military lacked two main ingredients
for RMA, i.e., dynamic doctrine and modern
tactics. Hence its defeat, time and again at the
hands of opponents inferior both numerically and
in firepower - but opponents equipped with RMA.
The RMA of extremely disciplined
troops fighting as a coherent and well-drilled
team versus multitudes of Indians, who would break
into unorganised, chaotic, individual warfare of
the centuries past. While analysing the Indian way
of warfare, Philip Mason credits Indian soldiers
with unmatched courage, superior horsemanship and
skill at arms. But at the intellectual level he
states, "Indians had not really given thought to
the problem of war; no one had really cudgelled
his brains as to how to concentrate the maximum
possible fire on a given section of the enemy's
line; no one had given attention to the point that
practice for the crew could turn a gun that fired
four rounds an hour into one that fired eight."10
The positive experience, apart
from the Maurya and Gupta periods comes much later
and in small parts. Southern India remained
independent to a large extent from 10th
to 12th century. The kingdoms of the
Pallavas and the Cholas, in South India fluctuated
in their size and fortune. However, history does
not reveal much of RMA in their methods of
warfare.
Shivaji definitely produced a gem of an RMA
adapting his doctrine, strategy and tactics. From
a small beginning, emanating from the isolated and
dispersed forts of Maharashtra, the ensuing
Maratha power was to execute powerful forays right
up to Bengal and Punjab. Unfortunately, while this
RMA was successful against the prevailing Indian
military matrix – it would be blunted and
overwhelmed by even newer RMA brought in by the
British. The rock like infantry, the closely
orchestrated firepower from muskets, the salaried
sepoys and alongside logistics, all this led by
leaders well versed with modern manoeuvre warfare
then flowering in Europe was to overwhelm the
Indians - Indian forces superior in numbers,
artillery guns but with inferior training,
tactics, and a military mind steeped in the past.
The richest nation, with a large military would
lose to a smaller force, supported by an inferior
economy, operating thousands of miles away from
its heartland and separated by vast oceans.
Guru Gobind Singh, the
transformer of the timid Hindu into a lion-like
Khalsa to fight the injustice of Aurangzeb and
other kings of the hill states of Punjab, also
revealed sparks of RMA. But these started and
finished with him.
Why did the Indians lack or fail in RMA?
Doctrinally, we continued with military thoughts
and traditions which were no more relevant in the
modern times. We believed in misplaced notions of
chivalry, courage, political craft, etc. In the
entire history of mankind and warfare, it was only
in India that Mahmud of Ghazni – an invader who
forayed 17 times, was allowed to withdraw, recoup
and re-attack because of internal rivalries
between the kingdoms of Kannauj, Malwa and Ajmer.
When Mahmud attacked the Somnath temple, 50,000
Hindus charged blindly to be massacred.11
Centuries later, Babur, another invader said “the
Indian knew how to die, but not how to fight”.12
Babur with his 12,000 men had defeated an
Indian army of 1,00,000. Philip Mason described
the Indian Army as, "Vast crowds of undisciplined
horseman surrounding a ponderous assembly of
elephants".13 Similarly in 1191,
Mohammed Ghori was defeated in battle with Prithvi
Raj Chauhan. But he was allowed to get away. Next
year he returned better prepared and defeated
Prithvi Raj Chauhan. Similarly, about 15 centuries
earlier the Hun King Mihirgula was spared by
Baladitya the king of Magadha. Baladitya defeated
Mihirgula in 528 BC. Mihirgula was a Hun ruling
over northwest India. But instead of imprisoning
him, Baladitya spared him his life and allowed him
to return to his native place with full honour.14
This was nothing else but chivalry devoid of
political craft.
Courage was another misplaced notion responsible
for our failures. When defeat loomed large, our
warriors encouraged their wives in to commit sati.
