The May 30, 2003 news reports from Myanmar stated that Daw Ang Sang Suu Kyi was placed under "protective custody" after a scuffle in central Myanmar between Ang Sang Suu Kyi's NLD and USDA (Union Solidarity Development Association), a rival political group. The detention occurred on the eve of the visit of the UN Special Representative, Razali Ismail, to encourage progress toward political reform. As the story broke, verbal outrage was expressed by various media outlets echoing official stance and personal frustration. In sharp contrast, only a year and half ago, the same community reacted with blind optimism when Ang Sang Suu Kyi was released from house arrest. The keen observer notes that the responses by the world community seem to be nothing other than perfunctory overreactions. This style of response may even be counter-productive. To properly understand why the international community's responses are meaningless and even counter-productive one has to look at the circumstances of the release and the re-incarceration.

Ang Sang Suu Kyi was released when international labour organizations threatened to place sanctions if Myanmar did not move towards democracy. Therefore, in an attempt to placate irate international organizations the military regime released Ang Sang Suu Kyi. The release occurred without any plan for substantive discussions. Yet, it was met with jubilation by the world community. It could be said that the SPDC's gambit worked and helped the Myanmar junta deflect international pressure and sanctions. Over the next year and a half, the junta allowed her to roam the country and meet social and religious leaders. However, no official talks occurred between the military and the NLD. In an interview, the UN Special Envoy, Razali Ismail, expressed surprise at the prolonged delay in discussions. The overreaction and naïve optimism expressed by the international media sent the message to Myanmar's leaders that cosmetic changes are sufficient to mollify the international community.

Overreactions aside, the international community has muddied the waters when it comes to Myanmar. Statements urging Myanmar towards democracy are issued by UN representatives and neighbours who have stakes in the status quo. The prime example is that of UN Special Envoy to Myanmar, Razali Ismail, a distinguished diplomat. It was reported in August of 2002 that Iris Technology, a Malaysian info tech company, signed a contract with Myanmar for imbedding microchips in 5,000 passports. The crux of the conflict of interest is that Razali Ismail owns 30% of Iris Technology. The SPDC must certainly be aware of Razali's business involvements and at the very least this transaction has created the appearance of impropriety. The entanglements don't stop there. Ambassador Razali Ismail expressed disappointment with ASEAN leaders over their lack of encouragement about talks between the SPDC and Ang Sang Suu Kyi. Ironically, Ismail has praised the Malaysian Prime Minister's commitment to Myanmar's political reform, despite his flouting of similar commitments at home. Ambassador Razali as a career diplomat has close ties to Dr. Mahathir Mohammed and is known to discuss his UN appointed role with his long time friend.

Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed built his political reputation on the economic success of Malaysia. He has close ties to business interests and Malaysian business interest is synonymous with his interest. Malaysia is Myanmar's fourth largest trading partner and second only to Singapore in the region. He even has personal ties to Myanmar through his son, Mirizan Mohammed, who runs a shipping company seeking to increase its presence in Myanmar. The critical moment came in 2002 when Mahathir, a long time vocal champion of democracy in Myanmar, sought to visit the country. It was hyped as a landmark and historic visit because of his scheduled meeting with Ang San Suu Kyi. He was accompanied by a 300 member strong delegation of businessmen and officials who signed a significant number of business accords. The result of the visit was success for the business interactions; however, the SPDC did not allow Mahathir to meet Ang San Suu Kyi. Since then, Mahathir has tempered his stance and now encourages a careful return to democracy.

The failure of the international community to encourage Myanmar to move towards political reform is due to several factors. One is the icon worship of Ang San Suu Kyi and the international media's over interpretation of the slightest event regarding her status. Her release and arrest caused mass hysteria. The euphoria at her release was precisely the response the SPDC expected and used to deflect pressure form international labour organizations. It would be interesting to note if the SPDC will release Ang Sang Suu Kyi if international pressure is again brought to bear. Once again, we might expect to watch the hysterics of the media announcing "significant progress" with much amusement. Instead of being involved in these histrionics, the international media would do better to focus on significant dialogue that takes place between her and the SPDC. This would be a better indicator of moves toward political reform.

Another factor is the failure to recognize the money trail in Myanmar. In a radical shift from the Ne Win era, the current leadership is open to international investment. The foreign investments in Myanmar are controlled by the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEH), a Tatmadwa (Burmese Military) owned corporation. Therefore, any foreign business investment in Myanmar is an investment in the current government. Once business and countries invest in Myanmar, they are left with little choice except to support the status quo. The alternative is to support a change in government and face uncertainty or, worse, loss of the investment. The SPDC is fully aware of this and can therefore successfully court businesses and simultaneously deny Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed, Ambassador Razali Ismail and others access to Ang Sang Suu Kyi. The repeated release and arrest of Ang Sang Suu Kyi also has a desirable domestic effect for the SPDC. It has been able to successfully send the message to the NLD that Ang San Suu Kyi is the reason for the lack of negotiations. After the May 2003 detention, Harn Yawnghwe, a Shan member of the exiled government, has started to examine dialogue paths besides Ang Sang Suu Kyi. This is a significant development which could potentially lead to a greater splintering of the pro-democracy forces in Myanmar possibly along ethnic lines and weaken the movement as a whole.

Overall, Myanmar's politically astute generals have been able to get exactly what they wanted and give up nothing in return. Domestically, they have caused fissures in the NLD coalition. Internationally, those who have sought to encourage political reform in Myanmar through sanctions are being gradually superseded by those who fell into the honey trap of lucrative investments that are designed to support the current regime. This is a failure of the carrot and stick policy because it is difficult, if not impossible, for countries with investments in Myanmar to pressurize change when that change could directly harm their business interests. Myanmar's military regime has turned the carrot and stick policy turned on its head.