Then they opened the main gates of the fort and
charged headlong into the enemy – to be
slaughtered. Dr Anjali Nirmal states that, “A
Hindu warrior wielding a sword, spear or bow
charged and fought in exactly the same manner (in
1500-1600 AD) as his predecessors had done three
centuries before Christ”.15 If this was
so, then where is the question of RMA? Is it a
coincidence that similar thoughts have been
ascribed by renowned author VS Naipaul. "Indians
say that their gift is for synthesis. It might be
said, rather, that for too long, as a conquered
peoples, they have preserved their sanctuary of
the instinctive, in creative life, converting that
into a religious ideal; at a more worldly level,
they have depended on others for ideas and
institutions that make a country work."16
More recently Aditya Nehru described the Indian’s
wars of the past as, "No leadership, no strategy,
just greed for gold - individual bravery, heroics
and chaos."
Let us now move on to modern India,
post independence. There is no point repeating the
well-known facts soon after independence. Like
Nehru’s idea of defence and defence forces;
Krishna Menon’s contempt for senior military
leadership; idealism and naivety instead of the
pragmatism of realpolitik in our foreign affairs.
Former Defence Secretary Dr PVR Rao summed this up
nicely, "In the circumstances in which the Indian
leaders came to power, there was an essential
antagonism between them and the organs of
government - the civil administration, the police
and the defence forces - which had been used by
the British to suppress the nationalist
movement... This was more pronounced with respect
to the defence forces, as unlike their civilian
counterparts, the services rarely came into
contact with the political parties."17
But let us not forget the more mundane but
enduring factors which motivate military men.
Unless the men are highly motivated, all the three
components of RMA i.e. the doctrine, the
technology and the tactics cannot be exploited to
produce the RMA. Patriotism is an ephemeral
motivation. It blossoms at a particular moment but
is soon fractured by the realities of everyday
life. Pay and allowances have more lasting
permanent influence. Perks and privileges motivate
fighting men far more than the mere appeal of
one-way duty to the nation. Why
did the Indian sepoy serve his British master so
loyally? Even abroad, when sailing overseas was
considered sacrilegious to most - from the deserts
of the Middle East to the jungles of Malay and
Burma; in the trenches of Flanders and the rest of
France; in both the World Wars. Even at home,
whether against the Sikh Kingdom in 1845; or
against the defenders of the first Indian freedom
struggle of 1857-58, and once again against the
Indian National Army in 1944 at Kohima?
The answer lies in what the sepoys got in return
for their sacrifices and services. The British
ensured attractive pay and allowances, (An MC
winner received Rs 40/month, nearly 3 times his
pay)18 priority in civil courts to deal
with problems relating to land and related
disputes, allotment of land for cultivation,
either as a reward or at concessional rates, and
lastly respect in the society and fair treatment
from their officers, especially groomed for the
role. These incentives provided "Izzat", an idea
highly valued by the Indians. Whenever there was
denial of one or more of the above considerations,
dissatisfaction surfaced, sometimes leading to
mutiny. Some of the examples being the revolt of
1857-58; the Punjab Rebellion of 1919; the Naval
Mutiny of 1946; and the Sikh Revolt of 1984.
One of the major causes for the
revolt of 1857 was abolition of batta (the
equivalent of the modern day travelling
allowance), which the sepoy got when operating in
areas away from his parent base. Once all of India
came under the East India Company, their auditors
suspended this allowance. The major causes for
revolt of 1919 in Punjab was the failure of the
British to honour the promises made to soldiers
enrolled for World War I. That was the award of
free agricultural land and adequate monetary
compensation.
What has been our experience after Independence?
Under the pressure of socialist philosophy and
indifference to the needs of defence, the pay of a
soldier was reduced from Rs 18/- per month to Rs
4/-. Of a Lieutenant General from Rs 4,500/- to Rs
2,500/- per month.19 Since
Independence, there has been continuous
downgrading of military ranks vis-à-vis civil
bureaucracy in inter-se seniority. While democracy
and equality are principles equally desirable to
military men, the continued decline in status of
services personnel in society, and in government
offices, etc have further eroded the dignity and
ethos which was associated with the services.
General Slim's prescription for an excellent army
was three-fold. On the spiritual plane the war
must be, for a just cause. Intellectually, the
troops must be convinced they can win. Materially,
they must be given best equipment and looked after
well.20
The reality, however, was contrary to this. George
Tanham described the state of affairs thus, "In
effect, the services have been down-graded in
status, taken out of national security
decision-making processes, and for the most part
kept ignorant of nuclear developments, while the
MoD civilian staff has grown in prestige and power
and controls almost all military activities and
programmes. At the same time, civilian and
political leaders have been upgraded and their pay
increased."21 The RMAs are essentially
generated by proud and professional personnel
highly motivated in their quest for excellence.
How can then one expect the military to be always
motivated when the Prime Minister ridicules his
Commander-in-Chief? In 1951, General Cariappa
forewarned about hostile Chinese intentions
towards Tibet and India. Sardar Patel had also
warned Nehru in 1950 about China. Nehru showed his
disdain by saying, "It is not the business of the
Commander-in-Chief to tell the Prime Minister who
is going to attack us where. In fact, the Chinese
will defend our eastern frontier. You mind only
Kashmir and Pakistan".22 Similarly,
General Thimayya was rebuked when he highlighted
the Chinese Threat.
Currently, in the year 2003, the
shortage of officers in the three armed services
has crossed 14,000 in a total of 57,000 vacancies.
Mr Fernandes, the Defence Minister attributed two
major factors for the shortfall. First, although a
good number of candidates pass through the written
examination, they are unable to get through the
Service Selection Board. Second, the relatively
risky and hazardous career in the Army compared to
other available options.20 As
far as RMA post Independence, certain episodes
from the 1947-48 operations in J&K do contain
sparks of tactical revolution in military affairs.
To recount some: landing of troops at the high
altitude of Leh, without any precedent and perhaps
outside the technical limits of the aircraft,
which saved Ladakh from falling into Pakistani
hands; bombing by Dakotas to lift the siege of
Poonch and air landing artillery guns at a hastily
prepared strip by night in Poonch. All this was
done by the famous Baba Meher Singh.
Sound military doctrine and strategy do not
originate in a vacuum. A nation does have its
Grand Strategy, though often it may not be clearly
articulated. To fulfil the Grand Strategy, the
political leadership devises strategies for
Diplomacy, Economy and Military. Therefore,
military strategy is a part of national strategy
and the national doctrinal thought impinges
heavily on military doctrine. Like the doctrine of
"offence being the best defence" in the case of
Israel or “defence being the best defence” in
Russian/Soviet belief to capitalize on its
continental size and huge manpower. While intent
can change overnight, the doctrine, the technology
and the tactics cannot. The Standing Committee on
Defence, Xth Lok Sabha, Fifth Report para 34
states, "Capabilities of a country take a long
time to build up while the intentions of countries
can change overnight. India cannot forget that a
number of high or low intensity wars were imposed
on her during the 50 years since Independence when
she had to defend her territorial integrity."
Thus, our leader’s desire to put the Chinese in
their proper place resulted in the blunders of
1962 in multiple stages. The blunder of Tibet's
annexation and its legitimisation by us: from the
Hindi-Chini slogan on one hand to the need to
display a strong posture by forward posts in
disputed areas. And this by ordering ill clad, ill
equipped and ill prepared troops to evict the
Chinese from the unfamiliar and hostile Himalayan
heights. When faced with the Chinese threat in
1962, failing to use combat airpower because of
the unprofessional advice and lack of proper
military knowledge. To top it all, at the sight of
the first signs of trouble because of the Chinese
advance at Bomdilla, getting defeated mentally and
accepting the inevitable loss of Assam well in
advance.21 During this period, leading
up to the 1962 Sino-Indo War, Indian airpower was
ahead of Chinese airpower in all the three
departments of Doctrine, Technology and Tactics.
It was the only instrument of military power that
could have turned the tables on the Chinese
advance.22
Did we learn from the war of 1962 and thus perform
better in 1965? Yes we did perform better. But was
it good enough? In most departments at national,
strategic and operational levels we still needed
to perform better.
Fortunately in 1971, as war
seemed to be the inevitable extension of our
diplomatic efforts to solve the East Pakistani
refugee problem, we fared much better - thanks to
clear leadership goals at national level and
uncompromising military strategy. In fact the
victorious march of our forces into the capital of
East Pakistan, Dhaka, in a matter of only two
weeks was nothing short of an RMA. We fought a
manoeuvre war on ground avoiding bastions of
forward defence. The three services co-ordinated
smoothly, planned jointly and executed
harmoniously.
That was the reason that General Niazi and 93,000
Pakistani's surrendered meekly. That this victory
could not be translated into political advantage
is another story demanding a revolution in
political processing.
After this glorious victory we have been lulled to
sleep – or so it would seem. A long stretch of
peace has dulled our realisation that modern
technology can allow yet another RMA if it is
married to correct Doctrine and Tactics. Despite
this being proved repeatedly in the Gulf War in
1991; in Bosnia in 1995; in Kosovo in 1999 and
more recently in Afghanistan. Otherwise, how can
one justify the statement of Farook Abdullah,
Ex-Chief Minister of J&K "PM Sahib we have
suffered for 12 years – please do something" . Why
is it that after so many years of fire fighting in
J&K we see no light at the end of the tunnel?
Suggestions for
Exploiting RMA
A
review of the past must enable us to select a
correct mix of doctrine and strategy and
appropriate force structure for the future. To
exploit RMA we will have to address all the three
components of the RMA. That is, doctrinally we
must decide to use our Armed Forces in an optimum
mix of defence and offence. Defence at minimum
level to guard against likely threat in addition
to sufficient offensive capability to deter war
and win when forced into one. We cannot afford
liberal doses of both defence and offence even
when we are much better off economically. The easy
choice is to have a bit of each Service and its
components. The smart choice would be to tackle
the difficult question of which service/component
to have priority over the other.
We could also decide to
postpone deterrence capability for some years till
we are better off economically, as has been done
so deliberately by China with its four point
modernisation starting in 1978. This requires
debate and deliberation at the highest as well as
widest level.
Technologically, we need to master all the
disciplines to contemporary cutting edge
standards. But it must be noted that, even if we
had the requisite brainpower, it would have to be
supported by tremendous amounts of R&D. This R&D
too, needs to be focussed and accountable to end
users. It cannot be left to the scientist alone.
We need to select technologies which will be
essential in tomorrow's wars. And we need to adapt
the technologies that we are good in to the needs
of warfare. Today, software is at the heart of all
marvels of science and technology. Can we utilise
this expertise in software for our military needs?
This would require a national effort. Good tactics
can only evolve from realistic training. We need
to do a critical examination of how we train. We
need to move away from the tactics of attrition
warfare to tactics with least attrition and yet
enabling military objectives. This is most
applicable in air warfare. In air war, each combat
sortie is akin to a battle on the ground. While in
short wars, a few surface units indulge in more
than one battle, in air war each aircraft and
pilot fights many battles each day. If he loses a
battle, he is virtually ruled out for the rest of
the war.
I
would prioritise sensors, processors and their
communication network as one important field.
These form the heart of aircraft, UAVs, space
vehicles and other networks of warfare. Their
integration demands most complex software. Ability
to secure them along with the ability to attack
the adversaries’ system is again a function of
software – though of a specialist kind. As
we march into the millennium, India is well placed
to harness the three components of RMA to realise
its dream of great power status. Whether it
translates this dream into reality shall depend
squarely on the shoulders of our leadership at all
levels.
What a society gets
in its armed services is exactly what it asks for,
no more and no less. What it asks for tends to be
a reflection of what it is. When a country looks
at its fighting forces, it looks in a mirror - the
face that it sees there will be its own.
-General Sir John
Hackett
End Notes
1. Tipu Sultan was the
first one to use rockets for attacks on the enemy.
Yet this invention remained undeveloped
technically and not used by others in India at all
for centuries. Similarly, in most of the battles
of Indian kings against the East India Company,
the Indian kings had better and larger numbers of
cannons and soldiers. Yet the Indians lost all the
battles.
2. O'Hanlon Michael, "Technological
Change and the Future of Warfare", Brookings
Institution Press, Washington DC 2000 p 24.
3. Ibid pg.9
4. In the mere six
days of war, Israel fought the forces of Egypt,
Jordan, Syria and Iraq. Israeli casualties were
778 killed, 2,586 wounded. 211 tanks out of 800
were totally destroyed and many more were damaged.
It lost 48 aircraft out of 240 or so. But Arab
casualties were about 19,000 killed, 6,000 plus
POWs, 1,000 plus tanks destroyed/captured, 800
plus guns destroyed/captured, 10,000 plus trucks
and vehicles destroyed/captured. In addition, the
Arabs lost a large chunk of territory in Sinai,
West Bank, Gaza strip and Golan Heights.
5. In relatively modern
times, the following RMAs have been listed by
James Adams in his book, - "The Next World War
- Computers are the Weapons and the Frontline is
everywhere". P 56.
(a) 1340 AD - Bow.
(b) 1420 AD -
Artillery replaces Siege Warfare.
(c) 1600 AD - Artillery on ships.
(d) 1600 AD - Muskets.
(e)
1800 AD - Modern army with rationalised equipment
and staff system.
(f) 1850 - Naval
Revolution, metal hulls, steam turbine, submarine,
torpedo.
(g) 1860 - Railroad and
telegraph enable mobility and
communications. Rifling and
machining of guns.
(h) 1917 - Tanks.
(j) 1915-16 - Carrier aviation.
(k) 1920 - Strategic
bombing.
(l) 1945 - Nuclear
weapons.
6. Tiwary AK, "Attrition
in Air Warfare" Lancer Publishers, New Delhi,
2000, p 13. In World War I, 10
million were killed and 21 million
wounded.
7. Edgar O'Ballance, "The
Third Arab-Israeli War", Faber and Faber,
London. 1972, pp 35-170.
8. Jackson AV William, "History
of India" Asia Education Services, New Delhi,
Reprint 1987, p - 67.
9. Mason Philip, "A Matter of Honour - An Account
of the Indian Army, Its Officers & Men", EDB
Educational Private Limited, Dehradun, India,
1988, p. 40.
10. Ibid. p. 49
11. Jackson. Op. Cit p
289.
12. Nirmal Anjali, "The
Decisive Battles of Indian History." Pointer
Publisher, Jaipur,
1999, p 2.
13. Bhagwat Vishnu,
Admiral (Retd) "Betrayal of the Defence Forces"
Manas Publications, New Delhi,
2001, p 327
14. Omissi David, "The
Sepoy and the Raj - The Indian Army 1860-1940",
Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1994, p 80.
15.
Naipaul VS, "India: A
Wounded Civilisation"
Penguin Books, England, 1977, p 134.
16. Sundarji K
(General), "Of some consequences - A Soldier
Remembers." Harper Collins, India, 2000, p-117
17. Mason Op Cit. P 498
18. Tanham George K. "Securing
India - Strategic Thought and Practice" Editor
- Kanti P Bajpai & Amitabh Matoo, Manohar Press,
New Delhi, 1996, p. 91.
19. Tanham Op cit. p 95
20. The Hindu, 02
Aug 02, p 13
21. Indian Express,
Pune Edition, 14 Dec 1993
22. Kaul TN, "A
Diplomat's Diary 1947-99", Macmillan, New
Delhi - 2000. Pp 73-82.
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